OBJECTIVES FOR BURMA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 150762

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: OBJECTIVES FOR BURMA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Classified By: IO Acting A/S James Warlick, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and Action Request - Department requests USUN
share with the UK and French missions U.S. comments on the
papers that each mission shared with USUN regarding
short-term and long-term benchmarks for the Burmese regime,s
cooperation with UN Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari.

OBJECTIVES
--------------


2. (C) Department requests USUN to pursue the following
objectives:

-- Share with the UK and French missions the papers in para 3
and 4 below, which reflect Department comments to papers
shared by each mission with USUN;

-- Encourage France and the UK to share with Gambari,s
office the French-drafted short-term benchmarks paper with
U.S. comments (per para 3);

-- Express our concern that the UK-drafted, long-term
benchmarks paper guide next steps among the P3 but not be
shared with others. The benchmarks in Part 1 can be
extracted and shared as envisioned in the UK paper with
Gambari after his return from Burma;

-- Seek more information from Gambari,s staff and/or others
on the reference in the French-drafted paper to the two
commissions he has proposed, one on poverty alleviation and
the other for a constitutional review.

-- Emphasize to France, UK, and Gambari,s staff that
creation of a poverty alleviation commission should not
substitute for or precede action on a political dialogue and
release of political prisoners, and that any such proposal to
the Burmese must be tied to progress toward a democratic
transition; and,

-- Seek clarification on types of international assistance
that France and the UK are contemplating in the event that
Gambari is able to make significant progress during his
upcoming visit (see third para from the end in Part One of
the UK-drafted paper below).

FRENCH DRAFTED PAPER
--------------


3. (SBU) Begin text of the edited version of the
French-drafted paper on short-term benchmarks for the Burmese
regime,s cooperation with Gambari,s mission:

Benchmarks for first stage success of Gambari mission:

The Security Council in its 11 October Statement
(PRST/2007/137) has spelled out clear expectations:
-- &Full cooperation with Mr. Gambari by the government of
Myanmar and all parties concerned;8

-- &Early release of all political prisoners and remaining
detainees;8

-- Measures &towards a de-escalation of the situation;8

-- Launching of a &genuine dialogue with ASSK and all
concerned parties and ethnic groups;8

-- &Consider seriously Mr. Gambari,s recommendations and
proposals.8

First steps to address those expectations should be, notably,
immediate or short-term progress on the following points:

(1) A meaningful program with full access for Mr. Gambari to
all relevant interlocutors:

a) Mr. Gambari allowed quick entry to Burma and conducts
multiple unimpeded meetings with ASSK, Than Shwe, Aung Kyi,
democracy activists, ethnic minorities and other stakeholders
to establish inclusive dialogue.

b) Mr. Gambari is permitted to remain in the country for as
long as he requires and has control of his own schedule.

c) Mr. Gambari is permitted unrestricted movement in Burma to
conduct his good offices mission.

d) Mr. Gambari is allowed to visit any prisoners requested.

e) Mr. Gambari is given unrestricted re-entry for continuing
engagement.

(2) &Concrete actions and tangible results8 for Gambari's
mission (Note: The P3 will need to clarify the time-frame in
which we expect the actions below to occur):

f) Unconditional release of ASSK and other political
prisoners and recent detainees whose participation in an
inclusive dialogue would be critical (e.g. ethnic minority
leaders, National League for Democracy members, 88 Generation
Students). (Note: Short of unconditional release, relaxation
of the terms of confinement for ASSK and others so that they
can consult with political colleagues and associates could be
an acceptable short-term measure, but only if ASSK endorses
this arrangement.)

g) Public commitment by the authorities to an inclusive
dialogue with ASSK, NLD and ethnic groups, and other
democracy activists. First session of substantive
discussions between ASSK and the authorities.
h) UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Pinheiro given
unrestricted access to prisoners and ability to fulfill his
mandate according to his own terms during his visit to Burma.

i) Agreement to allow ICRC or other independent organizations
access to determine numbers of detainees, location, condition
and family visiting rights.

j) Releases of prominent political prisoners and recent
detainees.

k) Other &de-escalatiQ measures8 such as cessation of
politically-motivated arrests, information on missing
persons, investigation of human rights violations.

l) Progress in obtaining access of humanitarian assistance
organizations to all persons in need throughout the country.

End of French text.

UK-DRAFTED PAPER
--------------


4. (SBU) Begin text of edited version of UK-drafted paper on
long-term benchmarks for the Burmese regime,s cooperation
with Gambari:

P3 DISCUSSION PAPER ON BURMA AND NEXT STEPS

This non-paper explores action the UNSC might contemplate on
Burma, depending on progress or lack of it in the Gambari
process over the next few months.

Part One of the paper concentrates on progress we want to see
in the next phase. We should communicate these benchmarks to
the UN and others with influence on Burma, e.g. China and
ASEAN states, while also telling them that if these steps
forward are not realized, the Council will need to consider
further action.

Part Two of the paper looks at possible elements/measures for
a UNSCR to encapsulate such further action.

PART ONE

-What we want to see in Burma:

--We want a genuine dialogue between the regime and the
opposition that results in an orderly transition to a more
inclusive, democratic government, without threatening either
the territorial integrity of the state or the stability of
the region.

--We want a demonstrable improvement in the human rights
situation.

--This does mean the release of all political prisoners as
part of the transition process. This does not mean external
toppling of the regime or dismantling of the army. As ASSK
recognizes, the army is part of the fabric of the nation.
She and the opposition have made clear their willingness to
work with the SPDC to achieve positive, stable and orderly
change. There is a recognition that the military will need to
be part of this process, but will eventually need to leave
the political stage, submit to civilian authority, and see
its role in the economy greatly reduced.

-The Process-

The UNSG,s good offices mission pursued by Gambari should
lead to a genuine, inclusive and continuing national
reconciliation dialogue with the clear objective of
transition to civilian, democratic rule.

Benchmarks for first stage success of Gambari mission:

-- a) Intermediary Aung Kyi holds first meeting/s with ASSK
prior to the return of Prof. Gambari and continuing
thereafter.

-- b) Gambari allowed entry quickly to Burma and meets ASSK,
Than Shwe and Aung Kyi, and also ethnic minorities and other
stakeholders for the dialogue.

-- c) Gambari is permitted to remain in the country for as
long as he requires and to meet with anyone requested, and is
given unrestricted re-entry for continuing engagement. A UN
office is established to support him, including an
independent representative in Rangoon, reporting directly to
Gambari.

-- d) Gambari allowed to visit prisoners and/or secures
agreement to ICRC-supervised or other independent access (not
Myanmar Red Cross or other government NGOs) to determine
numbers, location condition and family visiting rights.

-- e) Unconditional release of ASSK and other political
prisoners and recent detainees whose participation in an
inclusive dialogue would be critical (e.g. ethnic minority
leaders, National League for Democracy members, 88 Generation
Students). (Note: Short of unconditional release, relaxation
of the terms of confinement for ASSK and others so that they
can consult with political colleagues and associates could be
an acceptable short-term measure, but only if ASSK endorses
this arrangement.)

-- f) UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Pinheiro allowed
to visit Burma and given access to detainees and all
political actors requested. Regime must meet the
requirements laid out by the Special Representative to
fulfill his international mandate.

-- g) Agreement by the regime not to proceed with
constitution drafting until there is agreement on a way to
make the drafting process more inclusive.

-- h) Establishment and convening of a first session of a
formal mechanism for political dialogue to include
representatives, all authorized to negotiate, of the SPDC and
the opposition including ASSK, other opposition leaders and
ethnic minority representatives to agree on a framework for
the process, including an agenda agreed upon by all sides
that addresses both political and economic problems. (Note:
The UK has already submitted separately to the UN a non-paper
with a suggested framework and agenda. End note.)

-Timelines-

We should expect to achieve a) to g) by the end of 2007, and
h) in early 2008:

-- Action in the Council: what happens if the steps are taken?

-- Any proposals for action in the Council will need to be
judged against our assessment of the regime,s cooperation
with Gambari, or lack thereof, in the next few weeks,
including, crucially whether it initiates a dialogue and
allows Aung San Suu Kyi to consult freely with her
colleagues, and whether key parties in the dialogue,
including Aung San Suu Kyi, express satisfaction with the
process.

-- If he achieves significant progress on items (a) to (f)
above in his forthcoming visit, we could envisage a UNSC
reaction, welcoming the progress and looking forward to
further steps, e.g. first session of the dialogue, but also
calling for the release of all political prisoners and for
direct dialogue to continue, including agreement on timelines
for transition to an interim central government of national
unity.

(Note: We think it is premature to consider relaxation of
pressure and to engage in any substantive discussion about
possible assistance packages until the regime has clearly
demonstrated a serious intention to engage in an inclusive
dialogue and that that process is well underway (i.e. step h)
above.)

PART TWO: DRAFT UNSCR ELEMENTS

What happens if the steps are not taken in this time-frame?

If the P3 agrees that there has been no progress or
insufficient progress on a) to f),the P3 should discuss
circulating a draft UNSCR:

-- To express discontent with the failure to make
concessions/cooperate with Gambari,

-- To spell out the benchmarks of forward momentum that the
UNSC wants to see (as above),

-- To give a time-frame by which we would expect (a) to (f)
to be achieved,

-- To make clear that in the event of a) to f) not happening
within that time-frame, the UNSC will be obliged to introduce
measures.

Options for Measures:

(Note: Measures should be proportionate and commensurate
with the pressure required to persuade Burma to meet
conditions a) through f). These measures should be capable of
being suspended once the regime starts to make real progress
on a National Reconciliation process and reversible in the
event that the process reaches a positive conclusion.)

Chapter VII measures:

Embargo on arms and related material:

--Prohibition on technical training or assistance related to
the supply of arms and related material;
--Assets freeze on named members of the Burmese Government;
--Travel ban on named members of the Burmese Government;
--A Sanctions Committee established to investigate and report
to the UNSC any violations of the above;
--A Group of Experts established to support the Committee in
monitoring implementation of the measures.

Other measures:

--Encouraging/mandating UN Special Advisers and Special
Rapporteur to visit/report;
--Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into human rights
abuses and serious crimes.

Also for discussion: Call upon all states and international
financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for
grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the
Burmese Government except for humanitarian purposes.

--Call upon all States to cease all forms of government
support for trade and investment with and to Burma.

STRATEGY WITH UN PARTNERS:

After agreeing amongst themselves, the P3 should begin now to
discuss Part One of this paper, the benchmarks of first stage
success, with the UNSG/Gambari, and then, as appropriate,
should also set them out to the Chinese and Russians, the key
ASEAN members and the rest of the proposed Core Group.

The P3 internally should also start to discuss Part Two of
this paper, measures for a UNSCR, and agree amongst
themselves on priorities and also how much they think the
UNSC market might bear.

We should then discuss with other Core Group partners the
need for progress, e.g. by the end of the year, making it
clear that the next stage should those deadlines not be met
would be to introduce a UNSCR.

End UK text.
RICE