2007:COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 146856

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SUBJECT: 2007:COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 145633

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1. This message provides preparation guidance for
preparing the 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT).


2. We recommend that "Country Reports on Terrorism 2006"
be the starting point for this year's exercise. Per
reftel, the Department requests that posts draft narrative
submissions, as opposed to the itemized format used
through 2005, and that you post submissions on
intellipedia. Three examples of the kind of reporting we
seek are in paragraph 12.


3. Per reftel, for the 2007 CRT, we will not/not accept
Post submissions in the itemized format. Please note the
proper URL for setting up your passport account is:
https://passport.csp.sgov.gov/passport/servle t/Passport.
(In reftel, "gov" was misspelled as "goli". We regret any
confusion this may have caused.)


4. Posts' submissions must be UNCLASSIFIED. Although the
Department is authorized to provide a separate classified
supplement to its report to Congress, past reports were
unclassified. If posts find it necessary or useful to

SIPDIS
provide classified information or commentary, they should
classify such material separately by paragraph.


5. Each post is requested to report major political
developments or changes likely to have an impact on the
ability of terrorists to attack or operate in the relevant
country, including using it as a safe haven. We also ask
you to report changes or trends that emerge when comparing
local developments in terrorism/counterterrorism in 2007
versus 2006.


6. Submissions are due NLT December 21. Since the report
covers calendar year 2007, any significant developments
occurring after post submission should be addressed in an
addendum for submission during the first three weeks of

2008. Please note that The Department must transmit the
2007 report to Congress by April 28, 2008. Given the
necessary clearance and coordination processes, the
inflexible printing schedule, and the short lead time
between the end of the calendar year and the April 30
deadline for submission to Congress, we are under strict
time constraints to incorporate your contributions into a
product that is the definitive USG public document on
international terrorism.


7. Please note that 2007 preparation instructions for the
Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT),with any necessary
updates, are available on Intellipedia-S on CLASSNet as
part at the following link:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Country_Rep orts_on_Terro
rism_2007_Preparation_Instructions. These instructions are
also on the unclassified State Department intranet site:
http://intranet.state.gov, at the Directory tab under the
heading "Related Resources". Instructions include:

(a) legislation and mandated requirements;

(b) a 2007 CRT requirements checklist;

(c) style guidelines (voice, spelling, transitional
language, etc.) We urge you to review these guidelines,
because we can lose hours of time on continuity issues,
such as the spelling of al-Qaida, Hizballah,
counterterrorism (one word),and safe haven (two words).


8. The Department will depend on posts' contributions to
meet our requirements and will also work closely with the
National Counterterrorism Center to compile all requested
information. We ask Posts to consider four distinct (but
sometimes overlapping) categories of information:

-- General Assessment
-- Sanctuary (Safe Havens) Assessment
-- Terrorist Groups
-- Foreign Government Cooperation

Each post should review the description of each category
of information below to determine if last year's report
requires updating.


9. GENERAL ASSESSMENT. The annual Country Reports on
Terrorism (CRT) is required to include detailed

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assessments on each foreign country (a) in which acts of
international terrorism of major significance occurred;
(b) that is currently designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria); or
(c) that is otherwise determined by the Secretary to be
subject to the report.

(SBU/NOFORN) This should include:

--A review of the country's major counterterrorism
efforts. An analysis of trends in international terrorism
in each country, including changes in the technology
terrorists used, methods and targets of attack,
demographic information on terrorists, and other
appropriate information.

Only leadership steps taken in international fora need be
included. We include a matrix of which countries are
signatories to the thirteen international agreements and
protocols, so this information need not be included in
Post submission.

-- The response of the judicial system in each country
relating to terrorism affecting U.S. citizens or
facilities that have a significant impact on U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, including responses to
extradition requests.

-- Significant support, if any, for international
terrorism, and particularly to specific terrorist or
umbrella groups, to include:

a. political and financial support;
b. diplomatic support through diplomatic recognition and
diplomatic privileges;
c. providing safe haven to terrorists or terrorist groups
(i.e., groups actively engaged in international
terrorism);
d. providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance
in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or
terrorist groups;
e. positions (such as voting records) on matters relating
to terrorism in the UNGA and other international bodies.


10. SAFE HAVEN ASSESSMENTS. Please include detailed
assessments with respect to each foreign country being
used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist
organizations. These assessments should include:

-- The extent of knowledge by the government of the
country with respect to terrorist activities on the
territory of the country.

-- The actions of the country:
a. to eliminate any terrorist safe haven in its
territory,
b. to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and
c. to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in WMD
in and through the territory of the country.
Note: If safe haven does not apply to your country, there
is no need to state that.


11. INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. This
information should be updated in Chapter 6, "Foreign
Terrorist Organizations." This information could be
referenced, but not repeated, in your country narrative.


12. Please include information about activities that
occurred in 2007 of any terrorist group (i.e.,. any group
actively practicing, or which has significant subgroups
which practice, international terrorism) and any umbrella
group that is:

a. known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of
a U.S. citizen during the preceding five years;
b. known to have obtained or developed, or to have
attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass
destruction;
c. known to be financed by a designated state sponsor of
terrorism;
d. a designated foreign terrorist organization; or
e. a known terrorist group which the Secretary of State
believes should be included in the report.
f. Posts are invited to offer assessments of additional
groups they may recommend be subject to the report; where
appropriate we will make recommendations to S.


13. In the case of State Sponsors of Terrorism (Cuba,
Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea),this information
should include:

-- Significant financial support provided by foreign

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governments to those groups directly, or provided in
support of their activities;

-- Provisions of significant military or paramilitary
training or transfer of weapons by foreign governments to
those groups;

-- Provision of diplomatic recognition or privileges by
foreign governments to those groups;

-- Provision by foreign governments of safe haven from
prosecution to these groups or their members responsible
for the commission, attempt, or planning of an act of
international terrorism;


14. INFORMATION ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION. The
CRT should also include the following information
concerning each foreign country that the U.S. has sought
cooperation during the previous five years in the
investigation or prosecution of an act of international
terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests:

-- The extent to which the government of the country is
cooperating in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the
individual(s) responsible for the act.

--The extent to which the government of the country is
cooperating to prevent further acts of terrorism against
U.S. citizens in the country. (This information should
also be provided with respect to any foreign country from
whom the U.S. has sought cooperation in the previous five
years in the prevention of an act of international
terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests.)


15. Posts should also include important follow-up
information to major developments from prior years that
continued into 2005, including resolution or continuation
of terrorist prosecutions for acts committed in prior
reporting years.


16. It is important for all posts to draw a distinction
between host government actions aimed at suppressing
terrorist activity and those aimed at suppressing
legitimate political opposition or dissent. Posts should
also comment on the counterterrorism efforts of relevant
regional organizations and groupings for which they may be
responsible (e.g. OSCE, ASEAN, GCC, and others).


17. We provide the 2006 reports of Uzbekistan, the United
Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia as possible templates of the
kind of reporting we seek:

a. Uzbekistan
There remained a clear potential for Islamic extremism and
acts of international terrorism in Uzbekistan. Supporters
of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU),the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),and
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM),were active in
the region. Members of these groups expressed anti-U.S.
sentiments and have attacked U.S. interests in the past,
including a 2004 suicide bombing at the U.S. embassy in
Tashkent, which was clamed by the Islamic Jihad Group
(IJU),now the IJU. U.S. Government personnel and
facilities continued to operate at a heightened state of
alert.
The Government of Uzbekistan did not provide safe haven
for terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the
country's poor economic climate and repressive government
policies created conditions in which large portions of the
population were increasingly susceptible to extremist
ideologies. Uzbekistan's porous borders, particularly in
the Ferghana Valley, allowed for people and illicit goods
to move in and out of the country with relative freedom.
The government responded to these threats with even more
repressive actions against regime opponents and those it
deemed to be religious extremists. However, it failed to
address the conditions terrorists might exploit to gain
popular support and recruits for their cause. Although
Uzbekistan was among the first states to support U.S.
efforts in the War on Terror, the Government of Uzbekistan
ended virtually all counterterrorism cooperation with the
United States in mid-2005. In November 2005, the United
States fully vacated, at Uzbekistan's request, the Karshi-
Khanabad airbase. Authorization for U.S. aircraft to
overfly Uzbekistani territory ended in January 2006,
although an agreement was signed in November allowing
Department of Defense-contracted civilian aircraft to
overfly Uzbekistan on a fee-per-flight basis.
Tashkent hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's
(SCO) Regional Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS),
which claimed to have begun to focus on operational
activities such as developing a coordinated list of

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terrorist groups and facilitating joint counterterrorism
exercises among SCO member states. In the past, the
government participated in UNODC and OSCE programs aimed
at ensuring that it enacted appropriate terrorism
legislation. However, Uzbekistani participation in these
programs has virtually ended, and the government has made
little progress in this regard.
b. United Kingdom
There were no successful terrorist attacks in the United
Kingdom in 2006. In August, British, Pakistani, and
American officials worked together to disrupt a terror
plot involving British citizens intent on detonating
aircraft traveling between the United Kingdom and the
United States. The British government arrested over 20
individuals suspected of being involved in that plot, many
of whom were subsequently charged with criminal acts and
intent to carry out acts of terrorism. Their cases
remained before the courts. Some of those arrested had
spent time in or had ties to Pakistan. The British and
American governments instituted new restrictions to
transatlantic airline travel in response to the revealed
airline plot. The United States and United Kingdom enjoyed
a wide-range of bilateral information sharing on threat
assessments and terror networks, and government responses
to both. Cooperation in derailing the transatlantic terror
plot in August was evidence of the ability of the two
governments to work together, in real-time, to avert loss
of life from terrorism.
The British government acknowledged the existence of some
200 known terror networks in the United Kingdom. In
November, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the
domestic security service (known as MI5),made a stark
announcement that there were some "1,600" individuals,
"200 networks," and an estimated "30 terror plots" in the
United Kingdom. The British government viewed
radicalization of young people in the U.K. and elsewhere,
regardless of whether those radicalized in the U.K. had
ties to AQ or are "homegrown," as a growing threat to
international and British security.
The government enacted new counterterrorism legislation
that made the "glorification of terrorism" illegal, and
expanded the government's ability to detain terror
suspects before charging them. The government has a
mechanism for deporting foreign terror suspects to their
home countries once those countries agreed to provide
assurances that the suspects' human rights will not be
violated upon their return. The courts tried and convicted
several prominent terror suspects involved in terror plots
prior to 2006. The British government also increased its
efforts at outreach to Muslim communities within the U.K.
It sought to support advocates of moderate interpretations
of Islam and to gain support from within British Muslim
communities to counter the appeal of extremist ideology
and radicalization.
The United States and the U.K. worked closely within the
UN and the FATF to deny terrorists and their supporters
access to the international financial system. The United
Kingdom had strong legal provisions for freezing assets
related to terrorist financing, including the Terrorism
(United Nations Measures) Order 2001, the al-Qaida and
Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, and the
Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. In October, the
British government took measures to further strengthen its
terrorist financing legislation when Chancellor Gordon
Brown announced that Her Majesty's Treasury, on the advice
of law enforcement agencies, had agreed to use "closed
source evidence" (classified materials) in asset freezing
cases where there were strong operational reasons to
impose a freeze but insufficient unclassified information
available. He also announced that the government would
seek to amend its existing domestic legislation to give
"the Treasury the power to stop funds reaching anyone in
the U.K. suspected of planning terror or engaging with
terror."
c. Saudi Arabia
The Government of Saudi Arabia continued to experience a
mix of successes and setbacks in its efforts to combat
terrorism. Government security forces conducted successful
operations against terrorist cells, capturing or killing
large numbers of wanted terrorist suspects, as well as
members of their support networks. The government has made
some progress in other aspects of its counterterrorism
effort, such as financing and education, but it still has
significant ground to cover to address these issues.
Saudi efforts suffered setbacks with prison breaks and an
attack that led to the discovery of extensive support
networks in the Kingdom. Prison escapes occurred in March
at the al-Kharj prison and in July from al-Malaz jail in
Riyadh. On February 24, a Saudi-based AQ cell conducted a
suicide attack utilizing vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices on Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq oil
stabilization and processing facility near Dammam, which

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resulted in the death of two security guards and several
of the bombers.
Saudi security forces achieved several successes, both in
response to these attacks and independently of them. Saudi
security forces killed or captured all of the members of
the Abqaiq cell and all but three of the Maraz prison
escapees. On August 21, five wanted terrorists
surrendered in response to government assurances in the
media that they would receive mitigated sentences. In
December, the government announced the capture during the
previous three months of 136 suspected terrorists who were
involved in terrorist support networks in the Kingdom.
The Saudi government initiated several programs to support
its counterterrorism efforts and bolster its campaign
against extremists. King Abdullah created a special
security court, the Court of the Divergent, to prosecute
terrorist suspects. Interior Minister Prince Nayif gave
public assurances that the Court would not be a military
tribunal, but would conform to existing judicial practices
and law. Additionally, the government began planning a
border security system, including fences and sensors, to
prevent infiltration of terrorists or terrorist funding
into the kingdom. In December, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) summit reiterated its calls to criminalize
terrorism, and called for a comprehensive effort against
terrorism to include intellectual, social, and educational
efforts.
The Saudi government moved to monitor and enforce its
anti-money laundering and terrorist finance laws,
regulations, and guidelines. However, it still had not
established a High Commission for Charities. As in many
countries in the Middle East, there was still an over-
reliance on suspicious transaction reporting to generate
money laundering investigations. Saudi Arabia's
unwillingness to publicly disseminate statistics regarding
money laundering prosecutions impeded the evaluation and
design of enhancements to the judicial aspects of its
anti-money laundering system. The Saudi government did not
subject Saudi international charities to the same
government oversight as domestic charities. In August, the
UN 1267 Sanctions Committee designated the International
Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) branches in Indonesia
and the Philippines, and the Kingdom's Eastern Province
Branch Director, Abdulhamid Al-Mujil.
In late 2005, the government enacted stricter regulations
on the cross-border movement of money and precious metals.
Money and gold in excess of $16,000 must be declared upon
entry and exit from the country. While the regulations
were effective immediately, Customs has not issued new
cash declaration forms, and therefore has not yet been
able to enforce the current regulation. In the cultural
arena, official visits by a number of U.S. officials,
including Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom John Hanford, highlighted the government's efforts
to remove references in textbooks that called for violence
against non-Muslims and Muslims of different sects. The
government also initiated the National Campaign to Counter
Terrorism, which included publications, lectures, and
workshops intended to educate school-age girls and boys
about the evils of terrorism. To promote tolerance, the
government began revising curricula and teaching methods,
screening and reevaluating existing teachers, improving
selection of future teachers, and better monitoring of
teachers.
The government continued to require religious leaders to
attend courses designed to eradicate extremist ideology in
the mosques and monitor mosque sermons to promote
tolerance and eliminate extremism. Several religious
leaders were fired or subjected to punitive actions for
failure to abide by government instructions to avoid
provocative speeches against non-Muslims and non-Sunni
Muslims. In previous years in some mosques, a second
preacher would appear after the main preacher during the
Friday prayer and speak provocatively against Jews,
Americans, or non-orthodox Muslims. This practice is less
prevalent now, due in large part to the government's
efforts to combat extremism in the mosques.
The Saudi government remained engaged in its efforts to
root out terrorists and their support networks in the
Kingdom, but continued to face difficulties in combating
the appeal of AQ ideology. Despite significant efforts and
successes in the counterterrorism realm, Saudi security
forces continued to discover new terrorist networks in the
Kingdom. The Saudi government will need to further address
the social and religious underpinnings that sustain the
Saudi form of Islamic extremism.


18. Department greatly appreciates the volume of work that
goes into post contributions to this effort. S/CT is
prepared to respond to any and all questions posts may
have to assist in preparing their contributions. Please
forward all questions to S/CT Rhonda Shore at

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shorerh@state.sgov.gov. We are confident that thanks to
the information to be provided by posts, this year's
Country Reports on Terrorism will be the best effort yet
to explain the continuing threat.

19. Minimize considered.
RICE