Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE146225
2007-10-18 21:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 MEETING

Tags:  PREL PGOV OVIP SR YI KV 
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
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RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0000
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 146225 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP SR YI KV
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 MEETING
WITH SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA AT THE UNGA


Classified By: Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 146225

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP SR YI KV
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007 MEETING
WITH SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER KOSTUNICA AT THE UNGA


Classified By: Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Classified by: Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


2. (U) September 27, 2007; 1:00 PM; New York, NY


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
--------------
Under Secretary Burns
EUR DAS Rosemary DiCarlo
EUR/SCE David Schroeder (notetaker)

SERBIA
--------------
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica
Ambassador Ivan Vujacic
Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic
Alexander Nikitovic, Chief of Staff


4. (C) SUMMARY. In his meeting with U/S Burns, PM Kostunica
was unyielding and unchanged on Kosovo status stating that
Serbia would never agree to Kosovo,s independence.
Kostunica warned of &unpredictable consequences8 should
Kosovo make a unilateral declaration of independence. Burns
urged Kostunica to take advantage of the opportunity provided
by the Troika talks and expressed the USG,s determination to
work through this difficult period to maintain a strong and
productive relationship with Serbia. On NATO membership,
Kostunica said his party was against integration past the
Partnership for Peace stage, but that the Serbian people
would decide the issue in the future. On cooperation with
The Hague, Kostunica said that Serbia was doing all it could
to arrest Ratko Mladic and agreed with Burns that arresting
the PIFWC would bolster Serbia,s standing. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Kosovo
--------------


5. (C) Kostunica met U/S Burns following a meeting with the
Russians. He was in a relaxed and pleasant mood, but his
message on Kosovo was tough and unchanged. He asserted
(incorrectly) that there had been only two face to face talks
with the Kosovo Albanians in two years; it was the lack of
direct contact made compromise difficult. He repeated his
mantra that Serbia's proposal for autonomy would make the
Albanians the most privileged minority in the world and was
giving them 90 percent of what they wanted. He said only the

borders of a Serbia need to remain untouched. &Why not test
our proposal,8 Kostunica asked. He noted that "I know we'll
disagree" because Serbia's approach did not favor
independence for Kosovo.


6. (C) At several points, Kostunica complained that the
Albanians had not approached the Troika talks seriously,
because the USG had "promised them independence." He said
twice that "things would be different" had the USG told the
Albanians to "be more serious." He rhetorically questioned
why the international community would not embrace Serbia's
proposal which was in conformity with international law while
the Albanian position violated international law. He also
remarked that the consequences stemming from a unilateral
declaration of independence would extend beyond Kosovo and
affect "other countries and minorities.8


7. (C) Kostunica agreed with U/S Burns that partition of
Kosovo would not work. To the extent a positive note was
sounded, Kostunica said the Kosovars, recent offer of a
Treaty of Friendship was "quasi progress.8 But after
expressing doubt about the Kosovar Albanians, capacity to
keep their promise to support Ahtisaari-type protections for
Serbs, Kostunica said,"we will see who is right and who is
wrong."


8. (C) U/S Burns urged Kostunica to make the most of the
Troika talks over the next two months. He said Serbia should
consider having frequent high-level meetings with the
Kosovars because, no matter the outcome of the Troika talks,
the process would be beneficial in building trust and
familiarity between the sides -) they are neighbors after
all. Burns noted that the USG has repeatedly urged the
Kosovar Albanians to take the negotiations seriously for the
same reason. He added that we have told the Kosovar
Albanians -- in every meeting -- that they will be judged by
how safe Serbs in Kosovo feel. Burns said that the
supervised independence envisioned by the Ahtisaari plan
promotes the same objective. Similarly, the safety of all
ethnic groups was a priority for KFOR.


9. (C) U/S Burns expressed concern about rumors concerning

secession in northern Kosovo. All sides must avoid
provocative acts. Kostunica alleged that the Albanians had
never kept their word on protecting Serbs and that the
majority of Serbs in Kosovo lived in fear of Albanians. He
stated that Serbs who say they are not afraid have "strong
material interests" for wanting to stay or had other
interests with "corrupted UNMIK officials."

--------------
Bilateral Relationship and NATO
--------------



10. (C) U/S Burns stressed the USG commitment to a productive
long term relationship with Serbia, noting its importance to
the region and our strong economic ties. He added that the
coming months would be difficult but that the USG would try
hard to preserve the relationship during this difficult
period.


11. (C) Kostunica ignored the overture and said instead that
the USG should "rethink what is wrong with our proposal for
Kosovar autonomy. &If Kosovo became independent, there will
be consequences, maybe unpredictable ones, for sure," he
said. Kostunica commented that Albanians already had a state
and that a second Albanian state would cause regional
instability. He also claimed that that Serbia was much more
a democratic society than the Kosovar Albanians who, he said,
were rife with corruption and crime.


12. (C) When asked about Sebia's intentions regarding NATO,
Kostunica said that his party agreed to pursue PfP membership
but that Serbia should go no further than that because of the
NATO bombing in 1999 and the role of NATO in Kosovo. As for
future NATO membership, he and his party position were
presently opposed, but that "Serbs in Serbia will decide in a
proper way."


--------------
ICTY Cooperation
--------------


13. (C) U/S Burns stressed the importance of Serbian
cooperation on warcrimes and of arresting and transferring to
the ICTY remaining PIFWCs, especially Mladic and Karadzic.
Referring to the recent upholding of an acquittal decision of
an Albanian -- Fatmir Limaj -- Kostunica complained that
there were apparently two scales of justice in the Hague --
one for Serbs one for Albanians. He then said that Serbia's
policy was to cooperate with ICTY in any event and that his
government was doing "everything it could" to capture Mladic.
He maintained that there is no evidence Karadzic had ever
been in Serbia. Kostunica agreed with Burns that nothing
could do more for Serbia's international standing than a
Mladic arrest.
RICE