USG COMMENTS ON UNDPKO "CAPSTONE DOCTRINE"

UNCLAS STATE 145598

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN MARR
SUBJECT: USG COMMENTS ON UNDPKO "CAPSTONE DOCTRINE"

REF: MCCURRY/ODELL E-MAILS


1. (U) As part of its "peace operations 2010" reforms,
the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),
with the help of more than 250 international experts
meeting in workshops around the world, has developed a
document that sets out for practitioners the guiding
principles and core tasks of UN peacekeeping operations.
Once finalized, this document (the "Capstone Doctrine")
will be issued as a DPKO publication, and will replace the
1995 General Guidelines on United Nations Peacekeeping.



2. (U) Australia, Canada and Japan have all shared their
views with USUN and/or the Department of State (copies of
position papers/comments provided to country desks),and
we understand that the five largest troop-contributing
countries met this summer to seek a common position. DPKO
staff working on this paper hope to present a final draft
to DPKO management on October 22. USUN may give the text
in paragraph 3 to DPKO and to other delegations as needed,
for use in discussions, on the understanding that it be
treated with discretion.

3.(U) U.S. Comments on the Draft UN Peacekeeping Capstone
Doctrine:

Overview

The U.S. commends the work that has gone into this
generally excellent document. This will provide an
invaluable tool for peacekeepers and policy makers. It
reflects the substantial growth in the size, number and
mandated tasks of UN peacekeeping operations in the 21st
century. Missions are now being asked to lay the
groundwork for sustainable peace, rather than simply to
monitor and support the early stages of a cease-fire and
peace agreement.

That said, we believe the document would benefit from more
precision in its definition of terms and of how it
addresses the range of activities required to move from
conflict to stability and even prosperity. Most notably,
it blurs the Security Council's primacy in determining when
peacekeeping missions are needed and what their mandates
should be.

The charts and illustrative figures as we received them
are confusing and not well-executed.

We would like the opportunity to review Annex 2 (list of
current mandated tasks) and Annex 3 (Legal Framework for
UN Peacekeeping Operations) before the document is
finalized.


Introduction and Chapter 1: These segments are a useful,
concise overview of the changing international
environment.

Chapter The Spectrum of Peace Operations: The
definitions provided here are increasingly artificial,
with considerable overlap and not much added value.
Although the distinction between "peacekeeping" and "peace
enforcement" is sometimes used as a form of shorthand, it
is not particularly useful or meaningful in the UN
context, and the Security Council does not make such
distinctions when establishing the mandates of
peacekeeping operations. A more useful distinction that
could use discussion or clarification in the text is the
difference between UN political missions and peacekeeping
operations. We are not clear what is meant
by "positive" peace (paragraph 28). We recommend
mentioning the contribution of bilateral donors and the
growing body of expertise among donors, governments and
beneficiary countries on peacebuilding. The document very
usefully notes the increasing degree to which the various
elements of peace operations overlap in practice.

Chapter 3: The Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations: This
is generally clear and helpful. However, it should make
clear (paragraph 36) that, while the Secretary-General
recommends modifications to mandate, size and other
factors 'affecting an operation, it is the Members of the
Security Council that negotiate and authorize them.
Further, the Security Council can and does take steps
without any recommendations from the Secretary-General, and
is free to reject or accept his proposals. In para 36, we
note that mandate renewal discussions are another
Opportunity to make modifications to mandate, personnel
strength, structure or other aspects of a UN peacekeeping
operation. We recommend (paragraph 38) that the report
refer to the restructuring of the "security" forces, not
the "armed" forces (to include such elements as the
police),and that it specify "management" as well as
"distribution" of natural resources. In paragraph 40, we
recommend that the report include a specific reference to
the particular vulnerability of women and children. It
should be noted that the complicating effects of human
rights abuses on efforts to achieve national
reconciliation include both psychological and legal
problems, as well as social disruption. Paragraph 42
should be amended to read "..better match of capabilities
to mission requirements and better division of
responsibilities between and coordination among7
the various actors involved in responding to post-conflict
situations.

We have some concerns about how the draft document
describes the core business of UN peacekeeping
operations. Specifically, we do not necessarily agree
that UN peacekeeping operations should remain "..until the
State is able to assume full responsibility for the
security of its populations." Each scenario and country
situation may be different. In general UN peacekeepers
should maintain a secure and stable environment while
resources are mustered, plans are developed, and the
groundwork is laid for the State to resume full
administration of state functions, including the provision
of security.

Paragraph 49 is overly broad in its characterization of
the legal responsibilities of UN entities. We of course
agree that UN entities (personnel, agencies, and so on)
should respect and promote human rights. We are
uncertain, however, of the source of the asserted
"individual responsibility" of peacekeeping personnel "to
protect, promote and advocate for human rights", and of
the basis on which individual peacekeeping personnel (as
opposed to States) are "bound" by international human
rights law. We would urge that this paragraph be revised
to indicate that applicable standards for peacekeepers'
conduct in relation to human rights arise from UN policies
rather than from specific requirements under international
law. Similarly, we note that the assertion that all
peacekeeping personnel "are bound by international human
rights law" may be overly broad, in particular because it
fails to take account of the potential applicability of
other bodies of law, including international humanitarian
law, that may serve as the lex specialis in particular
circumstances and may affect the applicability of
provisions of human rights law. We expect that these
issues may be addressed in greater detail in Annex 3 to
the Capstone Document, addressing the legal framework for
United Nations peacekeeping operations, and we would
welcome the opportunity to review and comment on this
Annex.

Peacekeeping is not a substitute for development
assistance. We welcome the statement in paragraph 54
underlining that UN peacekeeping operations are neither
mandated nor have the resources to engage in long-term
peacebuilding. Similarly, the discussion in paragraphs 55
and 56 of UN peacekeeping operations serving a "catalytic"
role and "laying the foundations" for subsequent
peacebuilding are to the point. The U.S. also agrees,
strongly, that resources should be adequate to the
mandated tasks (paragraph 56); in our view, there has been
an increasing tendency in recent years to add tasks for
which the resources (human, technical/logistic or
financial) may not be available. This point cannot be
overly stressed. While the draft document
is very.clear about the distinction between peacekeeping
and development, as it progresses there are a number of
instances where that distinction becomes blurred. For'

instance, it should be made clear (paragraph 58 and
paragraph 59) that support by the peacekeeping operation
for economic reforms or humanitarian assistance will be
provided if the Security Council has mandated such
support.

In a similar vein, peacekeeping resources are not to be
used to provide material forms of assistance (e.g. goods,
consumables, money) to the host country. We do not fully
understand the scope of the "Quick Impact Projects"
discussed in the box following paragraph 59 and are
concerned by the suggestion that UN peacekeeping *
operations may have some general authority to provide "
financial support" to hOst country institutions funded
from assessed peacekeeping contributions. We would urge
that this discussion be revised to reflect the principle
that funding for material assistance to host country
institutions must come from traditional aid sources and
not from the budgets of peacekeeping operations.
Traditional aid sources must then become more flexible and
rapid in responding to the myriad tasks and requirements of
early stages of an operation. To that end, we continue to
support the concept of the use of
"Quick Impact Projects" in the earlier stages of an
operation to facilitate good relations between units and
the communities in which they are working, and to support
overall mission objectives.

Chapter 4: Guiding Principles of UN Peacekeeping
Operations: The distinction made in the proposed
amplified and longer list of "guiding principles" between
"credibility" and "legitimacy" is obscure and provides no
added value. We recommend that the discussion of
"legitimacy" be removed; if the Security Council has
mandated the mission, it is by definition "legitimate."
Its effectiveness and impartiality will determine its
credibility. We continue to have concerns about the lack
of clarity and possibility for confusion posed by the word
"consent." The discussion in the Australian paper is very
useful on this issue. "Consent" is a complex concept, it
may be coerced under certain circumstances, and may be
present at the political level but not fully present in a
given situation in the field. We support the Australian
recommendation that the document avoid too much
specificity about who is giving consent, since any given
conflict or political situation will contain variables
that do not meet the model, and those variables are likely
to change. It is also important to underscore that the
Security Council, consistent with its authority under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, retains the option of
authorizing a UN mission even in the absence of the
consent of the host country. "Restraint in the use of
force" is a useful formulation, and allows for a gradation
of responses in accordance with the mandate, rules of
engagement, and operational realities. We welcome the
statement that "the use of force always has political
implications." We note that, as drafted, the discussion
of use of force issues may suggest limits on the authority
of peacekeepers to use force in situations of armed
conflict that are not required by international
humanitarian law. To the extent that it is UN policy to
impose such limits on peacekeepers' actions for policy,
rather than legal, reasons, we suggest that the discussion
be revised to make this clear.

Chapter 5: Deciding to Deploy a UN Peacekeeping
Operation: We underline (paragraph 84.) that the Security
Council determines not only when and where a UN
peacekeeping operation should be deployed, but also what
its mandate should be. Overall, the discussion of the
conditions needed for success is'excellent.

Chapter 6: Planning a UN Peacekeeping Operation: This
section quite properly focuses on the critical role played
by good planning and long-term thinking about subsequent
priorities during stabilization. However, trying to draw
sharp distinctions between phases of an operation is
perhaps less useful than speaking of-priorities and how
they may change as a situation becomes more stable.
Focusing on priorities also allows identification of other
means to achieve political or security stability, such as
through a UN political mission.

Chapter 7; Directing and Supporting UN Peacekeeping
Operations: We found the direct acknowledgment (paragraph
118) that levels of authority in UN peacekeeping
operations are not as clear as they are in military
organizations to be to the point and helpful. It should
be made clear in-paragraph 120, as it is later in the
document, that the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General has authority in country to direct the

SIPDIS
other UN agencies. Also useful is the discussion in
section 7.2, on UN Logistics and Administrative Support,
of the possible need to shift focus and resources among
changing priorities as circumstances changes, and of how
the budget cycle may not be able to respond rapidly to
short-term needs. We welcome the particular attention
called (section 7.4) to the security needs of UN
international and national staff.

Chapter 8: Management and Integration of UN Peacekeeping
Operations: This is an excellent exposition. The
description in this section of the need to work in and
across a variety of national and organizational cultures
is succinct, clear and helpful, and underlines how
problems in this area can undermine the success of a


mission.

Chapter 9: Maintaining the Support of the Host
Population: Another practical, clear section, with
useful, concrete examples. We would welcome further
discussion with the Secretariat of the issues related to
welfare of uniformed personnel and civilian staff raised
in, paragraph 161.
RICE