(U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH'S SEPTEMBER 28,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 138346

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS KPKO XI UN
SUBJECT: (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH'S SEPTEMBER 28,
2007 MEETING WITH MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BENAISSA

Classified By: NEA A/S David Welch. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) September 28, 2007, 3:00 p.m., New York.


2. (U) Participants:

United States
A/S David Welch, NEA
Randall Kaailau, NEA/MAG (note taker)

Morocco
FM Mohamed Benaissa
Amb. El Mustafa Sahel, Ambassador to the United Nations
Amb. Youssef Amrani, DG of Bilateral Relations
Mr. Nasser Bourita, Dir., Int'l Org. Directorate


3. (SBU) Summary: On September 28, Assistant Secretary Welch
and Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa discussed the
Middle East peace process, terrorism in the Maghreb, and next
steps on the Western Sahara. End Summary.

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Middle East Peace Process
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4. (S) Benaissa expressed interest in preparations for the
upcoming international meeting on the Middle East, asking
whether the Saudis had received enough assurances to secure
their attendance and what role Hamas would play. Welch said
that the Saudis wanted more information on the timetable and
would push for President Bush to play a role. He noted the
Hamas leadership's tenuous control over its people and
suggested they might become spoilers if the conference
succeeds in constructing a plan that provides real benefits
to the Palestinians.


5. (S) Regarding the Israelis, Benaissa stressed that peace
could not be discussed unless the spread of settlements was
halted. He related that Foreign Minister Livni had told him
that she was ready to do so, but could not cease construction
of the security barrier. Welch assured Benaissa that the
United States considered the settlement issue to be part of
Israel's roadmap obligations, while we would press the
Palestinians to continue dismantling terrorist
infrastructure. Benaissa confirmed the Moroccan King's
commitment to the peace process and his desire to be helpful
in any way that would be acceptable to the Palestinian people.

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Responding to Terrorism in the Maghreb
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6. (C) Benaissa said the Government of Morocco (GOM) is
"deeply concerned" about terrorism in the region, which had
spread to Libya and Tunisia, and said he felt the Tunisians
"understated" their problem. He said that as a result of the
GOM's increased alert level last summer, civilians had begun
reporting suspicious activities to Moroccan authorities for
the first time. He attributed the outcome to the new era in
transparency ushered in by the King, where wrongdoing of all
kinds was exposed on television, so that "everyone became a
policeman" in Morocco.


7. (C) Algeria was not as fortunate with public vigilance,
Benaissa noted, but letters the King sent to the Algerian
Prime Minister after the recent bombings demonstrated
Morocco's willingness to open the door to cooperate in the
fight against terrorism. However, Benaissa concluded that
"what needs to be done is to see progress toward peace." He
said that President Bush's UNGA remarks about "a world where
Israel and Palestine exist side-by-side," represented a
positive step. Additional steps, even those less tangible
and more symbolic, would have a positive effect not only in
fighting terrorism, but also in reducing conflict in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia.

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Morocco's next steps on the Western Sahara
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8. (C) Welch noted that Britain, France and Spain appear to

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be inclined to support new wording in the Security Council
resolution on MINURSO at the end of October, but expressed
uncertainty about the prospects for passage of a resolution
stating that the Moroccan proposal should be "the basis for
negotiations." He said Spain would want to support the
principle of self-determination, which Benaissa ascribed to
the fact that Spain will have elections next year. Benaissa
said that the Polisario had succeeded in making the Western
Sahara a central Spanish political issue before the Zapatero
government realized it. At the same time, the government
understands it has equities in Morocco. Benaissa opined that
Spain would need a push from the United States before
agreeing to a resolution that more strongly supports the
Moroccan proposal. Welch said that the United States would
begin pushing its friends within the next two weeks.


9. (C) Benaissa said that the GOM would lobby for a process
based on UNSCR 1754, and added that the GOM does not want an
Algerian-penned resolution referencing the Baker plan to be
put forth in the UNGA Fourth Committee. He considered such
an effort an Algerian "game" with which the rest of the
international community was tired. He claimed that one of
his EU counterparts stated that if such language came to a
vote in the Fourth Committee, the EU would abstain.


10. (C) Benaissa mentioned that he had met with the UN
Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter

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Van Walsum for about an hour. Van Walsum expressed his
belief that the Algerians were "on top" of their efforts and
that one day the international community would insist that
there will be no solution without Algeria at the table.
Benaissa said he admired Van Walsum's frankness.


11. (C) Van Walsum also asked the GOM to commit to a date and
venue for the next round of talks. Benaissa said that first
the new Moroccan government would have to be formed (in about
two weeks),the government would have to produce a strategy
for the next round, and then Parliament would have to approve
it. Benaissa stated that since the Polisario was holding its
party conference in December, he did not feel rushed to
specify a date. Nevertheless, he said, Morocco is still
committed to continued talks, and would be patient despite
any obstacles.
RICE