(S) DEMARCH REQUEST: POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 134596

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PGOV MASS TH IR
SUBJECT: (S) DEMARCH REQUEST: POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF
AN/PRC-77 RADIOS TO IRAN

Classified By: Acting DAS Kevin O'Keefe for reasons 1.4(b) and (c)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Paragraph 2.

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Objective
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2. (S) Prevent the Government of Thailand (GOT) from
transferring -- temporarily or otherwise -- to Iran AN/PRC-77
radios for upgrading. Avert a potential violation of UNSCR
1747, which prohibits the export to Iran of military
equipment. Alert Thailand a Thai entity may be in danger of
violating the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA) and becoming subject to USG sanctions. If a
transfer has already occurred, attempt to obtain the details
of the transfer, i.e. how many radios were transferred and
when the transfer occurred. Department requests that Post do
so by discussing background information included below at
highest appropriate levels within the GOT.

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Background
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3. (S) The Department has received credible information
indicating a Thai firm, General Comtech Ltd. (No 186 Chareon
Krung 36, Chareon Krung Road, Bangrak, Bangkok),may be
attempting to arrange for an Iranian firm to carry out a
major upgrade of the US-origin AN/PRC-77 radios of Thailand's
armed forces. This upgrade, if carried out, may violate
Thailand's end-use and re-transfer assurances regarding
US-origin military equipment.


4. (S//REL THAILAND) Under the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),the President is required to
provide a semi-annual report to Congress identifying foreign
entities about which we have "credible information" that
indicates the entity transferred to or acquired from Iran,
North Korea, or Syria: a) equipment and technology listed on
multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical
Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime,
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement); b) items of
the same kind as those on multilateral lists, but falling
below the control list parameters (when it is determined that
such items have the potential of making a material
contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems);
c) other items with the potential of making such material
contributions; or d) items on U.S. national control lists for
WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists.
Because the AN/PRC-77 radio is controlled under the Wassenaar
Arrangement, the t
ransfer of this technology could subject the recipient to
INKSNA sanctions. We want to alert the Thai authorities to
the implications under U.S. law of this possible transfer to
Iran, and work with them to prevent any further violations
that could negatively impact U.S.-Thailand security
cooperation.


5. (U) Although the Department has not been able to identify
precisely the mechanism pursuant to which the GOT originally
acquired these radios, the relevant authority is likely found
in the Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, or their predecessor acts. Pursuant to these acts,
prior to the sale or grant of defense articles from the USG
to a foreign government, that government must agree to obtain
the authorization of the Department before any retransfer.
Similar requirements apply with respect to defense articles
procured via direct commercial sales.


6. (S//REL THAILAND) As required by law, the Department
reported to Congress on previous violations by the GOT of its
end-use, security and retransfer obligations. Violations
include unauthorized upgrades of F-5 aircraft by an Israeli
private entity, and the transfer of F-100 engines and
components to companies in Israel, Singapore and the Republic
of Korea. The Department may be required to report to
Congress if the GOT transfers these radios to Iran, making it
important to know whether a transfer - even temporary - of
these radios has occurred and which entities were involved.
Support for the GOT in Congress is already strained by
Thailand's 2006 military coup. Any violations of retransfer
assurances could further degrade this support for the GOT.


7. (S//REL THAILAND) The following text has been cleared for
release to Thailand at the SECRET level and should be used

STATE 00134596 002 OF 002


verbatim:

-- (S//REL THAILAND) We have information that the firm
General Comtech Ltd. (No 186 Chareon Krung 36, Chareon Krung
Road, Bangrak, Bangkok) was attempting to arrange for an
Iranian firm to carry out a major upgrade of the US-origin
AN/PRC-77 radios of Thailand's armed forces.


8. (U) Post should contact Tim Liston in PM/RSAT at
202-647-9121, if there are further questions. Following
consultations with the GOT on this matter, please provide the
Department with a summary of this discussion by September 28.
Please slug response for ISN/CATR- Michael Rolleri.
RICE