Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE114832
2007-08-15 23:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:
NEXT STEPS ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON AVIAN
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #4832 2272328 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O P 152316Z AUG 07 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0000 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0000 RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 0000 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0000 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0000 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000 RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0000 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0000 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 114832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL KFLU TBIO EAGR AMED SENV WHO ID
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON AVIAN
INFLUENZA
REF: A. JAKARTA 2157
B. STATE 103509
C. JAKARTA 1910
D. JAKARTA 2168
Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b, d, and e)
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 114832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL KFLU TBIO EAGR AMED SENV WHO ID
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON AVIAN
INFLUENZA
REF: A. JAKARTA 2157
B. STATE 103509
C. JAKARTA 1910
D. JAKARTA 2168
Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b, d, and e)
1. (U) Action Requested: See Paras 3-4.
2. (C) Department appreciates Ambassador Hume's thoughtful
message, recommending a strategy to secure Government of
Indonesia (GOI) resumption of viral sample sharing (refs A
and C). Department is in general agreement with the overall
strategy outlined in ref A.
3. (C) We agree that Ambassador Hume should use the
opportunities of his senior-level meetings in the coming days
to make the points in para 4 regarding USG views of the
situation and how the GOI should resume sharing of samples
while we work together to address issues the GOI raised in
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May and most recently in
the World Health Organization (WHO) Interdisciplinary Working
Group meeting in Singapore. Our overriding goal is for the
GOI to resume responsible participation in the WHO Global
Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). We leave to
Ambassador Hume how best to shape the points below to achieve
maximum effect and to gain better understanding of
Indonesia's aims. The Department would appreciate Embassy
Jakarta readouts, assessments, and recommendations.
4. (SBU) Key messages:
-- We understand the critical threat Indonesia faces from the
spread of the H5N1 strain of influenza virus in poultry and
extend our sympathies to the families who have had children
and other members infected by and killed by the virus. We
also understand the suffering that would ensue were this
virus to mutate into a pandemic strain.
-- We appreciate and support your efforts to contain the
spread of the virus and to prepare for a possible human
pandemic. Since 2005, we have committed more than $37
million in assistance to Indonesia for avian and pandemic
influenza through the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and
Health and Human Services -- more than the level of
assistance we have provided to any other country for the
purpose of combatting avian and pandemic influenza.
-- We are strongly committed to international efforts aimed
at promoting more fair and equitable access to the benefits
of pandemic preparedness, including to pandemic vaccines. We
have demonstrated our commitment by contributing $10 million
to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza
Vaccine Action Plan, from which Indonesia recently received a
$2.5 million grant to increase its vaccine production
capacity.
-- Indonesia, which currently suffers more than any other
country from widespread avian influenza, is in a unique
position from which it can facilitate global efforts to
monitor the threat from this highly-pathogenic virus. We are
deeply concerned, however, that the Government of Indonesia's
refusal to share samples with the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance Network (GISN) represents a major threat to
global health because experts around the world are unable to
track mutations in the virus without shared samples.
-- The unencumbered sharing of viral samples for risk
assessment and vaccine development is fundamental to our
battling this potential pandemic. We urge you to resume
sharing H5N1 influenza viruses immediately, even while we and
other nations continue to discuss your understandable
concerns, such as the rules and responsibilities of
participating in the WHO GISN and the development of
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of benefits.
-- We are committed to supporting voluntary mechanisms for
the sharing of benefits that improve pandemic preparedness
after you resume sharing human suspected H5N1 influenza virus
samples and isolates.
-- We look forward to your Government's prompt resumption of
sample sharing and to further exchanging views on solutions
to outstanding issues related to responsibilities and
benefits of the GISN system.
RICE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL KFLU TBIO EAGR AMED SENV WHO ID
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON AVIAN
INFLUENZA
REF: A. JAKARTA 2157
B. STATE 103509
C. JAKARTA 1910
D. JAKARTA 2168
Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b, d, and e)
1. (U) Action Requested: See Paras 3-4.
2. (C) Department appreciates Ambassador Hume's thoughtful
message, recommending a strategy to secure Government of
Indonesia (GOI) resumption of viral sample sharing (refs A
and C). Department is in general agreement with the overall
strategy outlined in ref A.
3. (C) We agree that Ambassador Hume should use the
opportunities of his senior-level meetings in the coming days
to make the points in para 4 regarding USG views of the
situation and how the GOI should resume sharing of samples
while we work together to address issues the GOI raised in
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May and most recently in
the World Health Organization (WHO) Interdisciplinary Working
Group meeting in Singapore. Our overriding goal is for the
GOI to resume responsible participation in the WHO Global
Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). We leave to
Ambassador Hume how best to shape the points below to achieve
maximum effect and to gain better understanding of
Indonesia's aims. The Department would appreciate Embassy
Jakarta readouts, assessments, and recommendations.
4. (SBU) Key messages:
-- We understand the critical threat Indonesia faces from the
spread of the H5N1 strain of influenza virus in poultry and
extend our sympathies to the families who have had children
and other members infected by and killed by the virus. We
also understand the suffering that would ensue were this
virus to mutate into a pandemic strain.
-- We appreciate and support your efforts to contain the
spread of the virus and to prepare for a possible human
pandemic. Since 2005, we have committed more than $37
million in assistance to Indonesia for avian and pandemic
influenza through the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and
Health and Human Services -- more than the level of
assistance we have provided to any other country for the
purpose of combatting avian and pandemic influenza.
-- We are strongly committed to international efforts aimed
at promoting more fair and equitable access to the benefits
of pandemic preparedness, including to pandemic vaccines. We
have demonstrated our commitment by contributing $10 million
to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza
Vaccine Action Plan, from which Indonesia recently received a
$2.5 million grant to increase its vaccine production
capacity.
-- Indonesia, which currently suffers more than any other
country from widespread avian influenza, is in a unique
position from which it can facilitate global efforts to
monitor the threat from this highly-pathogenic virus. We are
deeply concerned, however, that the Government of Indonesia's
refusal to share samples with the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance Network (GISN) represents a major threat to
global health because experts around the world are unable to
track mutations in the virus without shared samples.
-- The unencumbered sharing of viral samples for risk
assessment and vaccine development is fundamental to our
battling this potential pandemic. We urge you to resume
sharing H5N1 influenza viruses immediately, even while we and
other nations continue to discuss your understandable
concerns, such as the rules and responsibilities of
participating in the WHO GISN and the development of
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of benefits.
-- We are committed to supporting voluntary mechanisms for
the sharing of benefits that improve pandemic preparedness
after you resume sharing human suspected H5N1 influenza virus
samples and isolates.
-- We look forward to your Government's prompt resumption of
sample sharing and to further exchanging views on solutions
to outstanding issues related to responsibilities and
benefits of the GISN system.
RICE