DEMARCHE: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN EASTERN CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 103146

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
PARIS FOR GD'ELIA
RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN EASTERN CHAD

REF: A. (A)USEU BRUSS 2302


B. (B)PARIS 2913

C. (C)PARIS 2837

D. (D)NDJAMENA 530

E. (E)NDJAMENA 504

F. (F)USEU TODAY REPORTS

Classified By: AF A/S Jendayi E. Frazer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) Department requests Embassy Paris to convey to French
government officials the USG support for Foreign Minister
Kouchner's plan to deploy a European Security and Defense
Policy
(ESDP) bridging mission in Eastern Chad and to explore what
types of assistance the French might need and desire from the
U.S.

OBJECTIVES
--------------


2. (SBU) Department requests that Embassy pursue the
following
objectives:

--Inform the French government that the USG is supportive of
the
French proposal for an international humanitarian peace
support
operation in eastern Chad.

--Solicit more information about the mission itself and about
how the mission will interplay with other initiatives in
Chad,
including ongoing humanitarian operations.

--Query contacts about the type of support the U.S. could
provide
to advance the French proposal. We look forward to working
with
France and the EU on civilian aspects; encourage France to
direct
any requests for non-EU military, logistics or training
support
through NATO, where the U.S. and other Allies could consider
potential contributions;

--Express Department's willingness to participate in further
discussions about the mission in either Washington or Paris.

REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


3. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable by
August 1.

BACKGROUND
--------------


4. (SBU) Over 400,000 individuals are now displaced in
eastern
Chad (235,000 Darfur refugees and over 170,000 internally
displaced persons). Insecurity continues to hamper the
ability
of the UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to
deliver humanitarian assistance, prevents IDPs from returning
home,
and negatively impacts the lives of Chadians who are trying
to
remain in their homes. Armed groups operate throughout the
area
and can misuse refugee and IDP camps with impunity. The
inability
of the Government of Chad (GOC) to provide basic law and
order
in the region and effectively suppress (through negotiation
or
force of arms) cross-border threats to the regime suggests a
need
for external actors to step in to effect peace and security.
The
GOC continues to oppose a robust UN peacekeeping force in
eastern

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Chad as suggested in 2006, but seems open to the French
initiative,
without committing to an eventual UN force to which the ESDP
mission would bridge.


5. (SBU) To address the situation, in June, French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner proposed an initiative to address
security
concerns in eastern Chad. The initiative has two goals:
first, to
improve security in and around refugee/internally displaced
person
(IDP) sites and in areas from which many of the IDPs
originated by
deploying an interim force in eastern Chad; and second, to
launch a
civil reconstruction effort in the areas whence the IDPs fled
in
order to promote return, recovery, and reconciliation. The
security
force would not have a mandate to secure or manage the
Sudan-Chad
border.


6. (C) According to a non-paper circulated by the French in
June,
the "civilian" (police/gendarme/stability police) component
of the
security force would include 800 Chadian gendarmes and 230
international police/gendarmes, mostly from Francophone
countries.
The French had envisioned that the police force would be
blue-hatted
and would be commanded by an international police officer.
The
non-paper is silent about the composition of the military
force,
but reports from Brussels suggest that the military force
would be
comprised of 2,000-3,000 EU troops as part of an ESDP
deployment,
protecting a 900 km by 200-400 km zone in eastern Chad. The
French
do not want to provide more than half the total troops, and
are
apparently concerned about force generation. Sweden is
reportedly
considering offering troops, perhaps as part of the Nordic
Battlegroup that would follow an initial deployment by the
French.


7. (C) The mission was briefed to the USG as a temporary
mission
(from October 2007 to May 2008 approximately) that would be
followed
by a UN military force in eastern Chad, a force that the USG
still
considers a priority. Since the original briefing, there are
reports
that this mission may end in one year or with the deployment
of the
hybrid UN-African Union force.


8. (U) The Secretary expressed her support for such a mission
when
she met with President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner in Paris in
June.
The Department is exploring ways in which we can be helpful.
Some
ideas include:

--Utilizing our positive relationship with the AU and UNSC to
obtain
buy-in for the initiative and to support a UNSC authorization
for
the bridging force.

--Encouraging Germany and other EU members to support the
French
initiative and contribute troops, without diminishing the
priority
of other ongoing missions' needs, particularly in
Afghanistan.

--Encouraging DPKO to broaden its thinking when formulating
options
for a possible follow-on force.

--Committing USG funding for the follow-on UN force. Congress

STATE 00103146 003 OF 004


granted
83 million dollars for a UN force in Chad through the fiscal
year 2007
supplemental appropriation. This funding may only be used
for assessed
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

--Should funding permit, providing training through the
Center of
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) for
international
gendarme peacekeepers to deploy as part of the bridging force.

--Training and equipping of African military forces for this
mission,
if funding is available. This or similar requests for
security,
training or logistics assistance from the United States for
the
proposed ESDP should be directed through NATO.


9. (U) The Department requests that Embassy Paris ascertain
the
following information about the plan:

--The size of the military component of the force and the
expected
role and contribution of each EU member nation. Have any
countries
committed to sending troops? Will the ESDP include enabling
forces?
How will the force be supplied? How will the EU deploy such
a force?
What type of units will it include? What will be their Rules
of
Engagement (ROE)?

--The role of the United Nations. Will France still pursue a
robust
UN peacekeeping force to follow the France-EU force? If so,
has there
been any progress in obtaining Chadian buy-in for the
follow-on force?
The UN peacekeeping mission will also include a presence in
the
Central African Republic (CAR). Will the EU consider a
bridging
presence in the CAR? Would current initiatives, such as the
Central
African Multinational Force (FOMUC) or the French presence in
CAR,
be expanded? We believe a UN peacekeeping deployment in CAR
could help
address spillover from Darfur and provide a useful base for
launching
UN peacekeeping in Darfur and Chad.

--The participation and role of the African Union and the
militaries
and police forces of its members states in the mission.

--Will the force include a political component or address
domestic
Chadian issues such as political reconciliation? What do
French experts
see as the root causes of the instability in Eastern Chad,
and how will
the proposed security and reconstruction mission address
those drivers
of instability?

--What level of Chadian participation is expected?


10. (SBU) The USG is also interested in partnering with
France and with
the EU on the civilian aspects of this initiative. We intend
to
increase our emergency humanitarian non-food assistance to
IDPs with
supplemental budgets provided to USAID's Office of Foreign
Disaster
Assistance (OFDA),as well as to State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees,
and Migration (PRM). We would be interested in hearing more
about
France and EU reconstruction efforts and how we can best
coordinate our
extensive humanitarian efforts in the region with their
efforts.

STATE 00103146 004 OF 004




POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


11. (U) Please contact Madeeha Ashraf at (202) 647-1637 or
via e-mail
for any necessary further background information or
argumentation to
meet our objectives.
RICE