Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE101360
2007-07-20 19:31:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

(S) ALERTING SERBIA TO A POSSIBLE EFFORT TO

Tags:  PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 201931Z JUL 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 101360 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA SR

SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING SERBIA TO A POSSIBLE EFFORT TO
DIVERT U.S.-ORIGIN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).

S E C R E T STATE 101360


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA SR

SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING SERBIA TO A POSSIBLE EFFORT TO
DIVERT U.S.-ORIGIN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.


2. (S) Background and Purpose/Objective: We want to share
with Serbian officials information indicating that a Serbian
firm is seeking 32 U.S.-origin, fiber optic gyrocompasses.
Although this firm has indicated that these systems will be
installed on maritime vessels, we are concerned about the
large size of this order and the possibility that these
gyrocompasses could be destined for an entity in a country of
proliferation concern. For example, we understand that
Iranian entities have sought these same gyrocompasses in
recent months through sources in other countries. This
equipment is controlled under the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) as it contains three fiber optic gyroscopes
that also would be MTCR-controlled if sold separately. An
end-user with the requisite technological knowledge could
remove these gyroscopes and use them in cruise missile or
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) applications. Because these
are U.S.-origin items, their purchase is subject to U.S.
export control regulations, w
hich do not allow for their retransfer to prohibited
destinations such as Iran, or use in missile-related
applications. We therefore want to ask Serbian authorities
to use all available measures to ensure that this firm is not
diverting sensitive, U.S.-origin equipment to end-users in
countries of proliferation concern. (Note: As of July 20, we
are not aware of a license application having been submitted
by the U.S. firm to export this equipment. End Note)


3. (S) Action Request: Department requests Embassy Belgrade
approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the
talking points in Paragraph 4 and report response. Talking
points may be left as a non-paper.


4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET REL SERBIA)

-- We would like to bring to your attention a matter of
proliferation concern and request your assistance in
investigating this activity.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that the Serbian firm
Belchem expressed an interest in purchasing as many as 32
fiber optic gyroscope maritime navigation systems.

-- We understand that Belchem is seeking the Navigat 2100
fiber-optic gyrocompass, which is manufactured by the U.S.
firm Northrop Grumman/Sperry Marine. Belchem has indicated
that its customers plan to install these systems on maritime
vessels.

-- Although this equipment is designed for such applications,
we are concerned about the large size of this order and the
possibility that these gyrocompasses could be destined for an
entity in a country of proliferation concern.

-- For example, we understand that Iranian entities have
sought Navigat 2100 gyrocompasses in recent months through
sources in other countries.

-- The Navigat 2100 is controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) because it contains three fiber optic
gyroscopes that would be MTCR-controlled if sold separately.

-- An end-user with the requisite technological knowledge
could remove these gyroscopes and use them in cruise missile
or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) applications.

-- Because Navigat 2100 gyrocompasses are produced in the
U.S., their purchase by Belchem would be subject to U.S.
export control regulations, which do not allow for their
retransfer to Iran or use in missile-related applications.

-- Belchem is located at Zelezincaa 15, 1080 Zemun, Belgrade,
Serbia.

-- We ask that you use all available measures to ensure that
Belchem is not transferring sensitive, U.S.-origin equipment
to unauthorized end-users in countries of proliferation
concern.

-- We look forward to future cooperation with your government
on nonproliferation and export control issues and to hearing
the results of your inquiries into this matter at the
earliest possible time.

End talking points/non-paper.


5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN and EUR.


6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche in the "MTAG - EUR"
folder.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text