Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SOFIA87
2007-01-18 13:10:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1484
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSF #0087/01 0181310
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181310Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3089
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000087 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY

REF: A. 06 SOFIA 1573

B. 06 SOFIA 848

C. 06 SOFIA 743

D. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0020 07

E. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0038 07

F. 06 STATE 79658

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000087

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY

REF: A. 06 SOFIA 1573

B. 06 SOFIA 848

C. 06 SOFIA 743

D. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0020 07

E. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0038 07

F. 06 STATE 79658

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Despite persistent U.S. lobbying and a
high-level push from official visitors, GoB officials are not
yet sold on membership in Turkish-led Operation Black Sea
Harmony (OBSH). Credible doubts about Turkey's willingness
to share information have fed into deep-seated mistrust of
Turkish (and Russian) intentions in the Black Sea. We can
start to bridge the confidence gap between Bulgaria and
Turkey by encouraging the two sides to improve the quality of
information sharing. Building trust between these two NATO
allies will improve the efficiency of Black Sea maritime
security operations and open the door to increased Bulgarian
participation and eventual membership in OBSH. END SUMMARY.

Interagency skepticism...
--------------


2. (S) Bulgarian skepticism of OBSH is nothing new (as
reported in reftels A-C); the Bulgarian inter-agency has
divergent views, though the trend line is to question rather
than sign up to OBSH:

The MoD:
The civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense is by far
the most forward-leaning, favoring pragmatic engagement with
OBSH, including formally joining the operation "if
necessary." This qualifier is, in itself, telling.

The MFA:
The politically controversial optic of Bulgarian forces
participating in what is still seen largely as a Turkish
operation has led the MFA to oppose formal membership in
OBSH, while favoring pragmatic cooperation and information
exchange. Privately, MFA security officials paint a picture
of OBSH as a Russian-Turkish wolf in NATO clothing. They

strongly advocate an "equal seat at the table" for Bulgaria
-- hinting that if NATO's Operation Active Endeavor (OAE)
cannot be extended into the Black Sea, Bulgaria may reorient
its Black Sea Policy toward the EU -- a forum free of what it
sees as excessive Russian and Turkish influence.

The General Staff:
Bulgaria's military leadership opposes direct participation
in OBSH, and is particularly sensitive to the possibility of
being incorporated into a Turkish chain of command. Military
commanders favor an "equal seat" for Bulgaria and want to
boost the role of the Burgas maritime information center by
channeling information directly from Burgas to CC-MAR Naples.
Officials in the General Staff and MFA alike complain of
Turkey's unwillingness to sign a bilateral agreement on
classified information exchange -- first proposed by Bulgaria
shortly after its accession to NATO in 2004.

...fueled by suspicions regarding Turkey
--------------


3. (S/NF) Balkan historical baggage is only part of Bulgarian
distrust of Turkish motives. By itself, this would not have
been a show-stopper. Unfortunately, more operational and
geopolitical concerns also weigh into the equation -- namely
Bulgarian intelligence reports that Turkey is withholding
information on threats to maritime security. Bulgarian
military intelligence has confided to us (protect) that it
monitors communications traffic in the Bosphorus (ref. D).
Reftel E contains suspicious vessel reports documenting the
Bulgarian services' assertion that Turkey regularly fails to
inform Bulgaria of vessels suspected of links to terrorism,
trafficking in persons, and smuggling of arms and narcotics
-- even when these vessels are bound for Bulgarian ports.

The Way Out
--------------


4. (S/NF) Bulgaria and Turkey are stuck in a circular
argument over OBSH. If these two allies are to cooperate

SOFIA 00000087 002 OF 002


effectively in the future -- in OBSH or otherwise -- they
need to begin their own dialogue about security and
intelligence. We suggest the following course of action to
break the impasse:

- Encourage Bulgaria to reach out to Turkey to begin a
bilateral dialogue on Black Sea security.

- Encourage mil-to-mil and intel-to-intel talks between
Turkey and Bulgaria, including direct talks by CNOs, military
intelligence chiefs and counter-terrorism coordinators.
(Turkish willingness to sign an agreement on classified
information exchange or to consider a special role within
OBSH for Bulgaria's Burgas center would be especially
important clinchers for a skeptical GoB.)

- U.S. and NATO political support for OBSH to help calm
Bulgarian fears of NATO "abandoning" the Black Sea. We will
have to gauge carefully when to deliver such messages to
break through Bulgarian reservations.


5. (S/NF) Ultimately, the endgame of this Black Sea saga --
as seen by the Bulgarians -- will likely require Turkey to
open the taps of information to Bulgaria as a quid pro quo
for Bulgarian membership in OBSH. This solution would best
come from the Allies themselves. We should continue to
advocate participation in OBSH, both in bilateral meetings
and especially during high-level military visits. Absent
greater bilateral Turkish-Bulgarian trust and information
flow, we should not anticipate an imminent breakthrough in
Bulgarian resistance to joining OBSH, but that shouldn't
deter us from pushing for greater Bulgarian participation
(e.g. increased sharing of operational information with
Turkish commanders, or participation in a suspect vessel
exercise that could be organized with OBSH partners) while
also encouraging more openness from the Turkish side as a
sweetener for eventual Bulgarian membership.

BEYRLE