BULGARIA ON KOSOVO: CONCERNED, ACTIVELY ENGAGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 001384

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA ON KOSOVO: CONCERNED, ACTIVELY ENGAGING
NEIGHBORS FOR A SOFT LANDING

REF: STATE 165486

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Jim Bigus for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Bulgaria, concerned about the fallout from
Kosovo independence, is working actively in the region to
maintain (or build) EU unity on Kosovo and advocating the
Ahtisaari plan with the Serbs. Following his visit to
Belgrade December 17-18, FM Kalfin will attend a trilateral
meeting on Kosovo with Greece and Romania in Athens on
December 22, and may visit Pristina after Christmas. He is
also preparing a formal request for U.S. assistance to Kosovo
in the event of a Serb blockade. MFA officials here are
optimistic about finding an EU consensus on a "coordinated
declaration of independence" (CDI) that would allow the few
holdouts to stand aside but not block the EU majority from
recognizing Kosovo. But, spooked by Serb threats, they
continue to insist that Bulgaria cannot be in the "first
wave" of countries to recognize Kosovar independence. END
SUMMARY.

Bulgaria's road to Europe runs through Serbia. . .


2. (C) We delivered reftel demarche to Deputy Foreign
Minister Kyuchukov on December 12. He told us the GOB is
concerned about the repercussions from Kosovo independence
and the EU reaction and would take an active role in the
region to "make sure our concerns and experience are heard."
FM Kalfin will attend a trilateral meeting with Greece and
Romania, "the most frontline EU states," in Athens on
December 22 to discuss the "European perspectives
of Serbia and Kosovo." Kyuchukov was optimistic about
finding an EU consensus that would allow the few holdouts to
stand aside but not block the majority of EU states from
recognizing Kosovo.


3. (C) Recognition will be a difficult decision, Kyuchukov
said, since Bulgaria's physical road to Europe runs through
Serbia, and ordinary citizens will have problems. "We don't
want our experience of the 1990s Yugoslavia embargo and the
growth of organized crime repeated, and we also can't have a
frozen conflict for the same reasons." Bulgaria was talking
openly to the Serbs about this, but their rhetoric is getting
harsher. Kyuchukov said he hoped the Serbs would relent
after a period of retaliation but could not be confident of
it. "We can't say after four or five months they will get
tired and come to an agreement with us."


4. (C) Kyuchkov said Bulgaria was pressing Pristina and
Belgrade not to take steps, "especially military ones," to
destabilize the region. He appreciated the Kosovars'
willingness to work with the international community and to
take political developments, particularly the Serbian
elections, into consideration. The EU is continuing to
consider the right mode of military and civilian deployment
while giving "strong signals to Belgrade and Pristina about
their European future. No one wants an isolated Serbia."


5. (C) On the Russians, Kyuchukov said "they cannot lose in
this situation." All their statements are negative and show
no sign of flexibility. The Russians had already
launched a discussion paper in the UNSC and reaction to it
would be important. Legalities of EU action had to be
considered. An invitation to the EU from the Kosovars to
send a mission would be unacceptable to the Serbs, Kyuchukov
said, and this is where it would be useful to
have an invitation from UN SYG Ban Ki Moon.

. . . so inaction is not an option


6. (C) On December 17 Office Director for Western Balkans
Krassimir Tulechki confirmed that Bulgaria is taking the
initiative to work within the EU to reach a consensus
position and to engage the Serbs directly to "make clear the
realities of the situation." Bulgaria would prefer not to
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence, UDI, but
would recognize a CDI, "coordinated declaration of
independence," done in coordination with the EU and U.S. and
backing the Ahtisaari plan. (NOTE: Kyuchukov told us earlier
that a UDI suits the Serb hardliners. "It can be challenged
now and forever. It's the best way for them to
lose and be the victims.") The Kosovars are cooperating on
the CDI, Tulechki said. He was optimistic about reaching a
consensus EU position, saying "at least 20-21 countries"
were on board so far for recognition. Romania, Greece,
Cyprus and Slovakia would be the most difficult.


7. (C) Tulechki said Bulgaria is consulting with other EU
members on steps to take in reaction to a possible Serb
cut-off of roads, electricity and water to Kosovo and
neighboring states that recognized Kosovo. U.S. help would
be needed to ease the situation in Kosovo, "especially fuel
for generators," and that FM Kalfin would approach us with
a formal request once a list is drawn up. Responding to an
earlier request, we provided Tulechki with biographical
information on controversial Kosovar millionaire and
politician Bedget Pacolli. Tulechki said the MFA was
seriously considering working with Pacolli to deliver
assistance to Kosovo in the event of a Serb blockade and that
FM Kalfin planned to meet him in the near future. Tulechki
said he questioned whether Pacolli should be met
at such a high level, but Kalfin made the decision.


8. (C) COMMENT: The Bulgarians, acting largely on their
own initiative but within the boundaries of EU decisions, are
making a good faith effort to be a bridge between Belgrade
and Brussels and to bring the difficult states (Greece,
Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus) on board with an EU consensus
-- or at least prevent them from being spoilers. We are
encouraging the
GOB to recognize Kosovo earlier rather than later, but fear
of Serb retaliation (tied to scars from the post-1999
embargo) is still extremely strong. FM Kalfin's early
January trip to Washington will provide Bulgarian insight
into any evolution in the views of Romania and Greece, and
help frame Bulgarian decision-making as we reach an endgame.
END COMMENT.
Beyrle