AMBASSADOR WISNER'S MEETINGS IN SOFIA ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 001382

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL KV UN EU RU BU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER'S MEETINGS IN SOFIA ON KOSOVO

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On December 6 Special Representative to
the Kosovo Status Talks Frank Wisner briefed Foreign
Minister Kalfin and, in a separate meeting, members of
parliament on the outcome of the Troika negotiations and
next steps on Kosovo. Wisner told the Bulgarians that
although the Troika negotiations did not bring the two
sides to agreement on the status of Kosovo, they did result
in a commitment by both sides not to resort to
violence and a growing consensus among EU members that time
had come for a decision on Kosovo's independence. The
greatest danger was in inaction, though action would
trigger Serb and Russian economic and political
retaliation. Wisner underscored that the U.S. will stand
by its EU allies and Kosovo in the difficult times ahead
and needs Bulgaria to stand with us.


2. (C) Kalfin agreed that the status quo was untenable
and time had come for a decision. He said there was "easy
consensus" in the EU to deploy a mission to Kosovo after
the Kosovar unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),
expected to take place in early February after the Serbian
elections. The EU would call an emergency meeting
immediately after the UDI to formally authorize the
mission. The timing of formal recognition of Kosovo's
independence will be more difficult and Kalfin said he was
still working the issue within the GOB, but he warned that
it will be difficult for Bulgaria to be among the early
group of countries that would recognize. Bulgaria will
work actively with other member states to forge a common
recognition policy, also to be announced at the emergency
meeting. Wisner warned against separating the decisions on
mission deployment and recognition, as that would give the
Serbs and Russians room to continue pressing member states
to delay recognition. Kalfin expressed concern about Serb
economic retaliation, noting "Serbia has the means to hurt
Bulgaria." Both Kalfin and the parliamentarians cited the
importance of strong U.S. support for Bulgaria and Kosovo
in the event of Serb retaliation and of continued
engagement with the Serbs to bring them into Europe.
Kalfin emphasized that "we don't want a frozen conflict in
the region." End Summary.


3. (U) Participating in the meeting with FM Kalfin were
Kalfin's chief of staff Gano Gunchev and Political Director
for Analysis and Planning Valentin Poriazov. The
parliamentarians included, from the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Chairman Soloman Passy, Plamen Ranchev,
Konstantine Dimitrov, Yumal Lyutvi; from the Defense
Committee Asen Agov, Ilko Dimitrov, Yanko Yankov; and from
the Committee for European Issues Maria Angelieva, Hristo
Kirchev. The Americans accompanying Ambassador Wisner were
Ambassador John Beyrle, Ambassador Wisner's assistant Peter
D'Amico, and Sofia Head of the Political Economic Section
Jim Bigus.

Meeting with FM Kalfin


4. (C) Foreign Minister Kalfin opened by saying he had
recently met with Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremic, who had
told him that use of force in reaction to the UDI was a
"red line" but that "all else is fair," including
electricity and water cuts and blocking international
missions. Jeremic had begun submitting to parliament
various plans for reaction, "from light to heavy." Once
you submit ideas to a parliament, Kalfin noted, "you know
what you can expect."


5. (C) Ambassador Wisner said he had come to Sofia to
brief the Bulgarian leadership on Kosovo as a member of the
U.S. government and as a member of the Troika. The Troika
demonstrated to all that no stone had been left unturned in
the effort to find a negotiated solution on Kosovo,s final
status. Though the Troika did not bring the sides to
agreement, it helped position the EU to decide on what
needs to be done and gained commitments from both sides not
to resort to violence, threats or intimidation.


6. (C) Wisner noted that the status quo in Kosovo is not
sustainable and that this was also the position of the UN.
Further negotiations would only re-plow old ground. The
Ahtisaari proposal is still on the table and provides the
best way forward. There is danger in taking action but
even greater danger in inaction. Serbia and Russia will
react strongly and Europe needs to act decisively. There
is a consensus forming in the EU in favor of recognition,
though there are still some holdouts and it would be good
for Bulgaria to join that consensus.


7. (C) Wisner said a declaration of independence would
bring a new difficult phase and noted that Belgrade and
Moscow could create problems in Kosovo, in the region
particularly in Bosnia, in the Caucasus, and at the UN.
Wisner noted that it will be a long-term effort getting a
new nation on its feet but "I assure you we'll be there.
We need you to be there with us."


8. (C) Kalfin agreed that Troika effort was worth it, as
it showed the Serbs the international community was ready
to listen. It was also important that the sides committed
themselves not to use violence and that the EU was involved
as an organization. Kalfin noted that were a number of
negative scenarios, but the worst for Bulgaria was the
creation of a frozen conflict that would be unstable for
years. It is better to recognize the realities. For eight
years Belgrade had no say in the political institutions in
Kosovo except in the north, where its influence is
negative. There is the danger of Belgrade using the
"migration weapon" with the minority Serb population in
Kosovo. Kalfin said Macedonia was also a potential problem
area. All Albanian factions, including those in Macedonia
and south Serbia, need to agree not to spread violence.


9. (C) Kosovo needs economic development, Kalfin
continued, which will be hard without cooperation from
Serbia. Kalfin advocated a strong international presence
for Kosovo,s economy since otherwise, all the Kosovars have
to depend on is transfers from abroad. Bulgaria has its
own concerns about economic retaliation since there are
trade and transit ties and a Bulgarian minority in Serbia,
which gave Belgrade the means to hurt Bulgaria.
Additionally, Bulgarians remembered costs of the embargo
against Yugoslavia in the 1990s and how it fueled the rise
of organized crime.


10. (C) Kalfin said the sooner Serbia draws into Europe,
the better, and that the GOB is trying to keep a good
dialogue with the Serbs. Wisner noted the need to make
clear to Belgrade the need to get to Europe. It will not
be easy and they will have to earn it like the others.
"The greatest act of friendship to Serbia would be to make
it frank and clear - do not prolong the problem."


11. (C) On recognition, Kalfin said he was "roaming
around the government" still trying to build an official
position. Nevertheless, he agreed that additional
negotiations were not an option. Kalfin noted that some of
the EU countries in the region were reluctant to recognize
Kosovo,s independence such as Romania, Slovakia, Greece and
Cyprus. Slovenia, however, had fewer concerns. Everyone
has to make compromises on this, "the neighbors more." But
many countries in the region are hesitating on recognition,
and "it is hard for Bulgaria to have a separate view."
Kalfin stressed the need for a common EU position. An easy
point of agreement would be deploying the ESDP mission to
Kosovo, which would be a "sort of de facto recognition."
Each nation has its own national process for formal
recognition of independence and it "cannot be done in one
day." The time before UDI should be used to build a common
EU position. Kalfin said that the ESDP mission should be
ready to deploy by early February. Wisner noted that if
the EU decisions on the support mission and recognition
were not simultaneous, there would be trouble. The
Russians and Serbs would press for continued delays in
recognition and break the European consensus. Kalfin added
that if the first and second rounds of the Serbian
presidential elections took place on January 20 and
February 3 then there should be a delay to let them take
place.


12. (C) Kalfin described the process leading to the
deployment of the EU mission and consensus on recognition.
On December 14 the European Council will make a "general
political statement" regretting the failure of the Troika
effort and saying that in light of the situation "the EU is
ready to assume its obligations." There will be "easy
consensus" for this statement and it will be "interpreted
by EU members as readiness to deploy an EU mission to
Kosovo and as a signal to UN SYG Ban Ki Moon." The
deployment will have the legal basis of UNSCR 1244, an
invitation from the Kosovo authorities, and also possibly
an invitation from UN SYG Ban. Following the UDI, an
extraordinary EU meeting would take the formal decision to
deploy the mission. In the meantime, Bulgaria will be
working with the other member states on a common EU
position on recognition that will be adopted at the
extraordinary meeting.


13. (C) Kalfin noted that the partition of Kosovo would
create problems for the region. Wisner said the U.S. is
determined to resist partition. The Kosovo leaders did not
want to cause problems in Macedonia, and they told the
ethnic Albanians living in Serbia to stay calm
that "they live in Serbia." Wisner warned Kalfin that
"you'll have problems - we have to work carefully
together." Dialogue with Serbia has to be friendly but
clear: "We want you in NATO, EU, etc., but it is not a
given, not for free, it has to be earned, and you can't
interfere with Kosovo."


14. (C) Kalfin raised a recent conversation with Russian
FM Lavrov, who argued against recognition and for giving
more time for negotiations, pointing out that negotiations
on the Middle East peace process were going on for 59
years. Kalfin said he told Lavrov the region does not need
that kind of conflict. Kalfin posited that Russia needed
these types of frozen conflicts. Recalling a conversation
with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Titov where Titov
mentioned Kosovo as a frozen conflict, Kalfin repeated that
"we don't want a frozen conflict in the region." In
closing, Kalfin noted that Russia has a substantial
interest in using Serbia as an energy hub. Also, there
will be "some period of nationalist disease in Serbia and
the Russians will use it. They may go too far."
Nevertheless, Kalfin said that Russia did not offer a real
political alternative to the EU for Serbia.

Meeting with Members of Parliament


15. (C) Ambassador Wisner made a similar presentation
earlier in the day to a group of parliamentarians. The
parliamentarians agreed that further negotiations would be
useless and the time had come for a decision. Former FM
and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee Passy talked
about the need to focus on Serbia "to help it overcome the
pain. Europe has to pull Serbia in or it will go to Russia
and we don't want another Belarus on our border."
Recalling the 1990s embargo of Yugoslavia, several
parliamentarians raised the issue of "convincing our
constituencies that the EU and U.S. will stand by Bulgaria"
in the face of Serb retaliation. Wisner assured the group
that the U.S. would not walk away from Kosovo, would stand
by its allies, and is committed to helping it develop a
stable future for the region.


16. (U) Ambassador Wisner cleared this cable.
Beyrle