CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ DIFFICULT WITHOUT

S E C R E T SOFIA 001287

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR PM AND EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR BU IZ
SUBJECT: CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ DIFFICULT WITHOUT
UNSCR

REF: SECSTATE 150164

Classified By: AMB John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. Bulgaria's ruling coalition supports the
deployment of 155 servicemembers to Iraq and is mulling the
deployment of an additional 40 engineers, but it has
consistently stated that it views a UNSCR as a politically
necessary to continue its deployments. Given over 70 percent
public opposition to the deployments and increasing pressure
to focus attention and resources to domestic priorities, it
would be difficult but not impossible for the government of
Bulgaria to continue deployments to Iraq without the
political cover of a UN resolution. We expect the Bulgarian
response to depend upon whether they are asked to stay by the
Government of Iraq, the actions of other NATO/EU states and
calculations of the possible impact on 2009 parliamentary
elections. End Summary.

LEGAL SCENARIOS


2. (S) Our assessment is that Bulgaria would be able to
legally operate in Iraq under any of the four scenarios
described in reftel, though options A (the U.S. concludes a
agreement with Iraq and Bulgaria joins as a party to the
agreement) or D (Bulgaria commits its forces under U.S.
command ) either through an international mechanism or
through provisions in a U.S.-Iraq bilateral agreement
covering all forces under U.S. command) would likely be
preferable to the GOB, though it is difficult to be certain
without consultation with the host government. All of the
scenarios described in reftel would require approval by the
Council of Ministers and the parliament, a process that
usually takes months.

POLITICAL CHALLENGES


3. (S) The biggest challenges to continued Bulgarian
engagement in Iraq following the expiration of final UNSCR on
31 December 2008 are political. Despite pledging in the 2005
elections to withdraw all forces from Iraq, the ruling
Socialist party has maintained its mission in Ashraf and is
very seriously considering expanding its commitment through
the deployment of 40 engineers. The Bulgarians remain strong
partners on security issues, but they have consistently
warned us that all future deployments to Iraq would be
contingent on a new UNSCR. The government is currently beset
by a long and contentious teachers strike and internal
dissent in the ruling party following last week's local
election. It will certainly be reticent to stick its neck
out further on the Iraq deployments, which remain very
unpopular with the Bulgarian public.


4. (S) While an easy yes is unlikely, a positive result is
still possible. We expect Bulgaria's next moves in Iraq,
following the expiration of a follow-on UNSCR in 2008 to be
guided by four factors. First, the GOB will watch the U.S.
Government's next steps closely with regards to force levels
and will likely wish to be included in whatever legal
accommodations we reach with the Government of Iraq. Second,
the Bulgarian response will depend upon whether the
Government of Iraq specifically calls on coalition
governments to stay. Third, Bulgaria will gauge the
reactions of other NATO and EU states. If other coalition
members begin backing out, it will be much harder for
Bulgaria to stay. Finally, Bulgarian decision makers will be
forced to weigh the impact of staying in Iraq on the 2009
Parliamentary elections. Election politicking will become
increasingly intense beginning in Summer 2008. Therefore,
the later it gets, the less inclined the ruling coalition
will be to stake out any controversial positions.


5. (S) A generic UNSCR that calls for support to Iraq, but
does not authorize military action might be an acceptable
alternative for the Bulgarians, though consultation would be
required since at this stage the expectation is for a new
UNSCR substantially the same as 1723. Broadly speaking, the
legal considerations for continued deployments to Iraq will
not weigh as heavily on Bulgarian decision makers as the
political considerations described above.
Beyrle