Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SOFIA1183
2007-10-02 15:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIANS NERVOUS OVER KOSOVO UDI

Tags:  PREL PGOV KV SR BG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4521
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1183/01 2751523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021523Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4363
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001183 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV SR BG
SUBJECT: BULGARIANS NERVOUS OVER KOSOVO UDI

REF: SOFIA 1119

Classified By: Ambassador Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001183

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV SR BG
SUBJECT: BULGARIANS NERVOUS OVER KOSOVO UDI

REF: SOFIA 1119

Classified By: Ambassador Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Our recent high-level contacts with
Bulgarian leaders on Kosovo reveal increased nervousness over
a likely UDI in December, some softening of opposition to
partition, and a clear reluctance to be in the early group of
European states that would recognize Kosovo post-UDI.
Bulgaria has been a strong supporter of Ahtissari and early
resolution of status, but shares our pessimism over the
likelihood of any happy ending before December 10. Given the
harder lines taken by Athens and Bucharest, we need to keep
Sofia better plugged in to our evolving strategy and tactics
to ensure Bulgaria's their resolve -- as a key NATO/EU player
in the Balkans -- does not drift. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador met PM Stanishev and President
Parvanov on successive days (Sept. 26 and 27),inter alia to
discuss U.S. views and preview possible Kosovo developments.
The Ambassador underscored that we continue to support the
Troika process, but believe prospects for success are slim.
We had been prepared to recognize Kosovar independence in
June, but the President was persuaded to wait after
discussions with our European partners, including Bulgaria.
But clearly Russia was not prepared to engage constructively;
the Kosovars should not be expected to wait forever. If
there is no resolution by December 10, we need to be prepared
for Kosovo to declare independence very soon thereafter. The
U.S. would be prepared to recognize Kosovo, and we believed
that major EU powers -- France, the UK and Germany would
follow suit. Partition was not an option, and KFOR would
need to stay engaged.

PM Stanishev : EU unity is the key


3. (C) The PM said he was not an optimist that we could
achieve the best outcome, which would be an internationally
recognized solution that would allow us to overcome the
differences within NATO and EU allies. In this respect, he
urged the United States to "be as persuasive as possible"
with the major EU players -- there was no desire within
Europe to repeat the experience of 2003, with "old and new

Europe" at odds. Stanishev agreed there was no will in
Moscow to look for a workable compromise; the Russians are in
a win-win situation from the point of view of their own
short-term interests.


4. (C) Partition was the worst outcome; "we can partition
and partition every Balkan country until eternity." In
Serbia, there was no willingness to discuss status, and they
were putting no effort into the debate on standards. But the
EU needed to develop a strategy for Serbia -- even though
everyone recognized they would not become EU members soon --
with a focus on things like economic assistance, humanitarian
contacts, and visa facilitation. Europe would pay a high
price for failure to be proactive on Serbia, because there
are enough radicals and extremists both in Serbia and Kosovo.
It was important for Bulgaria to keep communications lines
open with Belgrade, and thus it "would be difficult to be
among the first" to recognize Kosovo

President Parvanov: Could Partition "Lessen the Blow"?


5. (C) President Parvanov made similar points -- with an
important divergence on the issue of partition. He stated
matter-of-factly that it would have been better to recognize
Kosovo independence in May/June; whatever the consequences
then, it would have been less painful than what is now
shaping up. He recalled his meeting with Putin at the June
energy summit in Zagreb (two weeks after President Bush
visited Sofia) when Putin was quite hard. Since then, the
Kostunica-Tadic relationship and internal Serbian politics
had yielded no genuine movement on the Serbs part. For
Bulgaria, independence outside of a UNSCR would be hard to
support; Bulgaria would not be among the first to recognize
an independent Kosovo. Bulgaria remains a strong KFOR
supporter.


6. (C) Noting increased European indecisiveness and
hesitation, and making a brief reference to Ischinger's
musings on partition, Parvanov said mixed signals make a
solution harder. In Serbia, there are some voices for the
partition of Kosovo; while many do not believe partition may
be possible or feasible, they can accept it. Russia, too,
would accept such a division, Parvanov stated flatly. What
motives the Russians have, in addition to those they state
openly on Kosovo, are open to interpretation. Perhaps if
some Serb municipalities in Kosovo can "save face," it could
lessen the blow in Serbia. But the overall situation was
hard. Parvanov recalled his discussion with Kostunica where

SOFIA 00001183 002 OF 002


he had threatened to break off diplomatic relations with any
country that recognized Kosovo; Parvanov counseled against
doing something Serbia would regret.

Comment


7. (C) The Bulgarian position on Kosovo has been steady:
resolve status sooner, rather than later; support the
Ahtissari plan; keep lines to Belgrade open and offer
concrete European incentives. None of this has changed. But
as the Troika process grinds on and the likelihood of a UDI
in December increases, their opposition to partition looks to
be softening a bit. Both the President and FM Kalfin
(reftel) have now both discussed partition with us as a
conceivable (if undesirable) outcome. Also, it appears that
without some prodding from us -- ideally backed up with
encouragement from Berlin, Paris or London -- Sofia will see
no advantage to joining an early wave of EU countries to
recognize, post UDI. With Romania and Greece likely to
resist recognition for as long as possible, the advantage of
keeping at least one NATO/EU member in the Balkans close to
us is evident. Putin's likely visit to Sofia in January will
also influence the Bulgarian calculus, unhelpfully. We
recommend that Sofia be made a stop on any diplomatic swings
planned through the region in the coming weeks/months as we
approach the endgame in the Troika process. End Comment.

Beyrle