Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE986
2007-12-19 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME ISSUE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK KV GR 
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VZCZCXRO5740
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0986/01 3531452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191452Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6829
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0134
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2159
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000986 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME ISSUE
AND KOSOVO STATUS

REF: A. SKOPJE 943

B. SKOPJE 973

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000986

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME ISSUE
AND KOSOVO STATUS

REF: A. SKOPJE 943

B. SKOPJE 973

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY


1. (C) President Crvenkovski is firm in preferring the
October 2005 Nimetz proposal over Nimetz's November 2007
framework as a foundation for resolving the name dispute with
Athens. He believes Macedonia will meet NATO membership
criteria, and that the strategic imperative of shoring up
regional stability in the wake of Kosovo status will argue
for Macedonia's membership even if the name dispute is
unresolved by April 2008. If Athens vetoes a NATO invitation
for Macedonia Crvenkovski, regretfully, predicts a "lose,
lose" outcome for all sides, including greater regional
instability, a sharp rise in anti-western and populist
sentiment in Macedonia, sharply reduced incentives for
pursuing NATO or EU reforms, and an end to UN negotiations on
the name dispute. In that event, Macedonia would pursue a
name change in the UNGA. On Kosovo status, Crvenkovski
continues to highlight the importance of including border
demarcation in any status solution. End summary.

NIMETZ FRAMEWORK AS STARTING POINT FOR EVENTUAL SOLUTION


2. (C) The Ambassador met with President Crvenkovski December
18 to discuss the name dispute with Greece and to review
Kosovo status developments. On the name issue, the
Ambassador said the U.S. position remains unchanged and that
we still hoped that, if Macedonia met the requirements for
NATO membership, Athens would honor the 1995 Interim Accord
and stick with the Nimetz process (ref A). Even under the
best case scenario, it was clear that Greece would not be
able to ratify Macedonia's entry to NATO, following an
invitation, absent a solution to the name issue. De facto,
this would mean a Greek decision not to veto an invitation,
while withholding ratification until the Nimetz process
succeeded.


3. (C) The Ambassador added that Skopje needed both to manage
its relations with Athens in the pre-April period to maximize
the prospect that Greece would not veto a NATO invitation,

and also to use the Nimetz process now to lay the foundation
for a solution before/before the Greek parliament was asked
to vote on ratification of Macedonia's NATO membership. She
urged Crvenkovski to consider as a starting point the
differentiation between Macedonia's constitutional name and a
name for international usage, as outlined in Nimetz's
November framework. Skopje should start looking creatively
at possibilities under such an approach, she added.

MACEDONIA WILL MEET NATO CRITERIA, WILL ATHENS VETO?


4. (C) Crvenkovski said he was confident Macedonia would meet
NATO membership criteria before PM Gruevski's January 20 NAC
presentation. That would give the USG and other NATO allies
time to work with Greece to argue that regional strategic
considerations, such as Kosovo status, should trump the
irrational name dispute when the Allies made decisions on
NATO membership.


5. (C) Crvenkovski said he was concerned that Greek
politicians had -- through their strong public statements --
given themselves little maneuver space. Crvenkovski was not
sure whether Athens was merely bluffing, but he thought it
more likely that Greece in the end would allow a NATO
invitation to be extended to Macedonia, while conditioning
this action in some way with a warning that it would not
ratify accession without a name solution. Agreement on a
name before the NATO summit was, however, a "mission
impossible."

IMPACT OF A VETO -- LOSE, LOSE FOR EVERYONE


6. (C) Crvenkovski outlined what he thought would be a "lose,
lose" situation for everyone if Athens did veto a NATO
invitation for Skopje. Recognizing that any future NATO
enlargement could be years away, the public would feel
betrayed by the West for not having stood up to Greek

SKOPJE 00000986 002 OF 003


pressures. Anti-western sentiment in general would grow,
even though the public would know that Greece was to blame.
PM Gruevski's populist government policies would further
stoke negative public reactions.


7. (C) Motivation for further NATO or EU reforms would wither
in this scenario. Even short-term reform targets would be
eliminated. Macedonia's leaders increasingly would turn to
populist rhetoric. "Alexander the Great" town squares and
statues would proliferate throughout the country.
Negotiations on the name would cease. The GOM would be
"forced to open a process at the UNGA to change the country's
name from FYROM into the Republic of Macedonia." It would
not matter that this would still leave Greece with a veto in
NATO and the EU, because the government and public would no
longer be working to qualify for either in the near term.

SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION -- BACK TO THE 2005 NIMETZ PROPOSAL


8. (C) Crvenkovski argued that the Nimetz framework proposal
-- that Macedonia keep its constitutional name but adopt a
differentiated name for international usage -- was not a
viable solution, since that would mean earlier bilateral
recognitions under the constitutional would have to be
reversed. Instead, the October 2005 Nimetz proposal, which
would have allowed Macedonia to keep its constitutional name
while allowing the time-limited use in the UN of "Republika
Makedonija" in multilateral affairs, and Greece to use
Republika Makedonija-Skopje indefinitely, was the best basis
for an eventual agreement.


9. (C) The key to a solution was agreement on preserving the
constitutional name and on the use of a time-limited
provisional name, Crvenkovski said. This would be followed
eventually by full reversion to the use of the constitutional
name in all fora except in bilateral relations with Greece or
with other nations that did not recognize the constitutional
name. The only problem with this approach, he added, was
that PM Gruevski, when he had been leader of the opposition
in 2005, had privately rejected the Nimetz proposal and had
not discussed it with the President since becoming Prime
Minister. Nevertheless, Crvenkovski during his December 3
meeting with Nimetz (reftel) had asked the UN Special Envoy
to work on some additional proposals along the lines of the
2005 framework, and Nimetz had not rejected the request.

"IDENTITY AND DIGNITY" -- OBSTACLES TO A FORCED SOLUTION


10. (C) The Ambassador argued that a differentiated name for
international use would not, as Crvenkovski had suggested,
force Washington to reverse its 2004 recognition of the
constitutional name. The differentiated name might only have
to be used in international fora, such as the UN.
Crvenkovski pointed out that the 1993 UN compromise on the
name had only required the use of the provisional "FYROM" at
the UN, but not in other multilateral institutions. Why,
then, the Ambassador asked, not propose a differentiated name
for use at the UN only?


11. (C) Crvenkovski shifted tack, explaining that a
differentiated name imposed by the NATO summit deadline was
unacceptable for two reasons. First, for purposes of
national identity, Macedonians could never consider
themselves "Northern Macedonians" or "Vardar Macedonians;"
they were, simply and irrevocably, Macedonians. Second, for
reasons of national dignity Macedonia could not make
additional concessions. Skopje, under pressure of the Greek
embargo, had had to change its flag and constitution. Any
further concession would be an unacceptable blow to
Macedonia's dignity.

KOSOVO STATUS -- CONTINUED FOCUS ON DEMARCATION


12. (SBU) On Kosovo, the Ambassador updated Crvenkovski on
recent developments (ref B) and reassured him of USG support
for including reference to border demarcation in any final
status solution. Noting that we had been discussing with
various GOM contacts their contingency planning efforts for
the aftermath of a Kosovo CDI, she said we hoped Macedonian
border and customs officials would help facilitate the
increased flow of traffic at the Blace border crossing in the

SKOPJE 00000986 003 OF 003


event of a Serb embargo on Kosovo. Crvenkovski was thankful
for the update and stressed that reference to demarcation
must be included in any status solution, along with a
commitment to moving quickly to implement demarcation.

COMMENT


13. (C) This was the first indication at the leadership level
here of serious analysis and thought being given to
constructing a path to success on the name issue.
Crvenkovski's ideas were a bit fuzzy in terms of logic, and
do not represent any agreed intra-governmental approach. But
we found it encouraging that the long conversation focused on
the practicalities of the name issue, and not at all on
emotion-driven rhetoric. We will continue to press the
Macedonian side to offer creative ideas for working toward a
resolution when they next meet with Greece and Nimetz this
January.
MILOVANOVIC