Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE985
2007-12-19 13:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: PLANNING FOR KOSOVO STATUS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KV MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5674
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0985/01 3531351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191351Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6826
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0131
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3725
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000985 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PLANNING FOR KOSOVO STATUS

REF: SKOPJE 953

Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000985

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PLANNING FOR KOSOVO STATUS

REF: SKOPJE 953

Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) Macedonian government officials, party
representatives, and think-tankers believe independence
within the Ahtisaari framework is the only option for Kosovo
status. They believe recognition of an independent Kosovo
should also lead to the technical demarcation of the
Kosovo-Macedonia border based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje
agreement (reftel).


2. (C) Local Macedonian contacts tell us that security
concerns regarding Kosovo status, though widespread, should
be "containable" with the help of strengthened border
policing and with the support of Macedonia's ethnic Albanian
parties. International and government sources estimate that
any population movements between Kosovo and Macedonia in the
event of instability in the wake of Kosovo status will be
much smaller than during the 1999 conflict, and could easily
be accommodated in existing Macedonian government (GOM)
shelters. Macedonian contacts are wary of the potential
impact of a Serbian economic blockade to "punish" Skopje for
recognizing Kosovo, but several have been proactive in trying
to soften the blow, while some are even planning to profit
from an expected increase in exports to Kosovo.


3. (C) Despite some opposition party criticism of the GOM's
planning efforts for dealing with the fallout of Kosovo
status, we believe the government has done serious
behind-the-scenes contingency planning. Due to growing ties
between Skopje and Pristina, we expect Macedonia to be a
force for regional stability as an example, albeit imperfect,
of a functioning multiethnic democracy. End summary.

YES ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE... BORDER DEMARCATION, POLITICAL
DIVIDENDS AND THE MEDIA PICTURE


4. (C) In recent conversations with Emboffs, a wide range of
Macedonian government officials and political representatives
have reaffirmed the consensus here that a prompt Kosovo
status solution, based on the Ahtisaari plan is highly
desirable. Local contacts indicate Macedonia will recognize
and support Kosovo independence, but will expect Pristina in

return to honor and swiftly begin to implement its commitment
under the Ahtisaari plan to ensure the demarcation of the
Macedonia-Kosovo border is carried out in accordance with the
2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement (reftel). They also stress
that Macedonia will insist on no division of Kosovo in any
status solution.


5. (C) Hoping that the U.S. and the EU will manage to build a
critical mass of states to recognize Kosovo before Macedonia
has to do the same, GOM's leaders are weighing the political
credit they believe the country would receive from
recognition, versus the cost in terms of relations with
Belgrade. To that effect, the Chair of the Macedonian
Parliament's Defense and Security Committee recently told us
that, following recognition, "NATO should treat Macedonia as
a de facto NATO member, because of the high cost the country
would pay" for that decision.


6. (C) All political parties we have met with recently accept
that there is no sustainable solution to the Kosovo question
other than a CDI. Serbian minority MP Ivan Stoiljkovic,
president of the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, is
the obvious exception to that unified position. He warns
that all Serbian minority representatives will leave
Macedonian state institutions as soon as the country
recognizes Kosovo's independent status. (Note: As an ethnic
minority representing less than 5 percent of Macedonia's
total population, ethnic Serbs are only minimally represented
in state institutions. End note.) Predicting that the
"post-recognition euphoria" of the ethnic Albanians in
Macedonia would be "uncontrollable," a visibly emotional
Stoiljkovic told us that he felt the Macedonian state could
not protect him and his family in such circumstances.
Comment: Even though such statements do not present a real
political challenge for the GOM, they could nevertheless be

SKOPJE 00000985 002 OF 003


exploited by the irresponsible local media, which could steer
public opinion in an unhelpful direction. End comment.

SPILLOVER VIOLENCE... ETHNIC ALLIANCES, SKIRMISHES AND GOM
PLANNING


7. (C) Macedonia's public and politicians expect that a
continuation of the Kosovo status quo into the spring of 2008
could further increase tensions in the region that could
spill over into Macedonia. Even though the overall
environment does not seem conducive to sustained street
protests, the mainstream ethnic Albanian parties would have
to keep the lid on the actions of the sometimes unpredictable
War Veterans Association of the former NLA fighters. EU and
U.S. sources believe that, ultimately, all ethnic Albanian
representatives in Macedonia would take their cue from their
Pristina counterparts, and would respond to messages from the
international community urging them to keep a lid on
protests.


8. (C) The foreign policy advisors to the Prime Minister and
to the President, respectively, believe that prolonged
violence in Kosovo could split Macedonian society along
ethnic lines, but they dismiss this scenario as "highly
unlikely." A more plausible scenario, in their view, is for
small-scale, low intensity skirmishes between ethnic Albanian
agitators and Macedonian security forces along the border in
the Tanusevci and Debelde region (northwest Macedonia). To
this end, the GOM has formed a working group, headed by the
Minister of Interior, which has already taken steps to
strengthen security measures in the border area.

BORDER MOVEMENTS... WELCOMING REFUGEES, INTERNATIONALS AND
GOODS


9. (SBU) The Macedonian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy
(MLSP) and the local UNHCR office both expect that any
post-CDI population movements from Kosovo into Macedonia
would not exceed 2,000 Serbs, Roma and other minorities. The
MLSP has surveyed all its regional reception centers and is
ready to receive any refugee outflows. UNHCR has completed
its contingency planning and is stockpiling essential
foodstuffs for a potential refugee caseload.


10. (C) UNDP has reached an agreement with the Macedonian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant diplomatic status to all
international staff currently serving in Kosovo, in case they
must be evacuated to or through Macedonia in the event of
large-scale violence in Kosovo. Assessing the GOM's attitude
as "highly cooperative," UNDP and UNHCR representatives add
that the Macedonians are trying to open up the military
bypass at the Blace border crossing to facilitate the
movement of people and goods in the event of a Serbian
economic blockade of Kosovo.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SERBIAN TRADE EMBARGO... GLASS
HALF-FULL, OR HALF-EMPTY?


11. (C) Macedonian interlocutors expect Serb actions to
retaliate against Skopje for recognizing an independent
Kosovo could range from downgrading of diplomatic relations
to a full-blown trade embargo. According to 2006 figures
from Macedonia's State Statistical Office, Macedonia was
Kosovo's largest import partner, and Serbia was a close
second. If Serbia implements a trade blockade against Kosovo
following a CDI, some Macedonian business representatives
believe that will present an opportunity for them to secure
an even larger share of the Kosovo market. The
business-savvy GOM planned for this eventuality during a
recent closed session, during which it determined that
Macedonian producers were ready and able to provide timely
supplies of essential goods to an independent Kosovo.
According to the PM's Chief of Staff, the GOM's main
objective is to prevent smugglers from capitalizing on a
trade embargo, and to keep consumer prices down for the
general Kosovar population.


12. (C) A more pessimistic group, including the PM's Foreign
Policy Advisor, point to statistics showing that Serbia's
total trade in 2006 was three times that of Macedonia's;
Macedonia's was 3.5 times that of Kosovo; and Serbia's was 11

SKOPJE 00000985 003 OF 003


times that of Kosovo. The conclusion they draw from the data
is that Serbia is a more important trade partner for
Macedonia and Kosovo than either of them is for Serbia. As a
result, they believe a Serbian trade embargo would be more
damaging for Macedonia than any potential benefits to be
gained from increased sales to the Kosovo market.


13. (C) Local EU contacts emphasize that, were Serbia to take
measures such as imposing trade restrictions, cutting off
energy supplies, withdrawing landing rights or excluding
foreign carriers from its airspace, it would be breaching not
only bilateral agreements, but multilateral agreements such
as CEFTA 2006, and the Energy Community and Common Aviation
Area treaties. This might not deter Serbia from taking such
measures against Macedonia over the short-term, but EU
contacts argue that, as long as Serbia was the only country
breaching the treaties, Macedonia could follow the
appropriate complaints procedures and thus limit the negative
regional economic impact. According to EU analyses, the most
significant damage to Macedonia's economy would come from the
loss of investors' confidence and the potential downward
pressure on the Macedonian currency.

COMMENT


14. (C) There is a clear consensus within Macedonia that the
only solution for Kosovo is a CDI within the Ahtisaari
framework. Border demarcation and security concerns are
recurrent topics raised by all GOM officials, who have made
it clear that only strong international action and support
will ensure a favorable resolution of both issues.
Politicians of all stripes are convinced that the transition
process for Macedonia could be managed with minimal
disruption, provided a large enough international coalition
recognizes an independent Kosovo before Macedonia does the
same.


15. (C) Even though opposition politicians and think-tankers
criticize the GOM for "not planning, but just hoping for a
solution" on Kosovo, the international community's assessment
of the GOM's efforts is rather positive. Contingency plans
for refugees, provisions of continued supplies of essential
goods, and other security measures already are in place, and
an inter-ministerial working group is drafting contingency
economic plans to respond to a Serbian reaction to Skopje's
recognition of an independent Kosovo. We will continue
working with ethnic Macedonian, ethnic Albanian, and ethnic
Serb party leaders to encourage them to take steps to avoid
any potentially provocative actions in the months before and
after the CDI. PM Gruevski has indicated through his Chief
of Staff that he is willing to discuss some of the
government's Kosovo contingency planning with the other three
main political leaders in the country, and thus shed some
light on what is seen by some as a non-transparent planning
process.


16. (C) Growing ties between Skopje and Pristina, including
recent bilateral contacts at the highest political level,
suggest Macedonia could play a constructive and stabilizing
role in a post-CDI Kosovo. Moreover, Macedonia's imperfect
but functioning multiethnic democracy sets a positive example
for an independent and multiethnic Kosovo and offers the
benefits of good neighborly relations.
MILOVANOVIC