Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE960
2007-12-10 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:
MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI'S DECEMBER 12-13 VISIT TO
how-toVZCZCXRO8219 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSQ #0960/01 3441520 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 101520Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6792 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0121 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000960
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI'S DECEMBER 12-13 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).
SUMMARY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000960
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI'S DECEMBER 12-13 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).
SUMMARY
1. (SBU) FM Milososoki's visit is a timely opportunity to
reinforce the need for continued progress on meeting NATO
membership criteria, including government-opposition
dialogue, combating corruption, and strengthening rule of
law. It is also the right time to tell Milososki that
Macedonia needs to take the Nimetz proposal on the name issue
seriously and to develop an approach to get Skopje past
Athens' veto threat, while underscoring our continued support
for Macedonia's constitutional name. You should express USG
appreciation for Macedonia's solid support on Kosovo, while
underscoring that positive inter-ethnic relations in
Macedonia will bolster regional stability, and reaffirm USG
support for demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border as
outlined in the Ahtisaari Plan. Finally, Macedonia deserves
kudos for its recent decision to double its forces serving in
Iraq, and for its ongoing troop deployments in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, and Lebanon. End summary.
NATO MEMBERSHIP: GAINING MOMENTUM
2. (C) After nearly a year of lackluster performance in
meeting NATO membership objectives, the Macedonian government
is finally acting on our message to accelerate needed
reforms. The governing VMRO party has implemented much of
the five-point "May 29 agreement" the US and the EU had
brokered between governing VMRO and opposition DUI earlier
this year. It has taken additional steps to meet other NATO
benchmarks, including judicial and police reforms. Already
performing strongly on defense reforms and economic criteria,
the GOM's key challenge between now and early 2008 is to
sustain the momentum and complete remaining NATO benchmarks,
including full implementation of the May 29 agreement,
combating corruption, and strengthening rule of law. You can
usefully press Milososki to close all remaining issues before
decisions on membership are made in January.
FIRM ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL NAME
3. (C) Responding to Athens's threat to veto Macedonia's NATO
membership if Skopje does not agree to a compromise on the
name issue before the Bucharest Summit, PM Gruevski has
publicly stated that he would rather forego NATO membership
than agree to any change in the country's constitutional
name. In this he has the support of his political adversary
-- President Crvenkovski -- and the Macedonian public. We
believe, however, that UN Special Envoy Nimetz's recent
framework proposal offers the best chance for a resolution of
the issue: a differentiated name for international usage,
while the constitutional name remains intact. In our view,
Macedonia will be most amenable to such an approach after
receiving a NATO invitation, but for this strategy to succeed
they must lay the groundwork with Greece beforehand.
SUPPORTIVE ON KOSOVO
4. (C) Macedonia fully supports the U.S. stance on Kosovo and
strongly backs the Ahtisaari Plan, especially the Contact
Group's guiding principle of "no changes in borders."
Macedonia will press for demarcation of its border with
Kosovo based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement, an
internationally-accepted, UN-endorsed agreement which
Pristina in the past has rejected. Milososki likely will
seek a US reaffirmation of our support for demarcation on the
basis of the 2001 agreement.
5. (C) Macedonia will follow the U.S. and EU lead on the
timing of its decision to recognize an independent Kosovo,
but will not be in the vanguard of countries recognizing. At
the same time, Skopje acknowledges that in order to preserve
its constructive ties with Pristina, it cannot be among the
last to recognize.
SOLID SECURITY EXPORTER
6. (C) Macedonia continues to be a solid security exporter,
contributing troops to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Lebanon. The parliament recently
approved a government proposal to double, by an additional
SKOPJE 00000960 002 OF 002
platoon, Macedonia's contributions in Iraq. The Macedonians
also are providing at our request a donation of nearly four
metric tons of ammunition for Georgian troops serving in Iraq.
MILOVANOVIC
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: FM MILOSOSKI'S DECEMBER 12-13 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).
SUMMARY
1. (SBU) FM Milososoki's visit is a timely opportunity to
reinforce the need for continued progress on meeting NATO
membership criteria, including government-opposition
dialogue, combating corruption, and strengthening rule of
law. It is also the right time to tell Milososki that
Macedonia needs to take the Nimetz proposal on the name issue
seriously and to develop an approach to get Skopje past
Athens' veto threat, while underscoring our continued support
for Macedonia's constitutional name. You should express USG
appreciation for Macedonia's solid support on Kosovo, while
underscoring that positive inter-ethnic relations in
Macedonia will bolster regional stability, and reaffirm USG
support for demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border as
outlined in the Ahtisaari Plan. Finally, Macedonia deserves
kudos for its recent decision to double its forces serving in
Iraq, and for its ongoing troop deployments in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, and Lebanon. End summary.
NATO MEMBERSHIP: GAINING MOMENTUM
2. (C) After nearly a year of lackluster performance in
meeting NATO membership objectives, the Macedonian government
is finally acting on our message to accelerate needed
reforms. The governing VMRO party has implemented much of
the five-point "May 29 agreement" the US and the EU had
brokered between governing VMRO and opposition DUI earlier
this year. It has taken additional steps to meet other NATO
benchmarks, including judicial and police reforms. Already
performing strongly on defense reforms and economic criteria,
the GOM's key challenge between now and early 2008 is to
sustain the momentum and complete remaining NATO benchmarks,
including full implementation of the May 29 agreement,
combating corruption, and strengthening rule of law. You can
usefully press Milososki to close all remaining issues before
decisions on membership are made in January.
FIRM ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL NAME
3. (C) Responding to Athens's threat to veto Macedonia's NATO
membership if Skopje does not agree to a compromise on the
name issue before the Bucharest Summit, PM Gruevski has
publicly stated that he would rather forego NATO membership
than agree to any change in the country's constitutional
name. In this he has the support of his political adversary
-- President Crvenkovski -- and the Macedonian public. We
believe, however, that UN Special Envoy Nimetz's recent
framework proposal offers the best chance for a resolution of
the issue: a differentiated name for international usage,
while the constitutional name remains intact. In our view,
Macedonia will be most amenable to such an approach after
receiving a NATO invitation, but for this strategy to succeed
they must lay the groundwork with Greece beforehand.
SUPPORTIVE ON KOSOVO
4. (C) Macedonia fully supports the U.S. stance on Kosovo and
strongly backs the Ahtisaari Plan, especially the Contact
Group's guiding principle of "no changes in borders."
Macedonia will press for demarcation of its border with
Kosovo based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement, an
internationally-accepted, UN-endorsed agreement which
Pristina in the past has rejected. Milososki likely will
seek a US reaffirmation of our support for demarcation on the
basis of the 2001 agreement.
5. (C) Macedonia will follow the U.S. and EU lead on the
timing of its decision to recognize an independent Kosovo,
but will not be in the vanguard of countries recognizing. At
the same time, Skopje acknowledges that in order to preserve
its constructive ties with Pristina, it cannot be among the
last to recognize.
SOLID SECURITY EXPORTER
6. (C) Macedonia continues to be a solid security exporter,
contributing troops to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Lebanon. The parliament recently
approved a government proposal to double, by an additional
SKOPJE 00000960 002 OF 002
platoon, Macedonia's contributions in Iraq. The Macedonians
also are providing at our request a donation of nearly four
metric tons of ammunition for Georgian troops serving in Iraq.
MILOVANOVIC