Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE880
2007-11-06 11:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: UNANIMOUS "NO" TO NIMETZ PROPOSAL ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK GR 
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VZCZCXRO8958
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0880/01 3101118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061118Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6680
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0080
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2144
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000880 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (MCCLUNG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: UNANIMOUS "NO" TO NIMETZ PROPOSAL ON
THE NAME

REF: A. SKOPJE 853 (NATO AND NAME)


B. SKOPJE 841 (DICARLO)

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000880

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (MCCLUNG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: UNANIMOUS "NO" TO NIMETZ PROPOSAL ON
THE NAME

REF: A. SKOPJE 853 (NATO AND NAME)


B. SKOPJE 841 (DICARLO)

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY.


1. (C) The GOM, with opposition support, has unanimously
rejected the point in the November 1 Nimetz proposal on the
name that would allow Macedonia to keep its constitutional
name but would require it to agree to a modified name for
international usage. There is consensus as well between the
President and Prime Minister on the issue, with an agreement
to launch a diplomatic offensive in NATO and EU capitals to
explain the Macedonian position. The GOM has also reiterated
its view that a Greek veto of Macedonia's NATO bid over the
name would be a violation of the 1995 Interim Accord that
would annul that agreement. PM Gruevski's hasty public
rejection of the proposal was poorly coordinated and gives
the impression of Macedonian inflexibility in the UN talks, a
point we have underscored with the Prime Minister. We will
press for a low-key approach to the ensuing diplomatic
offensive, and for the GOM's reaffirmation of the positive
points in the Nimetz proposal. End summary.

INITIALLY RESERVED APPROACH...


2. (U) Responding to UN Special Envoy Nimetz's November 1
proposal on the name issue (Macedonia would not have to
change its constitutional name, but would agree to a
differentiated name for international usage),FM Milososki
took an initially cautious and non-committal approach.
Referring to the "guidelines and principles included in the
text" as "generally positive and satisfactory," he built on
an earlier statement by Ambassador Dimitrov, Macedonia's name
negotiator, who told a BBC reporter November 1 that the
proposal contained elements of an eventual solution, some
which "are compatible with our position, and some are not."

...THEN THE FLOODGATES OPEN, "NOs" POUR FORTH


3. (C) PM Gruevski, however, in a statement for the official
news agency on November 2, categorically rejected the second
point of the proposal. Although he said the government would
"keep analyzing" the proposal, and that it contained some

"good" provisions, he noted that the GOM could not accept the
point requiring Macedonia to "accept a name different from
its constitutional one for international use." Gruevski's
hasty rejection both unraveled FM Milososki's more cautious
approach, and violated the confidentiality provisions of the
Nimetz proposal. (NOTE: The Ambassador met with Gruevski
November 5 to raise, inter alia, our concern over his hasty
rejection of the Nimetz proposal and our dismay over his
violation of the confidentiality clause. Gruevski appeared
genuinely surprised to learn that there were confidentiality
provisions, and pointed to the leaks that had followed
Nimetz's October 2005 proposal. He added that he had
consulted with Ambassador Dimitrov before making his
statement. We believe that to some degree poor internal
communication contributed to Gruevski's hasty public misstep.
END NOTE.)


4. (SBU) Gruevski's flat "no" was followed by supportive
public statements by ethnic Albanian coalition partners DPA
and PDP saying that the country's "ultimate priority" is EU
and NATO membership, but that "we are not ready for
compromises which will influence the foundations of the
state." DPA President Thaci told the press that "Greece has
neither the historical nor the political right to demand a
change" of Macedonia's name, while PDP President Vejseli
vowed that the country would "not change our constitutional
name, even if that means we do not enter NATO." Opposition
SDSM also pledged its support for the government on the name
issue.


5. (SBU) Various local constitutional and legal experts also
chimed in, urging the government to reject the Nimetz
proposal. Even DUI President Ahmeti, who did not issue a
public statement on the issue, during a November 1 meeting
with the Ambassador said that he had told Greek FM
Bakoyannis, during a recent conversation, that he would

SKOPJE 00000880 002 OF 002


defend Macedonia's constitutional name.

PRESIDENT CONFIRMS UNANIMOUS "NO" -- GREEK VETO WOULD ANNUL
1995 INTERIM ACCORD


6. (SBU) PM Gruevski met with President Crvenkovski November
5 to discuss the Nimetz proposal, and -- despite their
political differences -- they reportedly reached a unanimous
conclusion rejecting the contentious point requiring a
differentiated name for international usage. Crvenkovski's
cabinet later issued a statement to the press, saying that if
Greece vetoed Macedonia's NATO candidacy over the name, the
"state leadership" in Skopje would consider the 1995 Interim
Accord as having been radically violated and therefore
annulled. Local press reported that Macedonia would launch a
diplomatic offensive to explain its position to EU and NATO
members, and to ask whether they had "blessed" the Nimetz
proposal.

COMMENT


7. (C) We believe PM Gruevski, who does not appear to have a
firm grasp of the detailed developments over the years in the
name discussions, thought he was being constructive when he
made his initial public statement on the name. Having
rejected only one of the several points contained in the
proposal, he likely thought that would be seen as a
reasonable compromise position. Furthermore, he probably
believed that Dimitrov's green light for a Gruevski statement
rejecting any trade-off between the constitutional name and
NATO membership also gave him the go-ahead to reject the
second point of the proposal. That point is artfully crafted
NOT to require Macedonia to modify its constitutional name
but to simply agree to a differentiated name for
international use, a point apparently lost on Gruevski. Now
that the train has left the station, however, we will urge
the GOM to take a lower-key approach to the "lobbying
offensive" in NATO and EU capitals, and to reaffirm the
positive elements in the Nimetz proposal.
MILOVANOVIC