Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE853
2007-10-22 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: MANAGING THE NAME ISSUE AND A NATO

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK GR 
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VZCZCXRO6175
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0853/01 2951656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221656Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6646
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0064
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000853 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER, DAS DICARLO, PDAS VOLKER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: MANAGING THE NAME ISSUE AND A NATO
INVITATION

REF: A. ATHENS 2089


B. SKOPJE 841

Classified By: Ambassador Milovanovic, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000853

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER, DAS DICARLO, PDAS VOLKER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: MANAGING THE NAME ISSUE AND A NATO
INVITATION

REF: A. ATHENS 2089


B. SKOPJE 841

Classified By: Ambassador Milovanovic, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Embassy Athens presents a clear assessment of the name
issue and Macedonia's NATO membership prospects (ref A). We
share Athens, preference for preparing joint recommendations
to Washington, but in this case our two Missions differ
substantially in their assumptions, analysis, recommendations
and expected outcomes. Hence, we feel Washington decision
makers will be best served if both sets of views are
forwarded for consideration. We believe Skopje will not/not
change its constitutional name under pressure, even at the
risk of losing a NATO invitation, and that continued Greek
pressure will reduce the GOM,s maneuver room to engage on
broader confidence-building areas. The GOM will argue that,
consistent with past enlargements, NATO membership should be
performance-based, not subject to the insertion of additional
bilateral criteria. The GOM name negotiator is actively
engaged with Matthew Nimetz, and the GOM is committed to
continued talks through the UN process, primarily with the
aim of finding a mutually acceptable name for use in
bilateral relations with Greece. GOM overtures to the GOG
regarding face to face talks have met with no success thus
far, but willingness remains in Skopje to pursue such talks.
We believe that if the U.S. no longer holds Greece to abiding
by the 1995 Interim Agreement, and/or the name issue is
recast as a multilateral matter, Skopje would react
negatively and emotionally and becoming less able to
compromise.


2. (C) At present, the problem as we see it is not the name.
The problem is Greece,s tactical decision (hugely
facilitated by the tone deaf, bull-headed actions of the VMRO
and the PM personally in his early months in government) to
attempt to renege on the 1995 Interim Agreement in the
erroneous belief that Macedonians will be willing to
sacrifice the name of their country in return for NATO
membership. What is needed is to start genuinely to restore

some confidence between the two countries and to provide
sufficient face-saving for the GoG to allow them to accept a
NATO invitation for Macedonia (if it meets NATO standards).
Bilateral talks, focused on any of the plethora of less
contentious issues of genuine importance to the two
countries, offer a good approach. Macedonia would be open to
such talks.


3. (C) A key step to reaching our goal is to eliminate all
hope that the U.S., EU members, or other third parties are
going to attempt to broker or design agreements to stave off
the inevitable, whether the inevitable is defined as almost
universal recognition of Macedonia,s constitutional name or
a Greek veto to Macedonia,s NATO bid. So long as there is
the belief that we will intervene, reluctance to get on with
the job, talk directly to one another, and begin to rebuild
relations will persist.


4. (C) We believe the key to managing the name issue and a
NATO invitation for Macedonia is to ensure continued
adherence by both sides to the 1995 Interim Accord, and in
the meantime to engage in direct discussions on a broad range
of issues of mutual concern, including addressing Greek fears
of alleged irredentist tendencies in Macedonia and how to
address them. Outside efforts to mediate or compel a
solution would, we believe, entangle us in a process that
would in the end simply produce frustration and resentment on
both sides, and jeopardize our relations with one or both of
the actors. END SUMMARY

TWO PERSPECTIVES


5. (C) Embassy Athens clearly and cogently presents its
assessment of the situation, the key issues as seen from
Greece, and recommendations for a way ahead (ref A). We have
a different perspective, and believe that we can best help
decision makers in Washington by providing both sets of
analyses and recommendations rather than trying to craft a
unified position.

SKOPJE: NO CONSTITUTIONAL NAME CHANGE, WHATEVER THE PRICE


6. (C) There is no likelihood that any Macedonian government,
whatever its party stripes, would accept a change to
Macedonia's constitutional name, either before April 2008 or
subsequently. The prospect of Macedonia's NATO bid being
vetoed by Greece, despite the commitments it undertook in the
1995 Interim Agreement, will not generate credible leverage

SKOPJE 00000853 002 OF 003


in Skopje. Athens, aided and abetted by the bull-headed
actions of VMRO and PM Gruevski in their early months in
government, is miscalculating if it decides to renege on the
1995 Interim Agreement in the belief that Macedonians would
be willing to sacrifice their country's name in return for
NATO membership.


7. (C) The name issue is consistently at the top of the
public's foreign policy concerns, and there is seamless
solidarity on the issue across all parties and throughout the
public. In fact, although the GOM is steadfast in supporting
the 1995 Interim Agreement under which it accepts to enter
international organizations as Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, most Macedonians, according to one recent
television survey, would rather forgo NATO membership than
enter as FYROM, despite the 90 percent public support for
NATO membership as a whole.

NATO MEMBERSHIP -- PERFORMANCE MATTERS. PERIOD.


8. (C) The GOM believes, consistent with previous
enlargements, that it should receive a NATO membership
invitation if it meets the MAP criteria. It sees the name
issue as an additional prerequisite not required of any other
NATO aspirant. Aside from Macedonia,s own response to the
addition of name-related criteria to the menu of NATO
requirements, we believe that accepting to insert a bilateral
conditionality not tied to performance into the multilateral
MAP NATO process would constitute an unhelpful precedent for
future candidacies. Future NATO aspirants might find
themselves blocked in the same manner ) on non-MAP grounds--
by one NATO member.

COMMITTED TO CONTINUE ENGAGEMENT


9. (C) The GOM remains actively engaged in the UN process to
find a mutually acceptable name that will replace FYROM in
bilateral dealings with Athens. Skopje believes that, with
118 countries already recognizing its constitutional name,
the permanent name is already an objective fact, and their
argument that the name issue is a bilateral problem between
Athens and Skopje is thereby reinforced. The fact that the
GOM has kept Ambassador Dimitrov, probably the country's most
capable diplomat, as the name negotiator is a positive sign
that the government is committed to finding a solution under
the dual-name rubric, given that changing the constitutional
name is not an option from the GoM,s perspective.
Additionally, the fact that Dimitrov has met several times
with Nimetz recently despite multiple other taskings by the
Prime Minister, is a further indication that the GOM is
committed to action in the UN Channel.

THE MORE ONE PUSHES, THE MORE THE OTHER DIGS IN


10. (C) The increasingly shrill public campaign of menacing
public statements by Greek leaders and spokespersons (and the
recent name-related harassment of the Macedonian team in
Thessaloniki that led to the withdrawal of the 130-strong
delegation of Macedonian youth sportsmen from a regional
games competition),is steadily reducing whatever slight
wiggle room there exists for Skopje to act constructively,
whether on the name or on the broader issue of face to face
talks to build confidence and calm tempers.


11. (C) So far, the GOM has exercised restraint, either
declining to respond to Greek statements or "interpreting"
them in such a way as to leave room for a response that does
not lead to escalated rhetoric. This restraint cannot be
taken for granted, since every indication of a failure to
counter Athens's verbal blows, at least rhetorically, is seen
as a political liability for the government. If the gloves
eventually come off, to use a metaphor drawn from PM
Gruevski's boxing past, the rhetorical temperature will rise
and the government's attitude will become even more rigid.

ACCOMMODATING TO THE INEVITABLE


12. (C) Macedonia believes that the name issue will resolve
itself over time as additional countries recognize
Macedonia's constitutional name. The United States cannot
&fix8 the name problem. In fact, the problem is &fixing8
itself with time, but the solution likely to emerge through
facts on the ground is one that ) very understandably * is
distasteful to the GoG. As Embassy Athens has noted, there
has been a tendency of the GoG to paint itself into a corner
(a reflex well-known in Skopje too, though not on the name
issue) instead of preparing the public for an inevitable
policy shift.

SKOPJE 00000853 003 OF 003



MANAGING THE TRANSITION WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT


13. (C) We agree that the Greek side, especially with its
slimmer parliamentary majority, needs help to make that
transition. We do not believe, however, that injecting
ourselves directly or indirectly into mediation or
facilitation of talks that can easily take place without
outside assistance will improve outcomes. It will, instead,
prolong the incorrect Greek assumption that their problem is
our problem. It would also give the Macedonians the wrong
impression ) which they do not yet have - that their problem
is our problem. The key will be to avoid giving either side
the false hope that the U.S., EU members, or other third
parties are going to help broker or deliver an agreement that
will prevent an inevitable outcome, whether that outcome is
almost universal recognition of Macedonia's constitutional
name or a Greek veto of Macedonia's NATO bid.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?


14. (C) What, then, can be done to square the circle and help
ensure Macedonia receives a NATO invitation if it fulfills
the criteria, while reassuring Greece that Macedonia has no
irredentist intentions toward its vastly more powerful and
influential southern neighbor? Two things.


15. (C) First, we should ensure both sides re-state that
until they agree on some alternative solution, they agree to
adhere to the 1995 Interim Agreement. We should be sure that
both sides understand that, if they fail to do so, they
cannot expect us to support them in arriving at alternate
outcomes. In the meantime, we would lean on Skopje to avoid
reacting to provocations, to ensure they resist the urge to
provoke the other side. If presented with specific
information regarding offending materials, we would also
ensure they took concrete, measurable steps to explain the
facts and as appropriate to address Greek concerns about
allegedly irredentist textbooks, medals, maps, etc.


16. (C) Second, we believe Macedonia is ready, even without
any third-party mediation, to meet directly with Greek
counterparts to begin discussions on a broader range of
issues in order to: 1) de-escalate tensions, and 2) begin to
build confidence through small practical achievements. If
necessary, we could help facilitate a process and place where
the Macedonians and Greece would talk directly to each other,
not through us or with us, about a range of issues (not only
the name),to include Greece's concerns about alleged
Macedonian irredentism and how to address those concerns
outside of the name discussions. Certainly both Embassy
Skopje and Embassy Athens, in close coordination with each
other, should be prepared to be behind-the-scenes coaches and
mentors to their host governments to help keep them on track.
For example, lowering Athens, rhetoric and keeping
Skopje,s down will be important, as will ensuring that both
sides understand that if public reiterations of the 1995
Agreement or elements of the Macedonian constitution become
part of building confidence, such statements will need to be
rigorously evenhanded ) involving equal pledges on both
sides. The agenda for such discussions should be broad
enough to cover areas where they already share strong and
often win-win mutual interests, including: border control
regimes, trade ties, investment, energy cooperation, roads,
and tourism, so that they begin to build more of an interest
in partnership than in name-calling.
MILOVANOVIC