Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE841
2007-10-18 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: DAS DICARLO FOCUSES ON NATO REFORMS,

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO MK GR 
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VZCZCXRO3237
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0841/01 2911628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181628Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6630
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0058
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2140
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000841 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/SCE FOR PFEUFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DAS DICARLO FOCUSES ON NATO REFORMS,
NAME DISPUTE, AND KOSOVO IN MEETINGS WITH GOM LEADERS

REF: A. SKOPJE 815 (SJC)


B. SKOPJE 812 (IRAQ TROOPS)

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000841

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/SCE FOR PFEUFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DAS DICARLO FOCUSES ON NATO REFORMS,
NAME DISPUTE, AND KOSOVO IN MEETINGS WITH GOM LEADERS

REF: A. SKOPJE 815 (SJC)


B. SKOPJE 812 (IRAQ TROOPS)

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) In meetings with government leaders in Skopje October
9-10, DAS DiCarlo told her interlocutors that time is running
out for Macedonia to show more concrete progress on reforms
required for NATO membership, including enhanced political
dialogue, improved President-PM cohabitation, and
implementation of the May 29 Agreement between governing VMRO
and opposition ethnic Albanian DUI. She pressed for more
confidence-building steps from Skopje to demonstrate goodwill
to Athens on the name dispute, including renaming "Alexander
the Great Airport." On Kosovo, she underscored the
importance of US and EU unity on a status outcome, and
reassured her interlocutors of continued USG support for the
Ahtisaari plan's provisions on border demarcation.


2. (C) DAS DiCarlo's interlocutors agreed on the need for
improved political consensus-building and dialogue, but
President Crvenkovski was skeptical that PM Gruevski would
return any goodwill shown on the President's part. Both PM
Gruevski and FM Milososki highlighted progress Macedonia has
made on several reform fronts, but acknowledged slow progress
on implementation of the May 29 Agreement. All three agreed
on the need for confidence-building steps with Athens and
continued negotiations at the UN on the name, but they also
underscored that changing Macedonia's constitutional name was
non-negotiable and that there was no chance of reversing the
decision to rename the airport. They reiterated the
importance EU unity would have in paving the way for
Macedonia to follow US and EU actions on recognition of an
independent Kosovo; FM Milososki suggested the GOM could work
with some skeptical EU countries to persuade them of the
positive impact resolution of Kosovo's status would have on
regional stability. End summary.

MEETINGS WITH GOM OFFICIALS OCTOBER 9-10



3. (U) EUR DAS DiCarlo, accompanied by Ambassador and P/E
Chief (notetaker) met with President Crvenkovski, PM
Gruevski, FM Milososki, and President of Parliament
Georgievski during her October 9-10 visit to Skopje. She
also met with the leaders of the two main opposition parties
in Macedonia, SDSM and DUI (septel).

FOCUS ON NATO REFORMS


4. (SBU) DAS DiCarlo reminded her interlocutors that the USG
supported Macedonia's NATO aspirations and recognized the
important progress the country had made on the defense and
other reforms required for membership. Time was short,
however, and there was still much to do to convince skeptical
Allies that Macedonia would be ready to receive an invitation
at the 2008 NATO Summit. As priority tasks, the government
needed to "do a U-turn" and work with the opposition to build
a stronger consensus on needed reforms, communicate more
effectively with the President, and show progress on
implementation of the May 29 Agreement between VMRO and
ethnic Albanian DUI.


5. (C) President Crvenkovski agreed on the need for broader
political consensus on reforms, noting that he and the GOM
had nearly closed a deal he had proposed on the composition
of the State Judicial Council, or SJC (ref A). PM Gruevski
at the last minute had maneuvered around the deal, however,
to force a solution that lacked broader buy-in, alienating
DUI in the process. On cohabitation, Crvenkovski said he
would accept the GOM's recent proposed list of ambassadorial
nominations (ref A),but was skeptical the GOM would
reciprocate with flexibility on other priority matters.


6. (SBU) PM Gruevski recited a litany of government
achievements over the year related to Macedonia's NATO bid,
including an improved TI Corruption Perceptions Index rating,
an increase in exports and FDI, tripling of the budget for
equitable representation, passage of a religious freedom law,
and the near completion of the composition of the SJC. He
noted that VMRO was engaged in "regular" dialogue with DUI,

SKOPJE 00000841 002 OF 003


but admitted there was still no agreement on the May 29
Agreement's provisions for a draft language law and
compensation for the victims of the 2001 conflict.


7. (SBU) FM Milososki noted that the MFA was engaged in an
outreach effort to other NATO allies to make the case for the
country's membership prospects. He agreed that enhanced
political consensus and dialogue were challenges the GOM had
to overcome, and suggested the GOM would work with the
opposition to eventually implement the Law on Police, a key
NATO membership-related reform that would require DUI's
cooperation.


8. (SBU) The Ambassador interjected that the way things were
accomplished in Macedonia often was as important as what was
actually achieved -- implementing the police law would
require the cooperation of DUI-run municipalities, and the
government, in bypassing DUI on the SJC, had created a
tougher atmosphere for future attempts to work with that
party. Milososki agreed on the need for improved
communication between VMRO and DUI, suggesting that another
meeting between PM Gruevski and DUI President Ahmeti might
contribute to that goal.

CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL NAME: "MISSION IMPOSSIBLE"


9. (C) In addition to carrying out NATO membership-related
reform efforts, DAS DiCarlo said, the GOM also should avoid
provocations related to the name dispute with Greece, and
should show good faith efforts in the ongoing UN talks on the
name issue. She suggested the GOM consider
confidence-building steps it could undertake to demonstrate
its goodwill toward Athens, including reversing the decision
to rename Skopje Airport as "Alexander the Great Airport,"
which the Greeks had seen as a deliberate provocation.


10. (C) President Crvenkovski replied that it was clear
Athens was trying to use NATO and EU leverage to extract a
compromise solution from Macedonia. He also acknowledged the
need for additional confidence-building steps, admitting that
the renaming of the airport as "Alexander the Great Airport"
had been ill-timed. Crvenkovski said he understood the
high-level USG messages he had received regarding the need to
demonstrate sincerity in the ongoing name dispute
negotiations under UN auspices. That would be hard to do,
however, if the Greeks continued to demand that Macedonia
change its constitutional name -- a "mission impossible."


11. (C) In a later tete-a-tete meeting, PM Gruevski was
adamant that he could not reverse the decision to rename the
Skopje airport. Separately, President of Parliament
Georgievski noted that Greece insisted on exclusive rights to
what the Macedonians believe is a "shared history." Such
attitudes were out of place in the more "inclusive" 21st
century, he said. FM Milososki said Skopje would continue to
use the "power of argument" to counter Athens's employment of
the "arguments of power" on the name, but in doing so would
try to keep a "low profile" on the matter. Milososki added
that he would welcome a meeting with the Greek Foreign
Minister to discuss the name dispute.

KOSOVO -- THE NEED FOR EU UNITY


12. (C) DAS DiCarlo briefed her interlocutors on Kosovo
developments. She underscored that the talks could not
continue indefinitely, that the December 10 deadline was
firm, and that if there was no agreement we thought the
Ahtisaari plan remained the best way forward. Partition was
"not on the table," she added, and the USG would also hold
the Kosovars to their acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan's
provisions on border demarcation.


13. (C) President Crvenkovski noted that the GOM kept saying
publicly that Kosovo status would not endanger stability and
security in Macedonia, but he acknowledged that any solution
would carry with it some risk for the country. The
government feared any attempt to divide Kosovo, but feared
"even more a frozen status quo that would leave Kosovo status
an open question." Crvenkovski was confident Macedonia could
tackle any challenge from a Kosovo status outcome, provided
inter-ethnic relations in the country remained stable. On
recognition of a Kosovo UDI, Crvenkovski said Macedonia would

SKOPJE 00000841 003 OF 003


want to follow the lead of Washington and the EU, if the
latter could manage a united front.


14. (C) PM Gruevski echoed Crvenkovski's point on the need
for a united EU position on Kosovo. He said the GOM's
positive role on Kosovo status issues had soured relations
between Skopje and Belgrade, but that Serbia eventually had
come to understand, if not accept, Macedonia's position.
Milososki echoed that theme, and said he hoped Belgrade's
threat to retaliate against Skopje if the GOM recognized an
independent Kosovo was "only rhetorical." He offered that
Macedonian might be able to work with countries like Hungary
and Slovakia to bring them closer to a hoped-for EU unified
position by convincing them of the positive effect resolution
of Kosovo's status would have on regional stability.

POSITIVELY CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR IRAQ


15. (C) Responding to DAS DiCarlo's praise of Macedonian
troops serving in Iraq, President Crvenkovski said the GOM
would soon complete its review of a USG request for an
additional Macedonian platoon for those operations (ref B).
He had asked to meet with the Prime Minister and his cabinet
to discuss the request. The GOM would consider its financial
capacity to fund the deployment, military capabilities, and
the political sustainability of an increased mission. He
expected to be able to give a positive reply within the next
week.


16. (U) DAS DiCarlo cleared this cable.
MILOVANOVIC