MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON NAME ISSUE, KOSOVO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000767

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON NAME ISSUE, KOSOVO,
SECURITY MATTERS, TROOPS FOR GWOT

REF: A. SKOPJE 766


B. SKOPJE 736

C. SKOPJE 698

D. SKOPJE 712

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) During a September 19 meeting with the Ambassador to
discuss cohabitation challenges (ref A),President
Crvenkovski expressed concern that Macedonia might be pushed
to the wall in its name dispute with Greece before the 2008
NATO Summit, underscored that there is no difference between
Skopje and Washington on Kosovo status issues, and agreed
with the Ambassador that recent criminal incidents in the
border area with Kosovo did not present a security threat to
Macedonia. The Ambassador highlighted the continuing
importance for Macedonia of demonstrating a constructive
approach and low media profile on the name issue. She also
told Crvenkovski that the U.S. would welcome additional
Macedonian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, if that could be
done without undermining defense reforms and Macedonia's NATO
membership prospects. On the name issue, the best we can
hope for from Skopje, if Athens decides to press for a
resolution of the dispute prior to the Bucharest Summit, is
an offer to engage in confidence building measures via
bilateral talks, and a restatement of its dual name offer.
End summary.

NAME ISSUE -- TAKE THE HIGH ROAD


2. (C) During her September 19 meeting with President
Crvenkovski to discuss cohabitation challenges (ref A),the
Ambassador also raised the name dispute with Greece and other
bilateral issues. On the name issue, she noted that the
President generally had in the past acted with restraint in
responding to statements from Athens regarding the name and
Macedonia's NATO membership prospects. She encouraged him to
stick to the high road in dealing with future developments on
the issue.


3. (C) The Ambassador advised that it was best to avoid
verbal confrontations with Athens and to instead focus on the
UN process for resolving the dispute. That would help the
USG make the case for strict adherence by both sides to the
1995 Interim Agreement. She encouraged Crvenkovski to
consider constructive actions the country could take to show
that Skopje was being reasonable in its behavior toward
Greece. It would be important to try to keep the issue out of
the media spotlight, which could only inflame the situation.


4. (C) Crvenkovski said that, in the aftermath of the Greek
elections, Macedonia was entering a "critical period" that
would extend to the April 2008 NATO Summit. His main worry
was whether UN Special Envoy Nimetz would submit a new
proposal during that timeframe which would be unacceptable
to Macedonia. If so, he expected Euro-Atlantic attitudes
toward Macedonia's NATO candidacy to sour; the country would
be blamed for being inflexible on the matter. That outcome
would unjustly "feed Greek arguments" that Macedonia was not
demonstrating the will to resolve the dispute.


5. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on September 20, FM
Milososki said that the GOM is considering proposing direct
bilateral talks with the Greeks, to supplement but not
supplant the UN discussions under Nimetz. The direct talks,
to be held parallel to the UN process, could (subject to PM
Gruevski's approval) include discussion of
confidence-building measures such a bilateral commission on
history textbooks in each country's schools. Milososki also
said that he had ordered the MFA not to broadcast the latest
recognition, by Canada, of Macedonia's constitutional name
for use in bilateral relations. Despite the effort, someone
outside of the MFA, possibly Canada's honorary consul in
Skopje, had leaked the news to the press. Milososki added
that the GOM nevertheless would continue, in its public
statements, to downplay this development.

KOSOVO -- NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SKOPJE AND WASHINGTON ON
STATUS QUESTION

SKOPJE 00000767 002 OF 003




6. (SBU) On Kosovo, the Ambassador said we would keep
Crvenkovski and the government briefed on developments as
they unfolded. Kosovo elections in November would be a
significant hurdle, and we would want Macedonia to continue
to play a constructive role as a stabilizing force in the
region. It would be important for all parties in Macedonia
to avoid speculation on possible status-related outcomes,
especially regarding partition concerns.


7. (C) The President agreed that Macedonia needed to
demonstrate a calm and constructive attitude in responding to
Kosovo developments. Talk of partition from any quarter was
"dangerous and destabilizing." He assured the Ambassador
that there was "no difference between Skopje and Washington"
on the Kosovo status question.


8. (C) In his September 20 meeting with the Ambassador, FM
Milososki volunteered that he has been regularly underscoring
to EU members the importance of working for a unified
position on Kosovo status, and of the need for a speedy
resolution of the status issue after December 10. MFA State
Counselor for Multilateral Affairs Svetlana Geleva told us
the same day that the GOM hopes for a unified EU position
that would make it easier for Macedonia to also follow the
U.S. lead when the recognition issue comes up. She said MFA
officials also are telling their EU counterparts that the
large ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia will make it
difficult for the GOM to delay recognition much beyond a U.S.
decision to recognize an independent Kosovo. END NOTE.

SECURITY MATTERS


9. (C) Referring to some recent shooting incidents and other
criminal action in the border region villages of Vaksince and
Tanusevci (refs B, C, and D),the Ambassador told Crvenkovski
that we did not view the incidents as presenting a threat to
Macedonia's security, despite wild local media speculation to
the contrary, nor did we think the incidents were linked. We
were confident that the Ministry of Interior was able to
operate throughout the country, including in the areas in
which the incidents had taken place.


10. (C) Crvenkovski agreed that the incidents were unrelated,
and that there were no links between the perpetrators and
Kosovo, as had been suggested in the local media. Kosovo
leaders wanted stability, he said, and would discourage
actions by Kosovar citizens in Macedonia that could threaten
stability. He attributed the incidents more to the rivalry
between DPA (ethnic Albanian governing coalition partner) and
DUI (main ethnic Albanian opposition party) than to any
challenges to Macedonian stability. He added that neither
party had tried to communicate with the communities in the
affected areas to determine and help address their basic
needs, which were substantial.

TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN


11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Crvenkovski (who as Head of
State is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) for
Macedonia's troop contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan. She
welcomed his upcoming October visit to Afghanistan to meet
with Macedonian troops serving with ISAF as a positive signal
of the country's commitment to democracy and stability in
Afghanistan. She added that we very much appreciated the
deployments. It was important for Macedonia not to
over-stretch its capacities in a way that might undermine
defense reforms and the country's NATO candidacy, but if
Macedonia were able to contribute any more troops to either
operation without a negative impact on those reforms, that
would be welcomed. Crvenkovski took the points on board.

COMMENT


12. (C) Crvenkovski and the GOM share identical positions on
the name issue, one of the few substantive areas on which
they agree. Neither party has indicated, in any
conversations with us, that there would be any flexibility on
the Macedonian side in terms of modifying the country's
constitutional name if push came to shove with the Greeks
(the PM's Chief of Staff told us on September 20 that any

SKOPJE 00000767 003 OF 003


party here "would commit political suicide" if they changed
the name). In our view, the best we can hope for from
Skopje, if Athens decides to up the ante and press for a
resolution of the name dispute prior to the Bucharest Summit,
is an offer to engage in confidence building measures via
bilateral talks, and a restatement of the willingness to find
a mutually acceptable name for relations with Greece,
consistent with dual name approach which the GOM considers
its "final offer" in the matter.
MILOVANOVIC