Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE766
2007-09-20 07:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON COHABITATION CHALLENGES

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK KV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6536
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RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000766 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON COHABITATION CHALLENGES

REF: A. SKOPJE 730


B. SKOPJE 719

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT ON COHABITATION CHALLENGES

REF: A. SKOPJE 730


B. SKOPJE 719

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d).

SUMMARY


1. (C) President Crvenkovski outlined for the Ambassador on
September 19 his proposal for working with Prime Minister
Gruevski to improve cohabitation and to resolve the issue of
composing the State Judicial Council (SJC),a key NATO
membership-related task. Gruevski's initial crude rebuff of
the proposal risks closing the window of opportunity
Crvenkovski has opened. We will press the GOM to show
greater flexibility in responding to the President's proposal
which, if implemented, could strengthen Macedonia's NATO
candidacy. End summary.

COHABITATION -- A STEP FORWARD....


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with President Crvenkovski, at
his request, September 19 to discuss cohabitation challenges
(septel reports on his views on the name issue, Kosovo, and
security matters). Crvenkovski started the meeting by
outlining an initiative he had unveiled on September 17 to
try to improve cohabitation with Prime Minister Gruevski in
order to break the deadlock over the composition of the
15-member State Judicial Council (SJC). He said he had
stated his willingness to give up his constitutional power to
propose candidates for two of the five SJC seats that remain
unfilled, as long as the government and opposition could
agree on the appointment of all five SJC positions -- the
President's two seats and the Parliament's three seats to
nominate. (NOTE: Of the 15 SJC seats, 10 already have been
filled. END NOTE.)


3. (SBU) In terms of process, Crvenkovski said he had
suggested starting with the list of the 35 qualified
candidates who applied, and then working with the leaders of
the four major parties in the parliament (governing VMRO and
DPA, and opposition SDSM and DUI) to whittle the list down to
five final candidates through a process of elimination. He
pledged to approve any list of five final candidates, as long
as they were acceptable to the group of four party leaders,
were not politically affiliated, and were unlikely to

exercise political influence on the judiciary.


4. (SBU) Crvenkovski also proposed breaking the deadlock on
appointment of new Macedonian ambassadors to 10 vacant posts
by agreeing to approve candidates from a list of 106 MFA
diplomats who meet the qualifications stipulated under the
Law on Foreign Affairs. He pointed out that, under the law,
two-thirds of ambassadorial posts overseas are to be filled
by career diplomats; under the current government, only 10
percent of ambassadors meet that requirement. As a result,
he had agreed to let the GOM select the candidates, including
for such key posts as NATO and the EU. He would accept those
candidates without pre-consultations (even though the law
required such consultations),as long as they were chosen
from the list of career diplomats eligible to assume the rank
of Ambassador.

....AN AWKWARD TANGO, PROTOCOL BREACHES


5. (C) Instead of responding to his ideas for breaking the
logjam, Crvenkovski said (and the media has widely reported),
PM Gruevski had counterproposed to meet on September 20 to
discuss the State Judicial Council and other priority issues.
The President was not averse to meeting but found the
proposed timing for the meeting frustrating -- why did
Gruevski need to wait another two days to act? Time was
running out for Macedonia to obtain a favorable EU progress
report from Brussels, the President added. "What on the
Prime Minister's calendar could be more urgent than solving
these issues?" he asked rhetorically.


6. (C) In addition to stalling for three days, Gruevski had
informed the President in his letter that the President
should meet the Prime Minister in the latter's cabinet,
instead of in the President's office, a breach of standard
protocol (and a further public snug by Gruevski). "Never

SKOPJE 00000766 002 OF 002


before in the history of Macedonia," Crvenkovski said, "has a
President been summoned to a Prime Minister's office."
Adding insult to injury, the Gruevski proposal had addressed
the President as "Mr. Crvenkovski," another egregious breach
of protocol reflecting Gruevski's long-standing refusal to
accept the legitimacy (confirmed by OSCE and ODIHR at the
time) of Crvenkovski's 2004 election to office.

NEED TO DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL MATURITY, RESULTS


7. (C) The Ambassador said we welcomed President
Crvenkovski's initiative and agreed that it was unfortunate
that the GOM had not reacted to the proposal with greater
dispatch. We also wanted faster movement on the SJC
composition, and had told the GOM as much on several
occasions. All parties needed to show that the political
system in Macedonia could function properly. Crvenkovski
replied that, even if the meeting with Gruevski failed to
materialize, he would join the follow-on meeting Gruevski had
proposed for the same day with SDSM, DUI, and DPA, and to
which the President had been invited.

A DANGEROUS SCENARIO -- EARLY ELECTIONS


8. (C) Responding to a question from the Ambassador,
Crvenkovski said the reason there had been no progress on
resolving the SJC issue in the past several months through
discussions with the opposition, was that Gruevski had
shifted direction and had instead tried to buy off the
smaller ethnic minorities with amendments to the electoral
code (ref A),in exchange for their support for government
candidates for the SJC. He had tried to push through the
electoral code amendments, without consulting the opposition,
in order to quickly gain support for finalizing composition
of the SJC.


9. (C) These tactical maneuvers were part of Gruevski's plan
for what Crvenkovski described as a "dangerous scenario" in
which the Prime Minister would call snap elections in May
2008, provided Macedonia received a NATO membership
invitation at the Bucharest Summit. This, the President
believed, explained Gruevski's neglect of EU priorities.
Gruevski had concluded the EU was a distant goal and was not
focused on it, but this, the President acknowledged, could in
turn hurt Macedonia's progress on completing NATO tasks. At
any rate, the President said, Gruevski believed that NATO
membership for Macedonia already was a foregone conclusion.
(NOTE: See ref B for an assessment of the likelihood of early
elections before/before the Bucharest Summit. END NOTE.)


10. (C) The Ambassador replied that such logic, if Gruevski
bought it, was deeply flawed. The USG could only support
Macedonia's NATO candidacy if the country met the membership
criteria. No decision on membership had been made yet, and
in any event Gruevski had to realize that there was a natural
overlap between EU and NATO membership criteria. We would
continue to work with Gruevski and the rest of the GOM, as we
had been for months, to make this clear and to keep them
focused on completing the tasks related to their
Euro-Atlantic integration goals.

COMMENT


11. (C) Crvenkovski's statesmanlike initiative opens a window
of opportunity that could improve cohabitation, resolve the
SJC issue, and strengthen Macedonia's NATO and EU candidacies
if Prime Minister Gruevski seizes the moment. Gruevski's
initial crude rebuff risks closing that window; it could be
weeks or months -- time which Macedonia cannot afford to lose
-- before a similar opportunity arises. We will work with
the GOM to keep the window open and ensure both sides
demonstrate the flexibility to capitalize on this opportunity
to advance Macedonia's NATO bid.
MILOVANOVIC