Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE719
2007-09-05 16:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: EARLY ELECTIONS NIPPED IN THE BUD?

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8789
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0719/01 2481600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051600Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6480
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0018
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 4333
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000719 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: EARLY ELECTIONS NIPPED IN THE BUD?

REF: A. PFEUFFER-NAVRATIL EMAIL DTD 9/1/07


B. SKOPJE 709

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(b) & (d).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000719

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: EARLY ELECTIONS NIPPED IN THE BUD?

REF: A. PFEUFFER-NAVRATIL EMAIL DTD 9/1/07


B. SKOPJE 709

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(b) & (d).

SUMMARY


1. (C) The prospect of early elections in Macedonia probably
has receded following a joint U.S.-EU demarche September 4 to
relay points to Prime Minister Gruevski's cabinet on the
potential risks to the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations of
such action. However, the early elections option could
re-emerge in the event Gruevski surrenders to the temptation
of an easy electoral victory if his approval ratings continue
to rise, opposition obstructionism continues, and his
coalition allies burden him with what he considers excessive
demands. End summary.

HIGHLIGHTING POTENTIAL RISKS OF EARLY ELECTIONS


2. (C) The Charge, accompanied by P/E Chief and EUSR POLAD
Walsh, drew upon ref A points on early elections to PM
Gruevski's Chief of Staff, Martin Protogjer, and to
Gruevski's foreign policy adviser, Andre Lepavcov, on
September 4. The Charge underscored that, although it was
the GOM's decision whether to proceed to early elections as
the MFA's State Secretary had recently outlined to us (ref
B),seriously flawed elections would color views in Brussels
and Washington regarding the strength of the country's
democratic institutions. Furthermore, they would distract
the government from reform efforts that could call into
question the country's readiness for NATO membership. That,
in turn, could undermine investor confidence, both foreign
and domestic.


3. (C) The Charge also emphasized that flawed elections and
disruptive post-election coalition building efforts would be
viewed with concern as potentially destabilizing just when
the Kosovo status process was entering a critical phase.
EUSR POLAD Walsh told Protogjer that the EU fully shared the
USG perspective. She added that a flawed electoral process
could further delay the EU's decision to define a date for
beginning accession negotiations with Skopje.

IMPROVING PARLIAMENTARY EFFICIENCY AND COALITION RELATIONS
THROUGH EARLY ELECTIONS


4. (C) Protogjer said he shared U.S. and EU concerns about

the timing of early elections, especially in relation to
Kosovo status developments. However, he said, the government
was being "pushed into" an early elections scenario by an
inefficient parliament characterized by constant opposition
moves to block the passage of reform legislation. The
opposition was intent on destroying the ruling party's
chances of earning of a NATO membership invitation in 2008
and wanted to block current GOM attempts to combat crime and
corruption.


5. (C) Early elections, given the Prime Minister's and
VMRO-DPMNE ruling party's high poll ratings, would change the
political dynamics in the parliament and allow the government
to sidestep opposition obstructionism, said Protogjer. In
the event a new coalition government was formed after the
elections (implying a VMRO alliance with ethnic opposition
DUI),intra-coalition relations ostensibly would improve.
Nevertheless, he said the early elections idea was only being
"discussed informally" within VMRO's executive board at this
time.


6. (C) Responding to Protogjer's comments, the Charge noted
that a hallmark of democracy is the ability to work with the
opposition to reach compromises on important issues, such as
the various political and judicial reform measures Macedonia
is pursuing in connection with its Euro-Atlantic integration
efforts. EUSR's Walsh added that, in terms of Macedonia's EU
aspirations, the government had to demonstrate it could reach
a consensus with the opposition on passing certain key reform
laws.

EARLY ELECTIONS NOT ON THE TABLE?


SKOPJE 00000719 002 OF 002



7. (C) Foreign policy adviser Lepavcov, in a separate
meeting, noted that Gruevski recently had stated publicly
that he "was not thinking about (early elections) at the
moment." That position could change, however, if Gruevski's
coalition partners DPA and NSDP increased pressure on the
coalition with increasing demands, in which case the early
elections option would be put back on the table. (NOTE:
Opposition DUI in principle opposes early elections, since it
believes Gruevski's junior coalition partner DPA would
manipulate them in order to ensure DPA's survival in the
coalition. Nevertheless, DUI VP Arifi recently told us the
party would not rule out a coalition with Gruevski in the
future, but that such an arrangement would require careful
and extended preparatory work between the two parties. END
NOTE.)


8. (C) Later the same day, Protogjer contacted us to report
that he had briefed PM Gruevski on our conversation and that
Gruevski had decided the government would not call early
elections, "either before or immediately after the April 2008
NATO summit in Bucharest." Protogjer said the government
intended to serve out its full mandate (until 2010) and to
then compete in and win elections based on a solid record of
accomplishments. He did note that the GOM would ask us (U.S.
and EU) for assistance in working with the opposition to get
them to stop blocking legislative processes and to play a
more constructive role in relations with the GOM.

COMMENT


9. (C) Although the likelihood of early elections probably
has receded for now in the face of the joint U.S.-EU
demarche, the temptation of an easy electoral win could prove
too great for Gruevski to resist if his poll numbers continue
to rise, opposition obstructionism persists, and his
coalition partners place what he perceives to be excessive
demands on him. Gruevski also wants to keep the lid on early
elections discussions in the government, since neither DPA
nor NSDP will react positively or constructively if they
discover a move afoot to replace them with their DUI rivals.
End comment.
NAVRATIL