MACEDONIA: MOI CONSIDERS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000712

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: MOI CONSIDERS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF
TANUSEVCI STANDOFF

REF: SKOPJE 698

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) The GOM is actively considering a non-violent approach
to resolving the current standoff with former ethnic Albanian
MP Xhezair Shaqiri, who is holed up in the village of
Tanusevci on the Macedonia-Kosovo border (reftel) to avoid
arrest on kidnapping charges. The approach includes offering
Shaqiri amnesty from prosecution and safe passage out of
Macedonia, in exchange for his pledge to refrain from
involvement in Macedonian politics for at least five years.
Although the plan needs further refinement, it is preferable
to a more traditional, direct police action approach in which
there could be civilian casualties in Tanusevci that could
inflame ethnic Albanian sentiment on both sides of the
border. End summary.

GOM APPROACH TO RESOLVING TANUSEVCI STANDOFF -- BACKING OFF
OF DIRECT ACTION


2. (SBU) Ministry of Interior (MOI) Director of Police
Todorovski briefed our DOJ police adviser and his OSCE
colleague August 29 on planning for addressing the
long-running standoff between the police and former ethnic
Albanian MP Xhezair Shaqiri (aka "Commander Hoxha"),wanted
on kidnapping charges. Shaqiri is holed up in the
Macedonia-Kosovo border village of Tanusevci hoping to avoid
arrest (reftel),and has issued inflammatory statements to
the press from his hideout, including threats to launch a
referendum calling for the secession of Tanusevci and its
union with Kosovo.


3. (SBU) During a raid on Tanusevci in May of this year,
police failed to capture Shaqiri, who was tipped off before
the police arrived and fled to Kosovo. The bungled operation
led to the resignation of Deputy Minister of Interior Refet
Elmazi, a member of the ethnic Albanian DPA party, and to
tensions within the ruling coalition. The Prime Minister
refused to accept the resignation, however, and Elmazi
remained in place.


4. (SBU) Media coverage of Shaqiri's wild rhetoric and
threats to repel any police action against him with an
organized group of armed ethnic Albanians has ratcheted up
pressure on the MOI to take action. Local electronic media
erroneously reported the evening of August 30 that a police
raid had been launched and repelled in Tanusevci, with
several wounded on the MOI side. The reports were later
countered by statements from Tanusevci residents insisting
that Shaqiri and his cohorts had retreated to a nearby forest
to fire their weapons and then claim that they had engaged in
a firefight with police. President Crvenkovski has joined
the fray by criticizing government inaction as a sign that
the GOM is unable to control that territory. So far, the
Interior Ministry has, judiciously in our view, resisted
precipitate action.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO DIRECT ACTION


5. (C) As an alternative to direct police action, Todorovski
said the MOI would attempt to exert psychological pressure
(e.g., deploying police forces in the vicinity) on Shaqiri to
get him to leave the village. If that failed, Todorovski
said, he would ask OSCE and the EU Monitoring Mission to
visit the village to relay an alternate MOI plan to Shaqiri.
The OSCE and EU representatives would assure Shaqiri that no
police action would be undertaken against him for the
following four days.


6. (C) After the four-day "cooling off" period elapsed, an
MOI negotiator would approach Shaqiri to offer him the
following: safe passage out of Macedonia to Turkey and
freedom from prosecution, amnesty for his followers
(estimated at less than 30 men),integration of some of his
followers into the Border Police, infrastructure improvements
in Tanusevci, and a resumption of mixed ethnicity police
patrols in the village. In exchange, Shaqiri would be
expected to remain outside the country for at least five

SKOPJE 00000712 002 OF 002


years and agree not to engage any further in political
activity in the Tanusevci area.


7. (C) IC POLADs from the US Embassy, EU, OSCE, and NATO met
August 30 to discuss the MOI's plan and agreed that, despite
the positive nature of this non-confrontational approach,
there should be no IC involvement in it. That position was
conveyed to Todorovski, who said he understood the IC
position but added that he hoped for IC support in the event
he carried through with it.

ETHNIC ALBANIAN PARTIES PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON SHAQIRI


8. (C) In the meantime, early on August 30, we asked the
leadership of the two major ethnic Albanian parties in
Macedonia, opposition DUI and junior coalition partner DPA,
to issue statements condemning Shaqiri's actions and
characterizing them as harmful to stability in Macedonia and
to ethnic Albanian interests specifically. DUI pledged to do
so, and DPA later issued a strong statement to that effect.
In its August 30 statement, DPA said the incidents being
provoked by Shaqiri were "neither in the interests of Kosovar
Albanians, nor in the interest of the residents of
Tanusevci."

COMMENT


9. (C) We believe the MOI's cautious, patient approach is the
right way to proceed. The press eventually will find other
stories to cover, and the publicity firestorm lit by Shaqiri
will die out. Although the MOI's alternative plan probably
needs further refinement for it to work, Shaqiri could see it
as the only way out of his dilemma. If not, it is unlikely
the police will be able to resist much longer public calls
for action to demonstrate its ability to enforce rule of law
in Tanusevci. Indeed, this idea for near-term action to deal
with Shaqiri contrasts sharply with what Todorovski told DCM
and embassy officers on August 27, when he said the police
would wait until snow falls in the Tanusevci area this
winter, further restricting Shaqiri's room for maneuver.
Given the possibility that police action could lead to
unintentional civilian casualties in that area, we will
continue to encourage the government to plan their approach
carefully, and to continue developing options for indirect
action to resolve the standoff. End comment.
NAVRATIL