MACEDONIA: DIALOGUE -- LIGHT AT THE END OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000387

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER),USNATO FOR DOUG JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DIALOGUE -- LIGHT AT THE END OF THE
TUNNEL; WILL AHMETI BLINK?

REF: A. SKOPJE 270


B. SKOPJE 321

C. SKOPJE 296

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) The political dialogue process between governing
VMRO-DPMNE and major eAlbanian opposition DUI appears to be
coming to closure, with a possible compromise on the main
agenda items DUI had proposed when the talks were revived in
early March. Following intensive Embassy and EUSR pressure
on both parties, the government has shown additional
flexibility in accepting proposed compromise language that
would address both sides' concerns and lead to DUI's return
to Parliament. The ball is now in DUI President Ahmeti's
court. If he accepts the compromise and returns to
Parliament, it will help demonstrate Macedonia's political
maturity as a NATO candidate. If he rejects the compromise,
we will be hampered in pressing the government for additional
flexibility by their impression that DUI's real intent is to
drag out the process and use Macedonia's NATO candidacy as
leverage to gain more concessions. End summary.

DIALOGUE PROCEEDS IN FITS AND STARTS...


2. (SBU) After moving in fits and starts since the leaders of
governing VMRO-DPMNE and ethnic Albanian opposition party DUI
revived political talks in early March (ref A),the dialogue
process finally appears to be coming to closure with a
possible compromise on items of key importance to DUI. Since
the Ambassador's April 20 intervention with DUI President Ali
Ahmeti, Embassy and EUSR representatives have shuttled
between both sides to reach agreement on a compromise text
that would satisfactorily address the four key agenda items
DUI has cited as preconditions for its return to Parliament,
which it has been boycotting since the beginning of 2007.

...US AND EU WORK TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES


3. (C) DUI's four agenda issues include: a list of laws
requiring Badinter (double majority) voting; recomposition of
the parliamentary Inter-ethnic Affairs Committee (IEC); a
political agreement to draft and submit a law on the use of
languages; and a political agreement to provide material
benefits for ethnic Albanian victims of the 2001 conflict,
including NLA (former guerrilla insurgency) veterans. After
direct discussions between the two parties on those agenda
items came to a standstill in mid-April, the Ambassador and
EUSR Fouere received the consent of both sides to draft
compromise language that would bridge the differences between
each side's contending proposals.


4. (C) Embassy and EUSR representatives merged the VMRO-DPMNE
and DUI texts, producing language that, in our view,
addressed the main concerns of both sides. After the
Ambassador met with FM Milososki May 7 to press for maximum
government flexibility in responding to the compromise
proposal, and following a joint meeting between the
Ambassador and EUSR Fouere with DUI's Ahmeti later the same
day to press for greater DUI flexibility, a draft compromise
text was presented to DUI on May 10.

DUI RESPONDS WITH HARDER-LINE PROPOSAL


5. (C) DUI VP Teuta Arifi responded with a counterproposal
that returned to harder-line language and added a fifth
agenda item -- discussing formation of future government
using Badinter voting -- which VMRO-DPMNE has long rejected
as a non-starter. Going back to the drawing board, the
Ambassador and EUSR reworked the DUI language and presented
an additional compromise paper to VMRO-DPMNE on May 11, which
was accepted as a basis for further internal party discussion.

GOVERNMENT SHOWS FLEXIBILITY


6. (C) After extended internal party discussions, the
VMRO-DPMNE side on May 15 presented a slightly altered
variant of the US-EUSR compromise proposal that contained the
following language:


SKOPJE 00000387 002 OF 003


--DUI's return to Parliament will take place following the
recomposition of the Inter-ethnic Committee (IEC).

--The parties agree to a list of 46 laws, per Annex 1,
requiring Badinter voting.

--The parties agree to recompose the IEC within one month of
the date of this agreement. The parties agree to draft and
submit to Parliament within three months a law regulating the
work of the IEC, which should refer only to the method of its
composition. This three-month period begins with the
adoption of the Parliamentary Rulebook, which should be
passed within one month of the date of this agreement.

--The parties agree to address the issue of providing
material and social support to the victims of the 2001
conflict and their families in compliance with current laws
and procedures. The parties agree to the continuation of the
working group (reftels) on this issue.

--The parties agree to draft and submit for adoption to
Parliament a law on the use of languages that is in full
compliance with the Framework Agreement and with Amendment 5
of the Constitution. The parties agree to the continuation
of the working group on this issue.

--Upon DUI's return to Parliament, the parties agree to the
continuation of discussions on the issue of the method of
government formation.

US-EUSR PRESS DUI TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE PACKAGE


7. (C) Embassy and EUSR representatives presented the VMRO
language to DUI's Arifi on May 16. Arifi was pleased with
the text in general. She was confident Ahmeti would find the
draft proposal a significant improvement over previous
versions. Ahmeti's only hardline demand, she continued,
likely would be for a parliamentary resolution or law on
providing benefits for NLA veterans and their families. The
Embassy and EUSR representatives pushed back, arguing that
there was no support in the International Community or among
most parties in Parliament for that position, and stressing
that the VMRO-DPMNE compromise proposal would directly
address the concerns of the victims of the 2001 conflict.


8. (SBU) In the meantime, the EU sent on May 15 a joint
letter from EU High Representative Solana and EU Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn to DUI's Ahmeti in which they strongly
encouraged him to "approve the compromise package now on the
table and to definitively end the boycott of the Parliament."
EUSR Fouere will deliver the letter to Ahmeti the on May 17,
and will urge him to accept the VMRO proposal as the best
deal possible under the current circumstances. We expect a
reply from DUI on the latest proposal by May 18.


9. (C/NF) NOTE: EUSR Fouere over the past year has faced
often critical local media scrutiny, first for his perceived
pro-DUI stance after the government was formed in August 2006
and, more recently, in the Albanian-language press and from
DUI for his perceived shift to supporting the government. He
is equally under fire from eAlbanian governing coalition
partner DPA, which has accused him of showing an anti-DPA
bias in public statements. This perceived lack of EUSR
even-handedness has weakened his leverage over the ethnic
Albanian parties, but without any commensurate increase in
his standing with VMRO-DPMNE. It also has distracted the
EUSR, leading to swings in his position that seem influenced
more by his concern over how Brussels will perceive his
actions, rather than his calculations of chances for a
successful outcome. END NOTE.

COMMENT: WILL AHMETI BLINK?


10. (C) Following sustained US and EU pressure over the past
several weeks, VMRO-DPMNE has shown additional flexibility
and willingness to find a compromise solution to the
political dialogue, which should end DUI's parliamentary
boycott. If Ahmeti blinks and accepts the package, DUI's
return to Parliament and continued work on the language law
and NLA veterans package will help demonstrate Macedonia's
political maturity as a NATO candidate. If Ahmeti rejects
the compromise proposal, the EUSR office has told us they no

SKOPJE 00000387 003 OF 003


longer will be willing to serve as a co-broker in the
dialogue process. We will have to pick up the pieces, and we
will, but with reduced leverage over a government that will
have become convinced that DUI's real intent is to drag the
process on indefinitely to use Macedonia's NATO candidacy as
leverage to gain more concessions, or to force a collapse of
the governing coalition.
MILOVANOVIC