MACEDONIA: EUR A/S FRIED'S TALKS WITH GOM &

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000209

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: EUR A/S FRIED'S TALKS WITH GOM &
OPPOSITION LEADERS ON KOSOVO AND NATO

REF: SKOPJE 203

SKOPJE 00000209 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).
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SUMMARY


1. (C) During March 8 meetings with GOM and opposition
leaders in Skopje, A/S Fried urged (and easily obtained)
continued support for the Ahtisaari status proposal and asked
his interlocutors to consider publicly supporting a Kosovo
UNSCR as a means to bolster security in Macedonia and the
region. He also warned that time is short for Macedonia to
make the necessary reforms to make its case for NATO
membership in 2008; there are only six months before NATO
members begin assessing aspirants for membership invitations.
His government interlocutors clearly understood the NATO
message; we will monitor closely to ensure follow through.
They also indicated they would consider a public statement
calling for a Kosovo UNSCR, but they will need prodding from
us and our assurance that we will help them weather the
Russian and Serbian displeasure they will incur if they do
so. End Summary.

CLEAR MESSAGES ON KOSOVO AND NATO


2. (C) EUR A/S Fried, accompanied by Charge, met March 8 in
Skopje with President Crvenkovski; PM Gruevski and members of
his cabinet, including FM Milososki; and opposition leaders
to discuss Kosovo developments and NATO membership. During
his meetings, A/S Fried reviewed his earlier visits to Serbia
and Kosovo, and asked for Macedonia's continued support for
the Ahtisaari proposal. He urged GOM and opposition
interlocutors to counter Russian suggestions that Kosovo
independence would be destabilizing for Macedonia by arguing,
at the UN and in other public fora, that a UNSCR endorsing
the Ahtisaari proposal and guaranteeing a continued
international community (IC) presence in Kosovo would, in
fact, have a calming and stabilizing effect. On NATO
accession, A/S Fried pointed to the need for political
dialogue that would bolster internal stability, and for
continued progress on implementing reforms related to the
Framework Implementation and rule of law.

KOSOVO STATUS -- DEMARCATION IN TIMELY MANNER, BALANCING
RELATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA


3. (C) President Crvenkovski acknowledged that, even without
the Ahtisaari plan, Kosovo would end up as an independent
state. He noted that the Ahtisaari plan "precisely and
correctly defined" the issue of border demarcation, a key GOM
concern. The government hoped for timely implementation of
demarcation, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan. PM
Gruevski reiterated GOM support for the Ahtisaari plan and
thanked the USG for supporting the language on demarcation.


4. (C) In an approach later echoed by PM Gruevski,
Crvenkovski said Macedonia would have to tackle the challenge
of balancing relations between Pristina and Belgrade,
particularly in regard to timing in the GOM's strategy for
recognition of an independent Kosovo and establishing
diplomatic ties with Pristina. Ideally, a UNSCR would
establish the grounds for timely recognition and
establishment of diplomatic ties. The GOM would continue to
build strong ties to Pristina, but the strongest guarantee
for Macedonia's security would be a continued IC presence,
civil and military, in Kosovo.


5. (C) In the event of a Russian veto of a UNSCR, Crvenkovski
cautioned, the scenario would be more difficult. Any lack of
EU unity on the matter would further complicate the picture
for Macedonia. Macedonia would not want to be at the head of
the pack of countries unilaterally recognizing Kosovo, nor
would it want to lag at the back. A/S Fried told Crvenkovski
that the USG would not pressure the GOM on the timing of recognition.
The USG did not want Kosovo independence to strain Macedonia
domestically; we would continue to stress that independence
for Kosovo could not serve as a precedent in the region or
elsewhere.

NATO MEMBERSHIP -- PROGRESS ON DIALOGUE, ACCELERATE REFORMS,
FWA IMPLEMENTATION

SKOPJE 00000209 002.2 OF 003




6. (C) A/S Fried told his interlocutors that NATO members
would begin assessing potential members around September

2007. Macedonia therefore had about six months in which to
consolidate progress on government-opposition dialogue, and
to accelerate progress on reforms, including implementation
of the Framework Agreement. He pointed out that, at present,
there was no consensus among NATO members on membership for
Macedonia.


7. (SBU) Calling NATO membership Macedonia's top priority, PM
Gruevski mentioned the March 6 political talks between him
and DUI leader Ali Ahmeti (reftel) as evidence the GOM was
taking seriously IC concerns. Gruevski said FWA
implementation was proceeding, with an increased budget for
equitable representation and with phase II of
decentralization to begin in mid-2007 as scheduled. He hoped
NATO would recognize the country's progress in combating
organized crime, corruption, and trafficking in persons, as
well as efforts underway to draft a liberal religious freedom
law.


8. (C) A/S Fried said the Gruevski-Ahmeti meeting had been a
good first step, but that the process needed to continue
since the impasse with DUI was having a negative effect on
Macedonia's NATO candidacy. He also cautioned against
provoking Greece with ill-considered decisions such as the
recent renaming of the Skopje Airport as "Alexander the
Great" Airport. He underscored the need to show measurable
progress on FWA implementation, including on equitable
representation and decentralization.

OPPOSITION LEADERS ON NATO MEMBERSHIP, KOSOVO


9. (C) SDSM (ethnic Macedonian main opposition) President
Radmila Sekerinska said her party wanted to move faster on
NATO reforms than the Gruevski government, which had "wasted
time and energy" in its standoff with DUI. SDSM would
support legislation required for NATO membership. DUI leader
Ahmeti also underscored his party's support for NATO
membership, and underscored the importance of continued U.S.
support for FWA implementation.


10. (C) Sekerinska said she did not think developments in
Kosovo would endanger stability in the country. Macedonia
had "worked hard to make itself immune to problems in Kosovo"
by supporting FWA implementation. She was wary of publicly
calling for a UNSCR for Kosovo, since that could endanger
Skopje's relations with Belgrade and lead some in Macedonia
to accuse SDSM of selling out to the Kosovo Albanians. A/S
Fried assured Sekerinska the US publicly would support
parties in Macedonia that called for a Kosovo UNSCR as a
guarantee of stability, both in Kosovo and in Macedonia.


11. (C) Ahmeti stressed the importance of supporting
stability in the region as a means of countering Russian
attempts to delay progress toward a Kosovo solution. He
suggested Macedonia eventually would be seen as the
"Switzerland of the Balkans," with respect for minority
rights. There was no interest among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia
in creating a greater Albania, which he believed would be
damaging to Albanian interests. Fried urged Ahmeti to contribute to
dialogue with the government; citing Poland's road to NATO in the
1990's Fried pointed out that cooperation on a NATO accession agenda
did not foreclose competitive politics otherwise.

COMMENT


12. (C) A/S Fried's message on the need for the GOM and
opposition to quickly work toward a national consensus on
implementing NATO reforms in the next six months, was clearly
understood. PM Gruevski later told the local press that
"Macedonia is aware of the homework it needs to do, and will
do it in order to enable the U.S. to argue in support of NATO
membership for us." The GOM also signaled tentative
willingness to make constructive public statements about a Kosovo
status solution and regional stability. Skopje will need some
proding from us, however; should the Department deem such statements
useful, particularly in light of contrary pressure from Belgrade and
Moscow.

SKOPJE 00000209 003.2 OF 003


displeasure they will incur in the event they make such
statements.


13. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried.
WOHLERS