Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE134
2007-02-15 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: DPA LEADERS ON DIALOGUE, KOSOVO STATUS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0031
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSQ #0134/01 0461551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151551Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5737
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000134 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DPA LEADERS ON DIALOGUE, KOSOVO STATUS,
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. SKOPJE 102


B. SKOPJE 106

C. SKOPJE 22

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000134

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DPA LEADERS ON DIALOGUE, KOSOVO STATUS,
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. SKOPJE 102


B. SKOPJE 106

C. SKOPJE 22

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) In a February 9 meeting with leaders of eAlbanian
governing coalition member DPA, the Ambassador pressed for a
revitalized government-opposition dialogue, warned DPA
against attempts to destroy eAlbanian opposition party DUI,
and asked for full support for the Kosovo status process.
She warned that Macedonia risks undermining its NATO
membership prospects if it does not speed up implementation
of the Framework Agreement (FWA),and advised DPA to let the
government enforce rule of law in accordance with applicable
procedures in countering criminals and potential Islamic
radicals in Macedonia.


2. (C) DPA leaders Xhaferi and Thaci accused DUI of
exploiting for partisan advantage international community
concerns regarding dialogue, denied they are trying to
destroy DUI, and expressed full support for the Kosovo status
process. They agreed there had been a slowdown in FWA
implementation and pointed to plans for hiring more
eAlbanians for public administration jobs as proof that DPA
is committed to full implementation. Thaci proposed a
forceful (but undefined) approach to flushing out criminals
in Skopje who allegedly are taking refuge among Islamic
hard-liners there. We believe Thaci, who is firmly in the
DPA driver's seat, will deliver on some of his commitments to
us (a few FWA implementation steps, support for Kosovo status
process),while diligently pursuing the systematic
dismantling of DUI. End summary.

MEETING WITH DPA LEADERS


3. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Arben Xhaferi and Menduh
Thaci, president and vice president respectively of the
eAlbanian governing coalition partner DPA, on February 9 to
discuss ongoing efforts to revive government-opposition
dialogue and the need to reverse the slowdown in Framework
Agreement implementation. She also addressed the need to
support UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's Kosovo status proposal
and to discourage eAlbanians in Macedonia from joining

Kosovar Albanian protests in Kosovo at this sensitive time.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE, EARLY ELECTIONS?


4. (C) Xhaferi argued that opposition eAlbanian party DUI was
trying to exploit international community (IC) concerns about
a lack of political dialogue in Macedonia in order to
pressure the government to engage in talks outside of
established institutions (ref A). By delaying progress on
reforms, DUI was trying to portray the government as
incapable of ruling. If the situation continued, Xhaferi
warned, the government would have to consider calling for
early elections.


5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that political dialogue is
intended to make it possible for parliament to function
practically, and in terms of FWA requirements. It was not
intended to create a parallel system, but would instead
provide an impetus for action within the constitutional
system. She told Xhaferi that Macedonia's politicians needed
to behave like politicians, engaging in trade-offs that would
advance Macedonia's EU and NATO membership agenda. All
parties had to be involved in such a process, but no party
could claim a veto right over it. She added that the IC
perceived DPA's goal as being the destruction of DUI, which
was not acceptable. The country was fumbling its chances for
NATO membership by engaging in brinkmanship with the
opposition.


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that there was profound concern
among NATO members about the current political situation in
the country. Early elections were not the solution. They
would only take time and further delay reforms. There would
be strong international concerns about the fairness of
elections conducted under such negative circumstances. Thaci

said there was no plan for immediate early elections, but
that the government had considered calling them for July or
September "to pressure the smaller parties in our governing
coalition." The leading coalition partner, VMRO-DPMNE,
anticipated that smaller coalition parties would lose seats
in the event of early elections. Those seats likely would
shift to VMRO-DPMNE, strengthening that party's hand. The
threat of such an outcome, Thaci implied, would silence
criticism and independent ideas within the GOM.

DESTROYING DUI -- COUNTERPRODUCTIVE


7. (C) Thaci denied that DPA intend to eliminate DUI, arguing
that it would be counter-productive to do so. He asserted
bitterly that, even when DPA found evidence of DUI's past
(alleged) complicity in corruption activities, the party was
forced to retreat by IC counter-reaction, especially from the
EU Special Representative's (EUSR) office. In the end, "we
will not offer DUI anything because nothing we offer DUI will
be accepted, and they will continue to try to create a
continual sense of crisis."

KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS -- SUPPORT IT, REFRAIN FROM PROVOCATIONS


8. (SBU) The Ambassador noted the GOM's support for
Ahtisaari's Kosovo status proposal (ref B) and urged Xhaferi
and Thaci to ensure full DPA support for the status process.
She also asked that they ensure DPA supporters did not
participate in or otherwise support anti-UNMIK demonstrations
in Kosovo. Xhaferi agreed, noting DPA's support for the
Ahtisaari proposal and its opposition to radical measures by
Kosovar Albanians. (Note: Local press reports indicate that
at least one DUI member participated in the February 10
demonstration in Pristina. We do not know of any DPA
participation. End Note.)

PREVENT SLOWDOWN IN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION


9. (SBU) The Ambassador urged that DPA work within the
coalition to reverse the current slowdown in implementing the
2001 Framework Agreement (FWA),especially in the area of
equitable representation. Xhaferi agreed, saying that the
FWA was "at risk of becoming non-implementable" in the
current environment. The party, he asserted without
providing any details, was working to overcome that.


10. (C) Thaci conceded that the GOM's implementation of the
FWA was sluggish. He openly admitted that the government's
much-touted "tripling of the budget for equitable
representation" was "a trick." The government had rolled
over, from 2006, jobs to be filled by ethnic minorities, and
had combined them with the 2007 target to inflate overall
numbers. Nevertheless, the governing coalition wanted to
take concrete steps to boost eAlbanian representation in
public administration jobs. DPA wanted to employ 70
eAlbanians in the UBK (Interior Ministry
counter-intelligence),but the EU had objected that DPA was
only trying to create jobs for party activists.

COUNTERING POTENTIAL ISLAMIC RADICALS AND COMBATING CRIMINALS


11. (C) Thaci asked for USG support in its "war against
Islamic fundamentalists and criminals, including racketeers
and the occupiers of the Arabati Baba Tekke in Tetovo."
NOTE: The Arabati Baba Tekke is the traditional compound used
as a headquarters for Macedonia's moderate Bektashi sect.
Several years ago, a group of Sunni radicals occupied the
main buildings of the Tekke. Since then, the Bektashi have
been prevented by the radicals from freely worshipping at the
Tekke. END NOTE.


12. (C) Arguing for a "soft approach" to ridding the Tekke of
its Sunni interlopers, Thaci said he would work with the
Bektashi leader and the reis (head) of the Islamic Community
of Macedonia (ICM) to persuade, with police action if
necessary, the occupiers to leave. Thaci melodramatically
said the successful resolution of the long-standing Tekke
dispute would set the stage for the "battle in the Skopje
mosques," in which racketeers, drug dealers, and "leftover
police structures" would be flushed out and arrested.


13. (C) The Ambassador noted that the government/government,
not individuals or political parties, is responsible for
enforcing rule of law, in accordance with established police
procedures. She asked Thaci why he was planning to undertake
such action, and why now? Was it simply a show of force in
the center of Tetovo to intimidate DUI? Thaci replied that
there was no attempt to target DUI, but that Islamic radicals
were receiving both external and internal funding and were
organizing -- now was the time to take action against them.

CRIME BOSS KRASNIQI


14. (C) The Ambassador asked Thaci whether DPA had any plans
for dealing with the festering problem of local Kondovo crime
boss Agim Krasniqi, who had been convicted on criminal
charges but had not yet been arrested to serve time for that
conviction (ref C). Thaci replied that Krasniqi would appear
in a Skopje court soon to face separate, reduced charges of
"endangering public safety" rather than terrorism charges
stemming from a second case against him. If convicted, he
would receive a suspended sentence. Krasniqi would in the
meantime lose his right to serve as an MP in parliament (he
is still on DPA's list of candidates from the July 2006
parliamentary elections).

COMMENT


15. (C) As evidenced by his dominant role in this meeting,
Thaci clearly is in the driver's seat in DPA, Xhaferi having
ceded that spot as his physical health has deteriorated. A
calculating, operational and practical politician with no
ideological foundation or beliefs, Thaci feels under pressure
to demonstrate DPA's relevance on the political stage. He
believes DUI has managed to squeeze tactical advantage out of
its stubborn opposition role (ref A). As a result, Thaci has
adjusted his rhetoric to match what he believes are our
expectations. He hopes that US "support" will strengthen his
hand as he seeks to offset DUI's perceived gains. Knowing
Thaci's mode of operation, we expect he will deliver on some
of his commitments (support for the Kosovo status process,
finding ways to demonstrate some FWA implementation advances,
keeping Krasniqi out of parliament) while pursuing the
systematic dismantling of DUI.
MILOVANOVIC