Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE102
2007-02-02 16:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA'S OPPOSITION: DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARRAY

Tags:  PGOV MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6741
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0102/01 0331655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021655Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5694
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000102 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S OPPOSITION: DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARRAY

REF: 06 SKOPJE 1174 & PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000102

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S OPPOSITION: DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARRAY

REF: 06 SKOPJE 1174 & PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY.


1. (C) Frustrated over the lack of a genuine political
dialogue with the government, Macedonia's main eAlbanian
opposition party DUI is boycotting the Parliament and
considering cutting ties between the municipalities it
controls and the central government. DUI leaders cite a list
of demands, including genuine dialogue on key issues of
concern to the party, that the government would have to meet
before DUI could consider returning to the Parliament. In
the meantime, the main opposition party, SDSM, is internally
divided and in disarray, while the Prime Minister and
President Crvenkovski engage in ugly verbal sparring that
further muddies the political landscape. Our message to all
the parties is to get back in the political process, start
making constructive proposals to move the country forward on
its Euro-Atlantic integration course, and work to achieve
concrete results before it is too late to demonstrate
Macedonia's value as a NATO candidate capable of contributing
to security and stability in the region and abroad. End
Summary.

DISENGAGEMENT: DUI BOYCOTTS PARLIAMENT....


2. (U) DUI, Macedonia's largest ethnic Albanian party, which
is in opposition, publicly announced on January 27 that it
would boycott the Parliament, effective immediately. In
addition to the parliamentary walkout, DUI decided to freeze
its participation in the National Security Council and in the
government's inter-ministerial Working Group on NATO
Integration. The party cited the ongoing lack of genuine
political dialogue (reftel),and the "marginalization" of
eAlbanians in the Parliament through the manipulation of
qualified majority voting as the main reasons for the
walkout.

...AND THREATENS MUNICIPAL SELF-ISOLATION


3. (U) Since the announcement, DUI party leaders have been
meeting with DUI mayors in the 15 municipalities the party
controls (all but one of a total of 16 eAlbanian
municipalities have DUI mayors) to discuss allegations that
the GOM has been, inter alia, pressuring those municipalities
by shortchanging them in the distribution of decentralization

funds. DUI leaders will decide in the next few weeks what
actions to take at the municipal level, including possibly
cutting cooperation with the central government and dropping
out of the non-governmental Association of Units of Local
Self-government (ZELS).

DUI COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND ATTEMPTS
TO DISMANTLE THE PARTY


4. (SBU) Senior DUI contacts recite a litany of complaints
against the government, including a complete lack of civil
political discourse and allegations that eAlbanian governing
coalition partner DPA has been pressuring DUI members through
various forms of intimidation in an attempt to dismantle the
party. They claim that PM Gruevski is trying falsely to
paint the current political impasse as a result of
intra-Albanian polarization. They also argue that Gruevski
has failed to recognize DUI's current status as the political
representative of the majority of eAlbanians in Macedonia,
given its electoral victory over DPA in 2006.


5. (C) DUI VP Teuta Arifi complained during a February 1
meeting with us that the Parliament's recent decision to
approve several amendments to a broadcasting law without
using qualified majority voting, even though that law had
itself been passed with a qualified majority vote, was a
clear example of the government's disdain for "correct
parliamentary procedures" as mandated by the 2001 Ohrid
Framework Agreement (FWA). She said that DUI cadres are
becoming "more militant" as they perceive the FWA is under
attack, but she ruled out any resort to violent action as a
political tactic.

LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?


6. (C) Both Arifi and DUI Spokesperson Ermira Mehmeti have

SKOPJE 00000102 002 OF 003


told us they believe the way out of the current impasse is
for the GOM to accept a real political dialogue that would
address and resolve issues of key concern for DUI. Those
issues include the composition of the parliamentary Committee
for Inter-Ethnic Relations (reftel); giving DUI a role in
negotiating the language to be included in a law on
languages; compiling a list of laws that would require a
Badinter (qualified majority) vote; and amending the
constitution to require the composition of future governments
according to the Badinter principle.


7. (C) Comment: Some of the Arifi/Mehmeti proposals are
non-starters, given the current negative political climate
here; however, it is possible Gruevski would consider giving
DUI a role in drafting a language law, and perhaps would
agree to compiling a list of laws requiring Badinter votes.
The larger challenge for DUI is to define, both internally
and publicly, its criteria for success in pursuing the
current course of action. DUI leader Ahmeti, a stubborn
political tactician, does not seem ready to take that step
yet. The equally stubborn Gruevski seems determined not to
give DUI any space on the political scene. End comment.)

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: WEAKENED BY INTERNECINE WARFARE


8. (C) With DUI out of the Parliament, the only potentially
viable opposition party, eMacedonian SDSM, is a house divided
and in disarray. Former Prime Minister Buckovski, now an
SDSM MP, has engaged in open warfare with recently elected
SDSM President Radmila Sekerinska and her foot soldiers,
trading insults and public accusations of incompetence, or
worse. In a January 29 meeting, Sekerinska told the
Ambassador that Buckovski had maintained silence for several
weeks after the party's November 2006 extraordinary congress,
when she was elected President and as he was being considered
for an ambassadorship to NATO, but had turned up the volume
after the latter initiative failed.


9. (SBU) In the face of strong opposition from Sekerinska and
her supporters, Buckovski has proposed that SDSM accept
official factions within the party, which would entitle them
to guaranteed seats and party funding; direct elections for
party positions; and an increase in the number of members on
SDSM's central board. Comment: If adopted, those proposals
would effectively neuter the party by dividing unity of
command and by eventually pitting Buckovski against
Sekerinska and her mentor, President Crvenkovski. End
comment.


10. (C) Sekerinska told the Ambassador she believes that
accepting Buckovski's demands would only result in more
demands, and that the party instead needs to focus on
rebuilding itself and its platform as an opposition force.
She acknowledged that Buckovski might lead his SDSM
supporters to vote with the government on some issues, and
said her goal was to retain at least 18 of SDSM's current 23
MP seats. She projected that it would take at least one year
to rebuild SDSM as a viable political party capable of
winning a national election.

PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT ENGAGE IN UGLY VERBAL SPARRING


11. (C) With DUI disengaged and the Social Democrats in
disarray, the perennial battle between Prime Minister and
President in Macedonia (reftel) has heated up. After
Gruevski and his cabinet failed to show up for Crvenkovski's
"state of the union" speech in December, intramural tensions
began to increase. Gruevski did attend National Security
Council meeting hosted by Crvenkovski immediately after the
parliamentary elections in Serbia, but nearly overturned the
government's carefully-crafted position on Kosovo final
status when he proposed asking for additional security
guarantees for Macedonia in the context of the status
process. Crvenkovski was able to get Gruevski to withdraw
the proposal, but Gruevski has nursed a grudge since then.
That became evident after Crvenkovski, in NATO and EU
meetings in Brussels this week, received serious criticism
from de Hoop Scheffer and Barroso about the government's and
opposition's failure to create a mature political dialogue
here. Gruevski's PR staff immediately jumped into action,
publicly accusing the President (and Sekerinska, for good
measure) of harming Macedonia by criticizing the GOM as being
responsible for NATO's and the EU's criticisms, and of having
undermined the GOM's NATO and EU membership efforts.

SKOPJE 00000102 003 OF 003



COMMENT -- AN END TO THE PUGILISM


12. (C) There does not seem to be any easy way to cut the
Gordian knot the government and opposition each have helped
to tie. Gruevski, an amateur boxer in his youth, seems
emboldened by his relatively high poll ratings, DUI's absence
from the ring, and SDSM's wobbly legs. He believes he can
shadowbox his way through the remaining reform challenges
ahead and into NATO by 2008, relying on his hefty
parliamentary majority to ram through legislation. Our
message to the Prime Minister is that he needs viable
opponents in the ring to make his efforts credible, and that
he needs to take DUI seriously as a political force
representing the majority of eAlbanian voters. Our message
to DUI is for them to get back in the ring where they belong
as the party elected to represent eAlbanian interests in the
Parliament, and to demonstrate their seriousness as
contenders for a constructive role in influencing FWA-related
legislation. SDSM will probably remain on the sidelines
until their wounds heal, which could take much of the rest of
the year. That could be too late for them to make a positive
contribution to the political battles being fought in this
critical year for Macedonia's NATO membership aspirations.
MILOVANOVIC