Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SINGAPORE995
2007-05-24 01:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

GOS PROVIDES SOKKIA, EPNO/DAINAN, NAVID'S

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGP #0995/01 1440154
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240154Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3190
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5624
C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 000995 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR
SUBJECT: GOS PROVIDES SOKKIA, EPNO/DAINAN, NAVID'S
COMPUTERS UPDATES

REF: A. SINGAPORE 175

B. 06 SINGAPORE 2323

C. 06 STATE 117450

Classified By: E/P Chief Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(b),(c) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 000995

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR
SUBJECT: GOS PROVIDES SOKKIA, EPNO/DAINAN, NAVID'S
COMPUTERS UPDATES

REF: A. SINGAPORE 175

B. 06 SINGAPORE 2323

C. 06 STATE 117450

Classified By: E/P Chief Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(b),(c) and (d)


1. (U) A Senior Assistant Director of MFA's International
Organizations Directorate presented us with the following
non-paper on May 23. The non-paper provides GOS follow-up to
export control cases involving three Singapore companies:
Sokkia Singapore, Epno Far East/Dainan Tech, and Navid's
Computers (reftels A, B, and C).


2. (C) Begin text of non-paper.

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

Releasable to the US

NON-PAPER

We thank the US for the information shared with Singapore
through the US Embassy, between April 2005 and October 2006,
on the activities of three Singapore-based companies. The
findings of the Singapore authorities are given below.

Sokkia Singapore Pte Ltd (April 2005, October 2006)

Our findings show that Sokkia Singapore Pte Ltd deals with
the import and export of surveying equipment. Imports come
mainly from Japan, US and China, while exports go to India,
the UAE, Thailand and South Africa. We ascertained that
Sokkia did indeed export surveying instruments to Iran.
However, our findings were that the surveying equipment
exported by Sokkia was not controlled and for civil
application.

The relevant authorities will continue to remain vigilant and
monitor the activities of our companies to fulfill our
commitments as a responsible international citizen.

Epno Far East Pte Ltd (July 2006)

In July 2006, following a demarche made by the US Embassy,
the relevant authorities visited the company Dainan Tech,
which is related to Epno Far East Pte Ltd. Our findings
showed that while Dainan Tech had records of machinery
brought in from Japan, no evidence was found of Dainan Tech
exporting this machinery to Syria. Specifically, Dainan Tech
had bought two vibration test systems from a Japanese
supplier, Shinken Co Ltd. One was shipped directly from
Japan to Indonesia, while another was re-exported from
Singapore to Indonesia.

While the information furnished by the US gave the model
number as G-0265L, the re-exported system from Singapore to
Indonesia bore the number G-9220. The relevant authorities
nonetheless reminded the companies in question against
engaging in any illicit activities that support the
development of WMD programmes by countries of proliferation
concern. Moreover, if companies were found to have committed
any offence under our law, we would not hesitate to take
action against them.

Navid's Computers (November 2005)

Following information provided by the US, the relevant
authorities looked into the activities of said company. The
records of Navid's Computers showed neither imports nor
exports of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). There were also
no imports of US-origin goods by the company nor any evidence
to link Navid's Computers to the Iranian entity Fan Pardazan.
Navid's Computers has since been warned against engaging in
any illicit activities that support the development of WMD
programmes by countries of proliferation concern, and that
the authorities would not hesitate to take action against
them if they are found to have committed any offence under
our law.

Conclusion

We continue to monitor the activities of the above three
companies. Industry has also been alerted to the list of
Iranian and other entities which the US believes to be
engaged in WMD-related activities. We welcome timely
information and actionable intelligence and evidence that the
US may have on these companies regarding their alleged links
with Iran and Syria.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
23 May 23, 2007

End text of non-paper.
HERBOLD