MFA PROVIDES BLOCKED SHIPMENTS UPDATES

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000023

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PASS TO ISN/CPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017
TAGS: ETTC MNUC MTCRE PARM PREL KNNP SN
SUBJECT: MFA PROVIDES BLOCKED SHIPMENTS UPDATES

REF: A. 06 STATE 204021

B. 06 STATE 185541

C. 06 STATE 184097

D. 06 SINGAPORE 3849

Classified By: E/P Counselor Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(c) and (d)


1. (SBU) Michelle Teo-Jacob, Assistant Director of MFA's
International Organizations Directorate, on January 3
provided us updates on three outstanding export control and
nonproliferation cases. She presented us with two
non-papers, reproduced in paragraphs 6 and 7.


2. (S) Teo-Jacob began with the shipment of chromium-nickel
steel plates (Ref C) that Singapore seized at USG request on
November 8, 2006. She reported that Singapore had
independently confirmed that China was the source and that
Iran was the final destination for the plates but that the
GOS was unable to determine if they were intended for use in
a WMD program. Therefore, the GOS had no legal basis to
continue detaining the shipment and had decided to release
the plates to the shipping company, provided it returned them
to China. Teo-Jacob said that Singapore would monitor the
plates' return and recommended we do the same.


3. (S) Turning to the Weining Pte Ltd case (Ref B),Teo-Jacob
told us that GOS officials had investigated the company and
found no evidence that it had procured Japanese-origin carbon
fiber on behalf of a Pakistani missile program entity.
However, the GOS investigation confirmed that Weining, an
engineering equipment company, had exported to Pakistan,
among other countries. Teo-Jacob said that the GOS had used
the industry outreach program associated with Singapore's
announced expansion of its export control list as a pretext
for contacting Weining and had advised the company that it
was under surveillance and warned it not to engage in any
proliferation activities. She suggested that we should now
pursue this matter with Tokyo.


4. (S) Finally, Teo-Jacob raised the shipment of precision
lathes (Ref D) that Singapore had detained in December in
response to a USG request. She said some of the equipment
might be of concern but that the GOS needed further
information on the lathes' tolerances from the USG (conveyed
through separate channels) in order to determine whether the
lathes were regulated under any multilateral nonproliferation
regimes. Teo-Jacob stressed that the ability to legally
justify seizures was of utmost importance to the GOS. E/P
Counselor took this opportunity to deliver the points and
non-paper provided in Ref A.


5. (S) Teo-Jacob said that the recent increase in USG
requests (and GOS compliance) to stop shipments as they pass
through Singapore, while "not insurmountable", had caused
waves in the shipping industry. In her opinion, any actions
that slowed the transfer of potentially dangerous goods to
countries of concern were valuable. Decisions like the one
to return the steel plates to China, however, had been the
source of much discussion amongst GOS agencies, she said.


6. (S) Begin text of steel plates non-paper:

SECRET

SIPDIS

NON-PAPER

We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through
the U.S. Embassy on 8 and 22 November 2006, concerning the
possible transshipment of chromium-nickel steel plates for
Iran,s missile programme through Singapore.

The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter. We
have ascertained through independent sources that the steel
plates originated from China and are bound for Iran through
Dubai. However, we are unable to ascertain if they are
intended for WMD purposes and have no legal basis to continue
to detain the steel plates. Therefore, the relevant
authorities have decided to release the steel plates to the
shipping company on the undertaking that they be returned to
China to their Chinese owners.

The U.S. may wish to pursue this matter further with its
Chinese counterparts. On its part, Singapore authorities
will also continue to monitor the shipment of the steel
plates from Singapore to its destination of China.
3 January 2007

End text of non-paper.


7. (S) Begin text of carbon fiber non-paper:

SECRET

SIPDIS

NON-PAPER

We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through
the U.S. Embassy on 17 November 2006 concerning the Singapore
company, Weining Pte Ltd, which may be working to procure
Japanese-origin carbon fibre on behalf of a Pakistani missile
development organization, possibly the National Development
Complex (NDC).

The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter.
The company,s core business is in the trading of engineering
equipment for oil, gas and water treatment, although it does
on occasion also trade in other goods when requested by
regular customers. The bulk of the company,s business is
local but it also exports to Pakistan, Malaysia and a few
other countries in the region. Our officials have advised
Weining Pte Ltd not to engage in any illicit activities that
supports (sic) the development of WMD programmes by countries
of proliferation concern which would include Pakistan.

The U.S. should now follow up by further pursuing this matter
with its Japanese counterparts as the carbon fibres are
likely of Japanese origin. Singapore authorities will
continue to monitor the company,s activities. We will not
hesitate to take appropriate action, should the company be
found to have committed any offence under our laws.

3 January 2007

End text of second non-paper.
HERBOLD