Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SINGAPORE1304
2007-07-06 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN

Tags:  ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 060909Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
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INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0767
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4056
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001304 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR MATTHEW WAXMAN, STATE FOR JAMES B. GREEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN
DURING S/P WAXMAN'S VISIT

Classified By: Economic/Political Chief Ike Reed for Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001304

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR MATTHEW WAXMAN, STATE FOR JAMES B. GREEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: ETRD IN PGOV PREL SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE URGES GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN
DURING S/P WAXMAN'S VISIT

Classified By: Economic/Political Chief Ike Reed for Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Singapore officials and academics urged
greater and more sophisticated U.S. regional engagement
during meetings with Policy Planning (S/P) Principal Deputy
Director Matthew Waxman June 25-27. GOS leaders argued that
a USG failure to understand the importance of "process" in
Asia and our senior officials, preoccupation with crisis
management were causing us to lose influence to China. When
pressed, Singapore counterparts seemed to have little
complaint with the substance of U.S. engagement, but rather
focused on perceptions of a divergence in U.S. and Chinese
attentions to the region. (NOTE: These meetings took place
just before the GOS was informed of the postponement of the
U.S.-ASEAN summit, originally planned for September in
Singapore. END NOTE.) Interlocutors noted the tolerant
traditions of Southeast Asian Islam but warned that a process
of "Arabization" was shifting the terms of debate in a more
conservative and, in some cases, radical direction. End
Summary.

--------------
Form As Important As Substance
--------------


2. (C) In familiar terms, Singapore officials and academics
told visiting Policy Planning (S/P) Principal Deputy Director
Matthew Waxman that the United States needed to step up its
engagement in Asia to avoid losing influence to China.
Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore,s former UN Ambassador and
current Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
agreed that the United States had demonstrated commitment to
the region, but said Washington,s failure to adopt "radical
new thinking" would allow Southeast Asia to become a "Chinese
lake." Pressed for specifics, he emphasized the need for
Washington to demonstrate leadership in APEC, such as through
the proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTA-AP),
which would make the East Asia Summit (EAS) "not so
important." Mahbubani complained that senior USG officials
focus too much on crisis management rather than pursuit of

strategic interests. Recalling that the Secretary was unable
to attend the 2005 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting due to
events in the Middle East, Mahbubani said "there will always
be a crisis in the Middle East."


3. (C) In a similar vein, MFA Second Permanent Secretary
Bilahari Kausikan asserted that the USG was good at
short-term problem solving but failed to understand the
importance of process, especially in Asia. He said the
United States should pay more attention to the various
overlapping regional architectures and find cross-cutting
issues (such as climate change) that it could use to breathe
new life into APEC and the ARF. At a roundtable lunch hosted
by the Ambassador, academics echoed these themes. They
emphasized the importance of "gestures," and urged the United
States to find "low-cost" means to engage, such as by sending
senior officials to regional meetings or signing on to
initiatives like the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC). Both Kausikan and a think-tanker who focuses on ASEAN
suggested that the USG work to revitalize the ARF as it was
trying to do with APEC.

--------------
China's "Charm" Offensive
--------------


4. (C) Interlocutors spoke of the effectiveness of China's
"charm offensive," noting that China showed great enthusiasm
for various regional fora and agreements, even if the
substance of its engagement was questionable. They cited
China,s offer of an FTA with ASEAN as an example. Even
though the FTA was not as comprehensive as a U.S. FTA, the
Chinese had been flexible and negotiations had progressed
rapidly. Given China's complicated history in the region,
the ASEAN countries had been wary of China up until the late
1990's. But China had since assuaged such concerns through
gestures of goodwill towards the region. Some saw China,s
engagement as more "strategic" than others; MFA's Kausikan
said that China was mostly interested in internal stability
and securing resources to fuel its economy. Mahbubani
thought China had a clear plan to extend its influence over
coming decades. Providing his own scorecard on the

SINGAPORE 00001304 002 OF 002


sophistication of current foreign policy (on a scale of 10),
Mahbubani gave China an 8, the United States a 6, the
European Union a 4 ("rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic") and Russia a 2.

--------------
"Arabization" of Indonesia and Malaysia
--------------


5. (C) Officials and academics pointed to the spread of a
more conservative Islam from the Middle East into
traditionally tolerant Southeast Asia ("Arabization") as a
worrying trend, noting that religion was playing a greater
part in politics. Mahbubani noted that Islamist political
parties in Malaysia and Indonesia had not increased their
historical share of the vote, but they had succeeded in
forcing "moderate" parties to shift in their direction. He
said that even this region,s many well-educated moderates
were "very angry" about U.S. policies. His prescriptions:
"shut off Saudi money" and get 50,000 Indonesia university
students to study in the United States. Kausikan noted that
Malaysia,s courts had recently allowed Islamic law to be
applied to non-Muslims, a development that seemed
inconceivable in the past. He cited similar trends in
Indonesia, though the high level of disorganization and
regional diversity in Indonesia made a consolidated movement
toward Islamic law less likely.


6. (C) Otherwise, Kausikan appeared to think Indonesia was
doing as well as could be expected. The new system had still
not reached a state of "equilibrium" to replace Soeharto,s
"New Order," but President Yudhoyono was "the best they,ve
got" and had a good economic cabinet. Key questions were
whether Yudhoyono would be able to reach an accommodation
with Vice President Kalla ahead of the 2009 election and
whether Indonesia could generate enough foreign direct
investment to generate jobs for millions of young people
entering the labor force. Kausikan said the conflict in
Southern Thailand was more about ethnicity than religion but
suggested that the incompetence of the current Thai
leadership was only making matters worse. He thought the
election later this year would do little to solve Thailand,s
underlying divisions.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) When pressed on the substance of U.S. engagement, GOS
officials and academics had few suggestions other than to
follow up strongly on initiatives like FTA-AP and try to show
similar leadership in the ARF. Rather, they focused on the
substantial gains China was making with goodwill gestures and
a diplomatic game played according to Asian expectations,
and the contrasting perception that the United States is
preoccupied elsewhere. For Singapore, more U.S. engagement
is always better, so we are unlikely ever to hear that we,re
doing enough. In fact, our economic, military and diplomatic
presence is enormous, and as long as it remains so, the
threat of Southeast Asia becoming a "Chinese lake" appears
exaggerated. China will likely make mistakes and eventually
will be expected to meet higher expectations. But for now
the perception that we are not willing or able to match
China,s "charm" is real, adding to a sense that we do not
fully grasp modern Asia or its trajectory. That alone can
complicate our diplomatic efforts in the region.


8. (U) S/P Deputy Director Waxman has cleared this message.

Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
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