Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHENYANG244
2007-12-13 03:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shenyang
Cable title:  

PRC-DPRK: UPDATE ON NK REPATRIATIONS/ASYLUM-

Tags:  PREL PREF PINR KN KS CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0509
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1774
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0720
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0072
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0057
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0778
RHHJJAA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI 0021
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0034
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/SACINCUNC SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0081
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0528
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000244 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM
MOSCOW PASS VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PREF PINR KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK: UPDATE ON NK REPATRIATIONS/ASYLUM-
SEEKERS; SMUGGLING; DPRK FOOD SHORTAGE CONCERNS; BORDER
TRADE

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 205

B. (B) SHENYANG 178 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN WICKMAN. REASONS:
1.4(b)/(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM
MOSCOW PASS VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PREF PINR KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK: UPDATE ON NK REPATRIATIONS/ASYLUM-
SEEKERS; SMUGGLING; DPRK FOOD SHORTAGE CONCERNS; BORDER
TRADE

REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 205

B. (B) SHENYANG 178 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN WICKMAN. REASONS:
1.4(b)/(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: PRC border officials in Baishan tell us
that they continue to apprehend and repatriate North Korean
border-crossers in their jurisdiction. Japan's Shenyang
Consulate is now home to seven North Korean asylum-seekers,
including two young children. North Korean authorities
near Sinuiju have launched an apparent crackdown on cross-
border commodity smuggling, with border guards conducting
house-to-house searches opposite Dandong, in a campaign
that Chinese smugglers say has had minimal effect on their
operations. Contacts in Jilin Province have expressed
growing concern about food shortages in the DPRK, one
official noting that a North Korean delegation traveled to
Changchun in late October requesting food aid from the
Jilin provincial government. PRC-DPRK trade transiting
Dandong this year is on track for a double-digit increase,
according to a trade official in the border city, a conduit
for over half of all official PRC-DPRK trade. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Poloff traveled to several points along the wintry
PRC-DPRK border in late October and November, including:
Baishan (October 31-November 1),just south of the Yanbian
Korean Autonomous Prefecture; Linjiang (November 1),across
from Chunggang, DPRK; and Dandong (November 7-8),opposite
Sinuiju. The following thematic update draws on site
visits and conversations with government officials there,
as well as on discussions with Korea specialists in
Shenyang (October 30) and Changchun (November 5-6),capital
of Jilin Province.

NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS: BAISHAN AND SHENYANG
-------------- --------------

3. (C) Baishan--which administratively supervises a
sprawling, key stretch of the PRC-DPRK borderlands that
includes Changbai and Linjiang--continues to find and
repatriate North Koreans that have crossed the border into

its jurisdiction, according to WANG Hongwei, Director of
the Baishan Foreign Affairs Office. Wang told Poloff on
November 1 that "not many" North Korean border-crossers had
arrived this year because the North Korean side had been
guarding its border "strictly." He mentioned that some
North Koreans apprehended in Baishan's administrative
district this year have been returned to the DPRK via the
Changbai and Linjiang land ports, opposite Hyesan and
Chunggang, respectively. The number of repatriations is
"unclear," Wang said, because the Border Defense corps
handles these issues, including the data on repatriations.
(NOTE: Wang's comments--and Post has not been able to
confirm their veracity--may suggest the existence of an
informal, ad hoc channel for repatriations separate from
Dandong and Tumen land ports, which a number of reliable,
well-placed PRC contacts have told us on several occasions
are the only two formal channels. END NOTE.)


4. (C) Several hundred miles south of Baishan in Shenyang,
the Japanese Consulate is again home, after a brief respite
earlier in the year, to more North Korean asylum-seekers.
Consul Shinichi KURITA (STRICTLY PROTECT) told Poloff on
November 27 that his consulate very recently acquired two
new arrivals, bringing to seven the total number of North
Koreans--all with previous family/historical ties to Japan-
-resident on the diplomatic compound. Kurita noted that
the PRC of late had granted relatively speedy exit
permission for Japan's Shenyang-based cases, though this
had not been true across the board and no real pattern had
emerged on why some cases moved quickly. He remained
hopeful that some of the current seven (five have already
been at the Japanese Consulate for three months) and

SHENYANG 00000244 002 OF 003


particularly the humanitarian cases of several children in
poor health, would be allowed to depart China before the
end of the year.

CROSS-BORDER SMUGGLING, BORDER FENCING: DANDONG
-------------- --

5. (C) Several kilometers north of downtown Dandong, DPRK
engineering troops continued fencing Yuchi Island, opposite
Hushan, on November 7. LU Chao (STRICTLY PROTECT),a Korea
specialist at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, told
Poloff in Shenyang on October 30 that according to his
Dandong-based contacts, the North Koreans had built the
fence to prevent, or at least reduce, the small-scale
cross-border commodity smuggling prevalent in the area.
Asked about the fencing on November 7, several Hushan
locals said they were unsure of its purpose but said they
suspected it was part of an official effort to counter
smuggling. They added that the fencing (which only
partially encloses the island) has had mixed effects. On
the one hand, they said the North Korean border guards
stationed just across the Yalu River, with whom they often
used to interact (e.g., bartering, smuggling at night),no
longer dare to beg them for food. On the other hand, they
said the North Korean locals can and still do so, albeit
with the consent of the border guards; they simply walk
their way around the fence to the banks of the river to
catch bags of food thrown across by Chinese on the other
side.


6. (C) One Hushan resident told Poloff that a crackdown on
commodity smuggling was under way on the North Korean side,
with border guards searching house-to-house for commonly
smuggled commodities like metals (e.g., copper). Fut
another local, small-scale Hushan commodity smuggler
explained that the putative crackdown has had minimal
effect on his operations, as well as on those of other
smugglers with whom he is friendly. He claimed to still
smuggle "nearly every day," selling on the Chinese side
during the daylight hours what he acquires through DPRK
border-guard intermediaries after nightfall. The selection
of wares shown Poloff included a North Korean bronze for
RMB 1000 (USD 135),a porcelain vase for RMB 300 (USD 40),
and a variety of other statuettes and small antiques. He
claimed that local Chinese police are apathetic about his
operations.


7. (C) Nevertheless, signs of what may remain a largely
rhetorical PRC campaign against smuggling (writ large) in
the greater Dandong area have translated into something
more formal, if yet ineffectual. During a drive along the
road from Dandong south to Donggang on November 7, for
example, Poloff observed a number of newly erected
permanent signposts bearing metal placards warning
residents against "drug smuggling," "alien smuggling," and
other "illegal behaviors." The placards replaced the
flimsy red banners posted in the area previously and
indicated they had been authorized by the local Border
Defense Committee (see refs A and B for details on earlier
efforts).

DPRK FOOD SUPPLIES: JILIN
--------------

8. (C) A number of Chinese contacts in recent weeks have
expressed concern about food shortages in the DPRK.
Baishan FAO Director Wang told Poloff on November 1 that a
North Korean delegation had traveled to Changchun during
the week of October 22 "begging" for food aid (grain) from
the Chinese. Wang and his colleagues in Baishan estimated
that neighboring DPRK localities would fare worse than last
year on the food/agricultural front. In Jilin Province's
capital, Changchun, Korea specialists and the provincial
government have been paying attention. ZHOU Weiping
(STRICTLY PROTECT) of the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences

SHENYANG 00000244 003 OF 003


noted on November 5 that one of her colleagues, ZHANG Feng,
had recently completed an internal study of the food
situation in North Korea. Unwilling to provide details,
Zhou said the report was quite "sensitive" and briefed to
senior provincial leaders.

BORDER OFFICIALS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DANDONG AND BAISHAN
-------------- --------------

9. (C) DANDONG. PRC-DPRK trade through Dandong rose
appreciably during 2007, according to YANG Wenjia, a
refreshingly professional and relatively open Director of
the Dandong Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau's
Foreign Trade Administration Section. Wang told Poloff on
November 7 that Dandong-DPRK trade this year looks set to
rise by fifteen percent over 2006, reaching nearly USD 700
million. The DPRK remains Dandong's largest trading
partner, Yang said, accounting for over fifty percent of
the city's total foreign trade. He claimed that the
composition of this trade has not changed appreciably this
year and that UNSCR 1718 did not have a measurable impact
on overall levels, even though Dandong Customs did step up
inspections after October 2006.


10. (C) BAISHAN. PRC-DPRK trade via Baishan looks to be on
track for a similar appreciation. ZHAO Lina, Chief of the
Baishan Commercial Bureau's Foreign Trade Section,
estimated on October 31 that Baishan-DPRK trade will end
the year twenty percent higher than in 2006 (USD 180
million, according to her earlier accounts). DPRK-related
trade accounts for roughly one-third of Baishan's total
foreign trade; North Korean lumber and minerals, mostly
transported through Changbai Port, are Baishan's largest
imports. Zhao, too, cited no major changes in Baishan-DPRK
trade over the past year, whether as a result of UNSCR 1718
enforcement or any other reason.


11. (C) On the investment side, Zhao reported that Baishan
firms continue to venture across the border into North
Korea, though investors tend to be mostly small firms, even
if some larger ones have invested in North Korean copper,
iron and mining more broadly. But the risk is
considerable, Zhao explained, and benefits sometimes
unclear. She offered the example of potentially investing
in North Korean lumber processing for the purpose of making
flooring, one of Baishan's most lucrative exports. Labor
across the border is certainly cheap--roughly RMB 3 (USD
.40) per month for a worker that would cost RMB 1000-2000
(USD 135-270) per month in Baishan, Zhao claimed. But
constant electricity blackouts, poor equipment, high start-
up costs, sub-par transportation infrastructure, and
lingering political risk temper the appetites of many local
Baishan investors, notwithstanding the potential labor
savings.


12. (C) TRADE ZONES. Proposals for$new PRC-DPRK barter-
trade zones in Baishan and Dandong still remain stuck in
the proverbial mud, as they have for most of the year,
according to border officials. Baishan has proposed, and
Beijing has approved, plans for a commodity-exchange zone
in Changbai, opposite Hyesan, said Zhao Lina. But the
North Korean side "has not been constructive," according to
Baishan FAO Director Wang, who noted that the long wait for
a DPRK response continues. Wang's deputy, Vice Director
LIU Fulin, told Poloff he had even traveled to Guangxi
Province to study its PRC-Vietnam border zone, which he
assessed was doing quite well; the hope in Changbai, he
explained, would be to replicate aspects of the Guangxi
model. As for Dandong, Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation Bureau Director Yang explained that, while his
city is eager for a barter-trade zone, the DPRK is simply
"not ready," at least in the immediate future.
WICKMAN