THEY "WON'T LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK": PRESS CONTROL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000153

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, INR, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: AUGUST 8, 2032
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SOCI KCUL CH
SUBJECT: THEY "WON'T LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK": PRESS CONTROL
IN NORTHEAST CHINA


Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN.
REASONS: 1.4(B),1.4(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Conservative propaganda officials in
northeast China continue to gag, muffle or otherwise
"manage" perceived negative news, according to Liaoning
journalists and Party sources, who note that media freedom
generally tends to be more restricted here than in other
parts of China. Propaganda authorities' recent
"management" of news coverage of a karaoke parlor explosion
near Benxi was only the latest example, though even some
high-level Party officials have grumbled to us about the
event's handling. The hand of the censorship apparatus
appeared again even more recently as propaganda authorities
managed an entire news blackout of an event implicating
social stability, when thousands of transport workers
launched a days-long strike in Jinzhou. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) An August 1 Washington Post expose on the "muffling"
of news coverage of the July 4 explosion of a Liaoning
karaoke parlor in Tianshifu, Benxi County, highlighted but
one in a long line of news events subject to controls by
propaganda officials in northeast China's Information
Offices (see Edward Cody, "China's Local Censors Muffle an
Explosion"). A range of Liaoning Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) members, newspaper journalists and television
reporters/officials in recent days discussed with us the
nature of the Liaoning censorship apparatus and the media
environment here more broadly.

THE CONSERVATIVE NORTHEAST AND ITS CENSORSHIP APPARATUS
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3. (C) Post sources generally concur that northeast China
remains a relatively conservative corner of the country in
terms of media freedom. CHONG Lin (strictly protect),a
close Post contact and Vice Director of the official
Shenyang Daily's economic section told PAO on August 3 that
propaganda officials she has encountered here have tended
to be more strict on the media than in other parts of
China. Her reporter-friends working elsewhere in China--
especially in the south--have had comparatively more
freedom to report on sensitive issues, she noted, conceding
that the business-related focus of her work has allowed her
more latitude than her other colleagues in town. Although
the orthodoxy of propaganda officials varies by province,
Chong stressed that the propaganda officials she has
encountered in the northeast tend to be less tolerant and
heterodox than those in the south, adding with a grimace
that the Liaoning propaganda officials with whom she
interacts are largely Party hacks that have no proper
journalistic experience.


4. (C) The actual process of news "management" differs in
practice between the television and the print media. TIAN
Wei (strictly protect),Deputy Programming Director for
official Liaoning Television, told PAO on August 2 that she
needs to seek the guidance of propaganda authorities on all
potentially sensitive stories. But she confided that she
generally does not need to coordinate too closely with
propaganda officials because she is already well aware of
their views and guidelines. If a sensitive but newsworthy
event occurs in another province, Tian said, then Liaoning
TV's guidance is to take its cues--and any television feed-
-from the official television station of the province in
question.


5. (C) Rules for the Liaoning print media tend to be
somewhat more flexible than those for television
journalists, Tian explained, a point echoed by others.
Even so, editors at the official Liaoning Daily still
consult with propaganda authorities "frequently" on their
stories, says GAO Xin, one of the paper's news editors.
Certain redlines are relatively clear. Asked on August 4
about a recent transport strike in Jinzhou (see below) Gao
said she had not heard of it but was quick to add that the
Liaoning Daily generally would not be permitted to cover
labor unrest because the subject is "sensitive."


6. (C) Liaoning TV's Tian Wei stressed to us the well-known
fact that news editors in many cases maintain close
professional and personal ties with propaganda officials.
According to a number of journalistic contacts, it is these
personal connections that prove to be a more potent force
in the process of censorship or (self-censorship) than
Party membership among members of the press corps. Why?
Chong Lin, for instance, estimates that at the Shenyang
Daily--a publication controlled by the Party--only one-

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third of her colleagues are Party members. Numbers are
even smaller, she said, at non-Party-controlled papers in
Liaoning. But a sense of loyalty to the CCP is likely a
more important element among Liaoning propaganda
authorities, whom Chong noted tend--at least among those
she has encountered--to be very loyal Party members.

THE CENSORSHIP APPARATUS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
--------------

7. (C) Not everyone has been pleased with the heavy-
handedness of the propaganda authorities, and even
relatively high-ranking Liaoning CCP officials have
occasionally privately vented their frustration. On the
Tianshifu explosion, for instance, Liaoning Party School
Deputy Party Secretary WANG Hongsheng (strictly protect)
confided on August 2 that he was quite "diwsatisfied" with
the guidelines from the propaganda authorities and the
resulting press coverage. Wang had read the internal Party
reports on the explosion and noted--unsurprisingly--that
they differed substantially from the official Xinhua news
accounts. The Party reports broached a wide range of
issues, including possible guilty parties, victims and
damage, inter alia. Motives are still unclear, Wang said,
but revenge may have been at play. (NOTE: The Liaoning
Public Security Bureau is still investigating the
explosion, Benxi Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) Director GUAN
Shizhen told the CG on August 3, promising no further
details until the effort was completed. END NOTE.)

BLACKING OUT THE JINZHOU TRANSPORT STRIKE
--------------

8. (SBU) Apparently subject to even harsher controls than
the Benxi explosion was a more recent event in Liaoning
that involved an entire news blackout and, unlike
Tianshifu, directly implicated questions of social
stability. On July 18, several thousand transport workers
in Jinzhou, a coastal city only recently revitalizing,
launched a days-long strike to protest the impending
privatization of the city's bus company and related
compensation issues. Buses lay idle for days as commuters
bore the brunt of the strike, and the CG observed their
conspicuous absence during a previously scheduled July 20-
21 visit. Most workers resumed their duties less than a
week after the strike began, following government efforts
to manage the situation, though according to one online
account, at least several hundred remained on strike nearly
a week later.


9. (SBU) All the while, Liaoning authorities imposed a
total news blackout, prohibiting domestic television and
print media from reporting on the strike. (Some local
reporters did make it to the scene, according to several
online sources). The sole source of information on the
Jinzhou strike proved to be local BBS sites, blogs and a
handful of Chinese-language overseas web pages that
primarily re-posted BBS messages from Jinzhou residents.
BBS boards on July 18 initially buzzed with details,
featuring sitreps and messages of support for the strikers.
By July 19, however, the discourse had shifted to the
alleged "malfeasance" of ZHAO Lihui, the state-owned
municipal bus company's general manager, who the sources
said stood to make a handsome profit. Netizens condemned
Zhao's "gall" and accused her of embezzlement. One Jinzhou
resident warned that Zhao had "underestimated the people's
strength." Another exhorted readers to "wake up" and "use
legal instruments to protect our legal rights." Watching
all this activity online, Post observed the webmaster for
one particular Jinzhou BBS--hosted on well-known web portal
Sohu--quickly and systematically deleting any item that
touched on the issue of possible corruption.


10. (SBU) Initially, the webmasters permitted discussion of
the basic details about the strike and the government's
actions to redress the grievances. The angry netizens,
however, continued to broaden their attacks over the
following days. By July 22, far more explicit attacks on
Zhao and, ultimately, the government itself appeared before
they were promptly removed. One Jinzhou resident groused
that the "government...won't let the people speak." Others
decried the "excessive" censorship and "tyrannical,"
"unjust" deletion of their BBS posts.


11. (C) Privately, officials seemed far less sensitive
about the strike than their media handling might suggest.
After Jinzhou Party Secretary TONG Zhiwu glumly fielded
strike-related phone calls on July 20 throughout a meeting
with the CG, FAO Director TAN Yunpeng the following day

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openly confirmed the strike had been ongoing since July 18.
Asked about its causes, Tan omitted the corruption angle
but explained, accurately, that the transport workers
feared losing their livelihoods during the privatization
process. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Tianshifu
explosion, officials in Benxi also did not shy away from
discussing the event. Benxi Vice Mayor LIU Shangyang and
FAO Director LU Enwei on July 11 openly told Econoff that
while the event was frightening, they did not find it
terribly significant.

COMMENT
--------------

12. (C) In the run-up to the 17th Party Congress, perhaps
it is unsurprising for the official print and television
news media in Liaoning to play it safe and project the
image of a stable, healthy and "harmonious" Liaoning. This
may be particularly important in light of Liaoning Party
Secretary LI Keqiang's anticipated elevation to Beijing

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this fall, perhaps to a Politburo Standing Committee slot.
And this may be one reason, in addition to the sensitivity
of the topic, why so many of Post's journalistic sources in
Liaoning--even longtime contacts--became noticeably nervous
when asked about the mechanics of censorship in general and
the role of propaganda authorities in particular. During
an August 3 meeting at the official Northeast China News
Web, for instance, nervous journalists actually stopped the
meeting, consulted outside for several minutes and, upon
their return, referred us to the provincial Information
Office for any further questions on censorship.
WICKMAN