Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI615
2007-09-14 11:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS?

Tags:  PGOV PINR SOCI ECON CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7662
RR RUEHCN RUEHVC
DE RUEHGH #0615/01 2571104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141104Z SEP 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6268
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6749
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000615 

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN, WRIGHT
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: X1, MR
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI ECON CH
SUBJECT: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS?

REF: A) SHANGHAI 549; B) BEIJING 5974; C) SHANGHAI 379

SHANGHAI 00000615 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN, WRIGHT
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: X1, MR
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI ECON CH
SUBJECT: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AT THE PARTY CONGRESS?

REF: A) SHANGHAI 549; B) BEIJING 5974; C) SHANGHAI 379

SHANGHAI 00000615 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (C) Summary: According to a long-time Consulate contact,
there would be more candidates for the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) than there were slots, reflecting a greater
focus on intra-party democracy. Meanwhile, separate contacts
reported differing accounts of the party's commitment to
adhering to the practice implemented at the last party congress
of forcing leaders who had already reached the age of 68 to
retire. These rumors may reflect President Hu Jintao's
continued efforts either to promote Vice Premier Wu Yi or to
retire Vice President Zeng Qinghong. While we await the
ultimate outcome of the Party Congress, Hu has prepositioned
some of his supporters to take up seats on the Central Committee
to increase the likelihood that voting for Politburo and PBSC
members goes his way. End summary.

--------------
Extra PBSC Candidates
--------------


2. (C) During a September 12 meeting, Tongji University
Professor Frank Peng (protect) said that in line with pushing
forward President Hu Jintao's more liberal, democratic agenda,
the central leadership had determined that, for the first time,
there would be more candidates for seats on the PBSC than actual
slots. There were currently eleven candidates: Hu, Wen,
National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Wu Bangguo (also
currently on the PBSC),PBSC member Li Changchun, Guangdong
Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, NPC Executive Vice Chairman Wang
Zhaoguo, Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, Jiangsu Party
Secretary Li Yuanchao, Minister of Public Security Zhou

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Yongkang, Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping, and one other

whom Peng could not recall. Peng said that two weeks earlier he
would have pegged United Front Work Department head Liu Yandong
as the eleventh candidate but she has since lost some of her
standing (Note: Peng either would not or could not elaborate on
Liu's position. End note.) Peng did not know if there would be
seven or nine PBSC slots.


3. (C) Peng said that rumors to the contrary aside, the PBSC
intended to enforce the age limits on PBSC membership and would
require everyone 68 or older to step down. Vice President Zeng
Qinghong, Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) head
Wu Guanzheng, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC) Chairman Jia Qinglin, and Luo Gan would all be retiring
from the PBSC this fall. In addition, Commerce Minister Bo
Xilai was virtually guaranteed a slot on the Politburo although
Peng was likewise confident that Bo was not on the PBSC short
list.


4. (C) In contrast, during a September 13 discussion with
Pol/Econ Section Chief, Shanghai Stock Exchange Global Business
Development Deputy Director Chao Kejian (protect) said that
according to "very recent" information, Vice Premier Wu Yi, who
will be 69 in November, would be promoted to the PBSC. The
party needed a high-ranked female and Wu had demonstrated the
skills needed to continue in a high-level position. Separately,
Chao noted that current China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) Chairman Shang Fulin would take up the post of People's
Bank of China (PBOC) Governor. While this was ostensibly a
lateral move, Chao explained that the CSRC Chairman and other
heads of the financial regulatory agencies were not members of
the cabinet, while the PBOC Governor was. Chao also predicted
that current PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan would be promoted to
State Councilor.


5. (C) Comment: We have been hearing back and forth rumors of
the enforcement or lack thereof of the so-called "seven up,
eight down" rule that would force people over the age of 68 to
retire while leaving anyone 67 or younger in place. Most of
these rumors seem to have been regarding the fortunes of Zeng
and Wu Yi. These constantly fluctuating rumors likely reflect
the continuing posturing by both Zeng and Hu. Since as early as
June, our contacts have reported a link between Zeng's efforts
to stay on and Hu's desire to promote Wu (Ref C). It appears to
be somewhat of an "either/or" package deal. End comment.

--------------

SHANGHAI 00000615 002.2 OF 002


Pre-Packaging the Party Congress
--------------


6. (C) Peng explained that when the Party Congress convenes on
October 15, one of its first orders of business would be to
elect the Central Committee. Towards the end of the Party
Congress, the Central Committee would elect the Politburo, which
in turn would elect the PBSC. There were likely to be more
candidates for both the Central Committee and the Politburo than
actual positions. In practice, every one of the Politburo
candidates would be elected, with those garnering the fewest
votes being relegated to the status of "alternate member." PBSC
candidates will be selected from among the ranks of the PBSC,
meaning that if they failed to be elected to the Standing
Committee, they could still retain their Politburo status.
(Comment: We assess it would be unlikely for current PBSC member
Li Changchun to remain on the Politburo if he were not
re-elected to the PBSC. End comment.)


7. (C) To ensure that voting goes his way, Peng said, Hu was
driving the current provincial and ministerial reshuffles in an
effort to preposition more of his people to be in line for
Central Committee slots at the Party Congress. If Hu were able
to control the Central Committee, he would have an easier time
securing the votes he needs to ensure his picks for the
Politburo and, subsequently, the PBSC will be elected. Hu was
also using the pre-congress personnel changes to oust loyalists
of former President Jiang Zemin. Peng pointed to the recent
ouster of Finance Minister and Jiang protigi Jin Renqing amidst
allegations of corruption and sexual misconduct as an example.
Jin was transferred to a Vice-Ministerial-level position at the
State Council Development Research Center, but had yet to take
up his new post, which appears to be a sinecure at best. Peng
believed that Hu had timed the investigation to free up the
position for someone more politically palatable to himself. Hu
was also behind recent reshuffles in the military, including the
replacement of the Nanjing Military Region Commander and
Political Commissar, to ensure that people loyal to him were in
charge.


8. (C) Comment: While having more candidates than PBSC seats
appears marginally democratic, in reality much of the selection
of Politburo and PBSC members will be a foregone conclusion.
For instance, if the central leadership has already come up with
the name list for the PBSC candidates, it would seem that they
will be elected as full Politburo members. Nevertheless, having
more candidates than slots for the PBSC could be a first
step--even if largely symbolic--toward intra-party democracy.
End comment.
JARRETT