SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000601

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMICS ON TAIWAN

REF: A) SHANGHAI 570 B) SHANGHAI 573

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Section Chief,
Political/Economic Section, U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a series of meetings in late August, Shanghai
cross-Strait experts expressed concerns about Taiwan's
referendum on UN membership, which they believed touched on the
redline of the Anti-Secession Law and created a basis for Taiwan
independence. While there were many voices in China about
Taiwan, President Hu Jintao still controlled Taiwan policy and
had yet to make a decision on what actions Beijing will take in
reaction to the referendum. The academics urged the United
States do more to stop the UN referendum. Fudan University
Center for American Studies Vice Dean Wu Xinbo asserted that
there was a great deal of pressure on President Hu to take
action against Taiwan before the October 15 Party Congress.
During this time period, it was especially important for the
United States to appear to be doing more and saying more on
Taiwan. Beijing would likely not take any military action
before the Party Congress as long as it appeared that the United
States was managing the situation. All of the experts were
disappointed with the KMT's efforts against the referendum and
worried that the KMT had become too focused on winning the
election. End Summary.

A Challenge to Hu's Taiwan Policy
--------------


2. (C) On August 28-30, Poloff accompanied two visiting Taiwan
analysts to meetings with some of Shanghai's leading Taiwan
academic experts. In an August 28 meeting, Shanghai Institute
for East Asia Studies (SIEAS) President Zhang Nianchi worried
that the referendum was putting pressure on President Hu Jintao
to abandon his current policy towards Taiwan that emphasized
patience. According to Zhang, President Hu's Taiwan policy
recognized that reunification was a long-term process and
supported a patient approach to Taiwan. The policy had four
aspects: 1) increase exchanges; 2) strengthen three direct links
between Taiwan and the Mainland; 3) support dialogue and
negotiations with political parties in Taiwan, including the
DPP; and 4) respect the wishes of the Taiwan people and trust
that they will make the right choice. The referendum was
causing some people to lose patience with Hu's policy and demand
that Hu take action against Taiwan.


3. (C) Taiwan Research Center Executive Vice President Yan Anlin
voiced similar concerns during his meeting with Poloff and
Taiwan analysts on August 28. He said that Hu's basic Taiwan
policy was to maintain stability through exchanges and
discussions. As Taiwan moved closer to establishing
independence, people were beginning to question Hu's ability to
contain Taiwan. He predicted that if the referendum did take
place, enormous domestic pressure would force Hu to change his
policy.


4. (C) Zhang said currently there was a fierce debate in
governmental and academic circles about Taiwan. He noted,
however, China was still a country in which power was
concentrated in the center. There might be multiple voices with
multiple ideas, but President Hu makes the final decision.
Until now, Hu has yet to make any statement on Taiwan or make
known his views on Taiwan. Unlike former President Jiang Zemin,
Hu liked to hear different opinions and has hosted regular
meetings with academics on Taiwan. In addition, many
organizations had "channels" to pass information to Hu. The
PLA, State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, MFA and even Zhang's
organization, SIEAS, all had their channels to Hu.


5. (C) Fudan University Center for American Studies Vice Dean
Wu Xinbo in a discussion on August 28 said that while China's
official policy came from the State Council's Taiwan Affairs
Office, it was also important to look at statements made by the
PLA, MFA and other organizations. These statements were not
necessarily "test balloons" or signals of policy changes but
provided insight into the debate occurring in China on Taiwan.
(Comment: Wu just returned from a year-long fellowship at the
U.S. Institute of Peace and is, perhaps, more sensitive to the
role played by different agencies in governmental decision

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making. End Comment.)

A Fuzzy Redline
--------------


6. (C) Academics were reluctant to say that the referendum had
crossed the Anti-Secession Law's redlines. Shanghai Institute
for International Studies (SIIS) South Asia Studies Deputy
Director Shao Yuqun on August 30 said China did not want to
clearly define the Anti-Secession Law's redline. At the same
time, it did not want to give Taiwan too much flexibility. This
ambiguity made it difficult to definitively say whether the
referendum would violate the Anti-Secession Law. This would
depend on many factors including which candidate wins Taiwan's
presidential election.


7. (C) According to Fudan's Wu Xinbo, the language in the
Anti-Secession Law was purposely vague to allow Beijing space to
maneuver. The law said that Beijing must act if there was a
"major and serious" change to the status quo. One could argue
that the referendum would not violate the Anti-Secession Law
because even if the referendum did pass, Taiwan would still be
considered a part of China. He concluded that, in the end, the
question of whether the referendum would or would not violate
the law depended on the political will of the Central
Government. SIEAS's Zhang Nianchi believed that the referendum
"touched" the Anti-Secession Law's redline. However, the
Central Government was not sure whether it should let the public
know this for fear that it would have to react.

Beijing Constrained, So Far
--------------


8. (C) Wu Xinbo asserted that both the upcoming 17th Party
Congress and the Olympics played a strong influence on the
debate on Taiwan in Beijing. President Hu was under great
pressure in the run-up to the 17th Party Congress to show that
he was capable of managing the Taiwan situation. After the 17th
Party Congress, this pressure should decrease. The Olympics was
also a factor. Wu, like Zhang Nianchi and Yan Anlin, noted that
Beijing's top priority was the Olympics and it did not want to
cancel the Olympics because of Taiwan. According to Wu, so far,
Beijing has been constrained in its actions partly because the
United States had made its position clear. As long as the
situation does not get too out of control, Beijing was content
to allow Washington to manage the situation.


9. (C) Wu believed that there was a good chance Beijing would
not take any action before the Party Congress. However, as the
elections in Taiwan heat up and the referendum gets closer,
Beijing might need to take some kind of symbolic action to show
its reserve and unhappiness as well as to show that it has the
capability to take care of the Taiwan problem.

Beijing's Possible Actions
--------------


10. (C) According to Wu, Beijing was taking a two-step approach
to the problem. First, it was looking to the international
community to constrain Taiwan. Recently, Beijing urged other
countries to publicly say that they would not support Taiwan's
entry into the UN and to also clarify their Taiwan policy.
Second, Beijing needed to take some action on its own that would
show the people of Taiwan that the referendum would hurt their
interests. Despite everything that Chen Shui-bian has done, the
economic relationship between the Mainland and Taiwan continued
unaffected. Economic actions should be on the table. He
acknowledged, however, that such a move could backfire and anger
the Taiwan people, leading more people to support the DPP and
independence. The elections in Taiwan were a constraining
effect on Beijing. Beijing understood that it must carefully
consider the consequences of any action on the election.


11. (C) Wu added that Beijing was also trying to reach out to
the DPP and it was considering inviting Frank Hsieh to the
Mainland before the Taiwan Presidential Elections in 2008.
According to Wu, Beijing has been trying to establish
communications with the DPP for several years now. After the
visit of James Soong and former KMT Chairman Lien Chan to the
Mainland, Beijing realized that it needed to also reach out to
the DPP. It has taken some time to build channels of

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communication. He indicated that there has been some progress
and noted that there were some DPP members who had a long-term
and more practical view.

The U.S. Role
--------------


12. (C) Most of the academics argued that the United States had
far greater influence on Taiwan then Beijing and urged the
United States to do more to force Taiwan to give up the
referendum. They were very appreciative of recent U.S.
statements on Taiwan. However, some believed that the United
States had the capacity to do more. Shao Yuqun suggested that
the USG make clear to the DPP that the referendum would hurt the
DPP's relationship with the USG. SIIS Deputy Director of
Japanese Studies Lian Degui in the same meeting with Shao
suggested that the United States to utilize Taiwan's media to
tell the people of Taiwan that the referendum would have a
negative impact on Taiwan. Many of the academics believed that
the people of Taiwan did not clearly understand what the
referendum meant and asserted that if the people of Taiwan were
better informed and educated on the impact of the referendum
then they would oppose it.


13. (C) Zhang Nianchi acknowledged that the United States was
doing a great deal and thanked the USG for its recent
statements. However, there was a "perception problem." Most
Chinese people believed that the United States was responsible
for the Taiwan problem because it gave Taiwan too much support
and tolerance. Chinese people believed that, if the United
States really wanted to, it could stop Taiwan from pushing for
independence. The fact that Taiwan independence continued to be
a problem meant that the United States really did not want to
stop it. Wu Xinbo made a similar point in his meeting. Wu said
that the United States was indeed doing a lot, but Beijing
expected the United States to do even more. As long as
Washington was managing the situation, there was less pressure
on Beijing to take strong action against Taiwan. Wu stressed
that in the period before the 17th Party Congress, the United
States must say more and do more or at least appear to be saying
more and doing more.

KMT: No Longer Restraining the DPP
--------------


14. (C) All of the academics were disappointed with the KMT and
its role in stopping the referendum. Zhang Nianchi said the KMT
was no longer restraining the DPP. It was becoming too
localized (bentu hua) and too focused on gaining votes and
winning elections. According to Zhang, the election was now a
competition of "who loves Taiwan more." Shao Yuqun declared
that the KMT was not sure if it wanted to become the Chinese KMT
or the Taiwan KMT. The KMT has not made its position clear on
the referendum and was suffering from many internal problems.


15. (C) Yan Anlin said the Chinese Government was very
disappointed with KMT Presidential Candidate Ma Ying-jeou and
not confident that he could stop the DPP. Wu Xinbo noted in his
meeting that Beijing was uncomfortable with Ma for three
reasons. First, Ma talks too much about democracy and human
rights. If he wins, it would be difficult for the Chinese
Government to deal with Ma on these issues. While one could
criticize Chen Shui-bian for playing the independence card, it
would be difficult to criticize Ma for playing the democracy
card. Second, under Ma's leadership the KMT has become too
localized (bentu hua). Ma believes that the future of the KMT
depended on it becoming more of a local political party.
Finally, many people were suspicious of Ma because he appeared
to be too close to the United States.


16. (C) Nevertheless, all of the academics preferred Ma
Ying-jeou to DPP Presidential Candidate Frank Hsieh. According
to Shao, it was hard to predict who would win the Taiwan
Presidential Elections. While Ma posed some problems, Hsieh
would never give up independence. In addition, if the DPP won
the election, the KMT would be finished and there would be no
one to check the DPP's power.

Taiwan Businessmen: Not Very Influential
--------------


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17. (C) The academics believed that Taiwan businessmen in China
would not have a big influence on the upcoming Presidential
election. Zhang Nianchi said Taiwan businessmen were a lost
cause. China protected many Taiwan businessmen and gave them
status on the mainland. However, when most of the businessmen
returned to Taiwan they refused to acknowledge that they
received any help from the Chinese Government and attributed
their success on the mainland to their own abilities. Zhang
concluded that the economic relationship was not a good platform
for discussion. Zhang added that even if all of the estimated
250,000 Taiwan businessmen living on the Mainland wanted to
return to Taiwan to vote it would be impossible. There were not
enough flights to Taiwan to accommodate this number. Yan Anlin
also discounted the influence of Taiwan businessmen on the
elections and noted that not all Taiwan businessmen were KMT
supporters.

Patience is the Key
--------------


18. (C) In all of the meetings with academics, Poloff and
Taiwan analysts urged that China continue to be patient with
Taiwan and adopt a long-term view of the relationship. A strong
reaction could have a negative affect on the relationship and
paint China in a corner.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) Poloff has had the opportunity to discuss Taiwan with
more than a dozen different Shanghai academics in the past two
weeks. (See Reftels.) The academics have been consistent in
their views. While some have argued that the referendum does
indeed cross the Anti-Secession Law's redline, most argue that
it only touches the line and should not automatically trigger a
military action from Beijing. How Beijing reacts depends, in
part, on whether the United States can contain Taiwan or at
least appears to be doing all it can on the issue, according to
these Shanghai academics.
JARRETT