Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI546
2007-08-29 02:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN'S AUGUST 22 BREAKFAST WITH SHANGHAI

Tags:  PREL PGOV MCAP MARR OVIP CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN CH TW 
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FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1365
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//HI//N5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0831
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0974
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0853
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0851
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0675
RUEHBJ/USDAO BEIJING
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6640
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000546 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF PASS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CNO ALSO FOR POLAD
DIA FOR DDH/DDHN-1G/DHO-3
USPACOM FOR J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP MARR OVIP CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN CH TW
SUBJECT: CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN'S AUGUST 22 BREAKFAST WITH SHANGHAI
ACADEMICS

CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. Consulate
General, Shanghai, China, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000546

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF PASS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CNO ALSO FOR POLAD
DIA FOR DDH/DDHN-1G/DHO-3
USPACOM FOR J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP MARR OVIP CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN CH TW
SUBJECT: CNO ADMIRAL MULLEN'S AUGUST 22 BREAKFAST WITH SHANGHAI
ACADEMICS

CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. Consulate
General, Shanghai, China, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. Shanghai scholars of strategic and American
studies urged the United States to suspend arms sales to Taiwan
through the May 2008 Presidential election in an August 22
meeting with United States Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Michael Mullen. Chen Shui-bian was described as a dangerous
figure still intent on moving Taiwan to independence, and the
extent of China's reaction to Chen's referendum on UN membership
or other actions is not certain. China, Taiwan and the United
States thus face a dangerous year ahead, and the USN and USG
should work with China to prevent the Taiwan issue from becoming
a crisis. The new joint efforts of the United States, Japan,
Australia and India will shape China's perception of its
security environment and may be seen as exclusionary and
threatening. Fudan University's Center for American Studies and
the U.S. Institute for Peace will launch a multi-year crisis
management workshop this autumn in Shanghai, and will seek
participation of academics, government officials and military
officers. One scholar said Chinese television news coverage had
underscored the seriousness and successfulness of the CNO's
visit.




2. (C) Summary continued. Admiral Mullen urged work on crisis
management, internally and bilaterally. Collaborative efforts
with other democracies are intended as a positive development
and not directed against China. Cooperative efforts on North
Korea -- and Iran -- are imperative. Admiral Mullen urged that,
if trust is to be built, the success of his visit should not be
a one-off event never replicated in the future. He also urged
establishment of a Pentagon - National Defense Ministry hotline,

and having an informed and empowered interlocutor available at
the Beijing end should such hotline ever be used. End summary.




3. (C) Five Shanghai scholars conversant on Taiwan, security
and American issues met with Admiral Mullen at an August 22
breakfast hosted by the Consul General. (See para 13 for list
of participants.) Fudan University Center for American Studies
(CAS) Director Shen Dingli said China held the highest respect
for the U.S. Navy and the Taiwan issue was the only issue about
which there are differences. He asked whether the U.S. military
could play a constructive role in riding out the turbulent times
through Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's May 20, 2008 end of
term. Chen was dangerous and counting on the PRC to be
constrained from dangerous reactions by domestic stability
concerns even if provoked by a UN membership referendum on
Taiwan. Chen's purported evaluation is not necessarily correct.
Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) Strategic
Studies Department Director Xia Liping (a retired PLA Colonel)
averred that Chen held two goals for his planned UN membership
referendum: (a) influencing the outcomes of the presidential
and Legislative Yuan elections, and (b) using the referendum
results as another step forward in Chen's approach to Taiwan
independence.




4. (C) Shen further suggested that the United States suspend
arms sales to Taiwan until the post-Chen administration has
taken office. China was opposed to arms sales to Taiwan on
principle but dealt with the issue constructively. Shen
recognized that such a move by the United States would be a
political, not military decision, but said such a move would
clearly signal to the Taiwan public that the United States would
not support irresponsibility and to the Chinese public that the

SHANGHAI 00000546 002 OF 005


United States was working to contain a dangerous issue. Admiral
Mullen replied that any change of policy would be a political
decision, but the United States was not in the business of
walking away from its friends. The United States understood the
significance of the Taiwan issue for China. Improved crisis
management capabilities and further contacts and deepened
understanding were important means to address the coming 9-12
months. Neither side should be making up policy steps on the
fly over the next few months. Taiwan or other press reports of
proposed arms sales should not be reacted to as if the weapons
were already deployed in Taiwan's military. The Admiral noted
that the Taiwan domestic political repercussions of a cessation
of arms sales were by no means certain.



--------------

The Security Dilemma: More Cooperation While

Preparing for the Worst

--------------




5. (C) Professor Xia noted increased bilateral economic
interdependence, cooperation on non-traditional security issues
such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and global
warming, and increased cooperation on issues such as the Korean
Peninsula and Taiwan. At the same time, the United States has
prepared for other scenarios, even confrontation with China. In
response, the PLA has also prepared for worst case scenarios.
The Asia-Pacific region places great importance on the concept
of major powers. Sino-American cooperation on Korean Peninsula
issues has sent an important signal to the region. (The Admiral
interjected that cooperation on Iran was also needed.) The
United States effort to form a Japan-Australia-India-United
States alliance based on shared democratic values would have a
negative effect on security cooperation with China in the
Asia-Pacific region. Democracy was a universal value, and
China, in accordance with its Constitution, was moving towards
democracy on a step-by-step basis. Was establishment of this
alliance likely? How would that alliance impact U.S.-China
relations? CAS Deputy Director Wu Xinbo expressed similar
concerns about the balance between cooperation and deterrence
and that the Japan-Australia-India-United States security
coalition would have a major impact on shaping China's
perception of its security environment. Wu urged more mil-mil
cooperation with China. SIIS Department for American Studies
Director Chen Dongxiao said the coalition could polarize rather
than stabilize the Asia-Pacific region and make security
architecture building more exclusionary than inclusionary.




6. (C) Admiral Mullen said that globalization has moved nearly
all nations closer together. Militaries must prepare for worst
situations. Having or developing a high-end Navy did not mean
that nations must have confrontations. The goal of the
"thousand-ship Navy" was to protect the global maritime trade
from which China, the United States and so many other countries
derived tremendous economic benefits. The cooperation between
the four countries should be seen as a positive relationship and
not directed against China. The Admiral took note of China's
great concerns about Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan and recalled
Chinese officials' unhesitating comments in Beijing earlier
during his visit that China would choose necessary action on
Taiwan over a successful Olympics. The Admiral reiterated the
need for cooperative efforts among many nations, including
China, to solve difficult issues such as North Korea and Iran.



SHANGHAI 00000546 003 OF 005




7. (C) Admiral Mullen explained that increased mil-mil
cooperation with China actually started under the leadership of
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and PACOM Admiral Fallon, and their
successors continued that emphasis to this day. The most recent
Quadrennial Review clearly showed a shift in emphasis to the
Asia-Pacific region. One of the reasons the Admiral had
traveled to China was to hear and better understand China's
concerns. The United States sought positive outcomes and did
not seek to increase suspicions.



-------------- --------------

Crisis Management Preparations and More Pressure on CSB

-------------- --------------




8. (C) SIIS Department for American Studies Director Chen
Dongxiao cautioned that Chen Shui-bian was trying to mobilize
domestic pressures in Taiwan by deliberately defying pressure
from the United States. China had not yet defined what steps to
take against Taiwan movements towards independence, and had not
yet defined the referendum on UN membership as a step towards
independence. However, Chinese officials had already described
the planned referendum as a grave threat. That left little room
for maneuver for China and made crisis management that much more
important. China, the United States and others should prepare
for crisis management, and should put more pressure on Chen
Shui-bian so that he sees the costs of his actions as too high
for him and his people.




9. (C) Admiral Mullen urged creation of fora to discuss
concerns such as these and to address crisis management
capabilities and preparations. Since the end of the Cold War,
deterrence had disappeared. Nuclear weapons proliferation could
occur in locations that could hurt the United States, China and
many other nations. Crisis management preparations were needed
to create off-ramps and avoid escalations of differences to
confrontations. The United States and China should engage to
deliberately recognize where we are and what may be next. Many
challenges confronted the bilateral relationship, such as
espionage, information security and space policy. His visit was
intended in part to develop trust but trust would not be
accomplished overnight.




10. (C) CAS Deputy Director Wu Xinbo, less than one month back
from a year at the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP),explained
that he had tried to identify potential bilateral crises and how
they could be managed. Different crises would need different
approaches and different solutions. He had found no systemic
studies of future bilateral crises. CAS and USIP will launch a
multi-year project, beginning with a preparatory session in
Shanghai this autumn, on crisis management. CAS and USIP will
each be responsible to obtain the participation of academics,
government officials and military officers, matching the
participation of the other side. Admiral Mullen expressed
interest in learning more and said he would discuss the project
with USIP's Ambassador Solomon.



-------------- --------------

Successful Visit Should Not be a One-Off Occurrence


SHANGHAI 00000546 004 OF 005


-------------- --------------




11. (C) Jiaotong University Center for National Strategy
Studies Vice Director Zhuang Jianzhong noted that Chinese prime
time television news coverage on August 21 (CCTV channel 9) had
demonstrated the seriousness and successfulness of the Admiral's
visit by broadcasting news about the Admiral first, ahead of
news of Communist Party and national leaders' activities.
Zhuang asked for further views of promotion of mil-mil relations.




12. (C) Admiral Mullen outlined the steps he had taken to make
PLA (Navy) Commander Admiral Wu Shengli's recent stateside visit
successful and the unprecedented access he in turn had enjoyed
on this trip, after having postponed his arrival in China until
knowing that he had a substantive schedule. The success of this
visit should not be a one-off event, but rather one to be
matched or exceeded in the future. Other needed improvements to
mil-mil relations included changing the programs for visiting
National War Colleges and Industrial College of the Armed Forces
delegations, who should not be sent to the same aged destroyer
year after year. The Chinese military should extend greater
transparency to cover those sorts of visitors. Transparency and
reciprocity needs to be kept up. More young PLA officers should
study in the United States. PLA Navy officers should be at the
Naval War College in Newport, even if Taiwan Navy officers are
there. If China wanted to be able to de-escalate cross-Strait
crises, it made sense for officers to have studied together.
Mil-mil hotlines should be established and someone at the
Chinese end should be able to pick up the phone and talk.
China's January anti-satellite test had been of great concern to
the United States and the PACOM Commander's calls to China had
gone unanswered. Mil-mil hotlines would enhance mil-mil
relations, trust and crisis management only if someone could
pick up the phone and could talk.




13. (U) This report has been cleared by Admiral Mullen's
delegation.



(U) U.S. Participants



Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations



Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, Shanghai



Donald Camp, Political Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations



Captain Bill Moran, Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations



Captain Thomas Mangold, Naval Attachi, Embassy Beijing



Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section Chief, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai

SHANGHAI 00000546 005 OF 005





(U) Chinese Participants



Professor SHEN Dingli, Director, Center for American Studies,
Fudan University



Professor WU Xinbo, Deputy Director, Center for American
Studies, Fudan University



Senior Fellow CHEN Dongxiao, Director, Department for American
Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies



Professor XIA Liping, Director, Department of Strategic Studies,
Shanghai Institute for International Studies
JARRETT