Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI529
2007-08-22 07:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI ACADEMIC ON SCO, RUSSIA, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

Tags:  PREL ENRG CH RS TI TX UZ KZ IR KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6623
RR RUEHCN RUEHDBU RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0529/01 2340713
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 220713Z AUG 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6163
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1351
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0663
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0841
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0839
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0819
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0961
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0006
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0006
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0001
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0006
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0012
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0004
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0100
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0002
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6611
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000529 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, SCA/CEN
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2017
TAGS: PREL ENRG CH RS TI TX UZ KZ IR KN
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMIC ON SCO, RUSSIA, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

REF: A) BEIJING 5496 B) 2006 SHANGHAI 7043

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, ,
U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000529

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, SCA/CEN
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2017
TAGS: PREL ENRG CH RS TI TX UZ KZ IR KN
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMIC ON SCO, RUSSIA, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

REF: A) BEIJING 5496 B) 2006 SHANGHAI 7043

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, ,
U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a lunch discussion with DPO on August 20,
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Academic Pan Guang
noted Russia's increased interest in energy coordination at the
recent SCO Summit in Bishkek and asserted that this represented
a slight shift in Russian policy towards the SCO. Russia
understood that it could no longer control the placement of gas
and oil pipelines in the region and was looking to the SCO to
play a coordinating role. Pan doubted that there would be any
new SCO members in the near future, including Iran. The one
exception was Turkmenistan, which has significant energy
reserves. Pan also briefed DPO on his recent tourism trip to
North Korea, which he said resembled China of thirty years ago.
End Summary.

Energy Cooperation
--------------


2. (C) DPO hosted a lunch for SASS Center for International
Studies and Institute of Eurasian Studies Director Pan Guang and
SASS Shanghai Cooperation Organization Institute Deputy Director
Hu Jian on August 20 to discuss the recent SCO Summit in
Bishkek. Poloff attended as notetaker. Shanghai-based Pan is
considered to be one of China's leading experts on Russia and
Central Asia as well as the Middle East. DPO observed that many
press reports about the summit provided lengthy details on
President Hu Jintao's meetings and goals for the summit, but
contained little information on President Putin's views. Pan
said that this was typical of Russia's attitude towards the SCO.
Russia's emphasis has always been on military cooperation. He
asserted, however, that in the last two summits, Russia has
become more active in pushing for energy cooperation. President
Putin called for the creation of a "regional energy club" at the
2006 Summit and pushed for progress in this area during this

years summit.


3. (C) Pan attributed this shift in Russian policy to a growing
understanding by Russia that it could no longer control the
pipelines. In the last month, China has signed three separate
agreements on building gas and oil pipelines to China with
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. (Note: One agreement
involved the final phases of an oil pipeline between Kazakhstan
and China which would allow Kazakhstan to ship 1 million of
barrels of oil a day to China. The other two agreements related
to a project to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China
which would transit Uzbekistan. Both pipelines would bypass
Russia. End Note.) Russia wanted more coordination among SCO
countries on these issues and was therefore pushing for a
regional energy club.

No New Members, Except Perhaps Turkmenistan
--------------


4. (C) As in previous conversations (ref B),Pan believed that
it was unlikely that the SCO would accept any new members in the
near future. He did not believe that Iran would become a
member. Iran had joined the SCO as an observer under the
reformist Khatami government, before Ahmadinejad came to power.
At the time, SCO members believed that Iran could be controlled.
Currently, many members were uncomfortable with Iran and did
not support allowing Iran to become a member. There was also
little support for either Pakistan or India becoming full
members. While there might be support for Mongolia joining,
Mongolia is satisfied to be an observer and has never expressed
an interest in membership. The one exception was Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan was a logical choice since it was a former Soviet
Central Asian country and had significant energy reserves. It
did not join the organization earlier because of its
isolationist policies under Niyazov. Now that there has been a

SHANGHAI 00000529 002 OF 002


leadership change in Ashgabat, there might be interest in
joining the SCO.

North Korea Tourism
--------------


5. (C) Pan and Hu had recently returned from a trip to North
Korea. According to Pan, the trip was purely tourism.
Approximately 30 people, mostly academics, were in the group.
Pan noted that they had decided that it was better to go as
tourists because if they went as an official delegation they
would have to reciprocate and pay for North Korean scholars to
visit China in addition to paying for their own trip to DPRK.
Pan and Hu said the trip was very interesting and North Korea
reminded them of the way China was thirty years ago at the very
beginning of the reform era. There were very few stores or
computers. The stores were located mainly in the "5-star
hotel." When asked what North Koreans did to purchase goods,
Pan thought that most North Koreans bartered for products. The
group also had to pay for everything in cash; no credit cards
were accepted.


6. (C) Pan found the North Koreans to be a bit naove about
money. For example, he had bought white Ginseng in Pyongyang
for 200 RMB. When he was in Seoul, he tried to purchase white
Ginseng but the cost was more than 10 times of the amount he
paid in Pyongyang. They also noted that RMB and Euros were
accepted everywhere, but they saw no U.S. dollars in
circulation. The North Koreas with whom they interacted with
were very talkative and asked a lot about the Six-Party Talks.
Surprisingly, they were willing to reveal a certain amount of
personal information. One guide claimed to be the son of a
Deputy Prime Minister, while the other admitted to be a military
dependent. Both spoke Chinese well, according to Pan.
JARRETT