DEMOCRATIC OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM--XIE TAO AND THE EAST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000470

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E.O. 12958: DECL: MR, X1
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM--XIE TAO AND THE EAST
CHINA PERSPECTIVE

REF: A) CPP20070511710008; B) BEIJING 4420; C) 06 SHANGHAI 155

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CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Embassy, Beijing, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (S) Summary: An internal poll showed that average people
and scholars were almost evenly divided in their support for an
article written by retired scholar Xie Tao, which advocated that
China adopt a democratic socialism model that included
multi-party democracy. Contacts who followed this debate agreed
that the longevity and intensity of the debate, as well as
President Hu Jintao's June speech to the Central Party School,
indicated that political reform and democratization would be the
major theme of this fall's Party Congress. They were split,
however, on what form the leadership intended democratization to
eventually take. Some argued that democracy would only be
implemented within the confines of one party rule under the CCP
in accordance with the tenets of "scientific socialism." Others
argued that scientific socialism was a politically necessary
slogan but that the de facto result of the groundwork that would
be laid at the Party Congress would be the eventual creation of
a multi-party system. End summary.

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Xie Tao and Democratic Socialism
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2. (SBU) On February 1, former Renmin University Vice President
Xie Tao wrote an article titled "The Democratic Socialist Model
and the Future of China" published in the Yanhuang Chunqiu (Ref
A). Xie's article launched a debate in Chinese academic circles
over what path China's political reform should take, with
articles on both sides of the issue published in major papers
and journals. (REF B). Xie advocated dispatching China's
Leninist political system in favor of a democratic socialist
system, such as that in use in Sweden. Xie implied that there
was nothing to fear in allowing the CCP's ideals to compete in
democratic elections. Through "correct policy initiatives to
represent the interests of the masses," a true socialist party
would "be elected to the government time and after..."

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Protecting the Blooming Flowers
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3. (S) During a July 6 discussion, Shanghai Municipal People's
Congress researcher Zhou Meiyan said that in June, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) conducted a survey to plumb
public reaction to Xie's article. The survey showed that more
than 50 percent of the general public supported Xie's article,
while slightly less than 50 percent disagreed with him. The
survey also found that 20 percent of Chinese scholars supported
Xie's position, while another 20 percent strongly disagreed.
The remaining sixty percent believed that supporting or
disagreeing with Xie was irrelevant. What was important for
them was that the discussion was allowed to take place. As a
side note, Zhou said that the CASS survey found that only
scholars over 60 had actively participated in the debate.


4. (S) During a June 25 discussion, Nanjing University
Professor Gu Su explained that President Hu Jintao himself had
not taken a side in the debate, but had still done a great
service in protecting the space for the debate to occur. Zhou
said that there had been a strong outpouring of anger directed
against Xie from party leftists accusing him of betraying the
party and calling for him to be punished. Zhou said that in
June, the internal version of the People's Daily published a
central government directive referred to as the "Three Nos."
These included: no criticism of Xie Tao would be allowed;
discussion of his article was not to expand further; and Xie
would not be punished for his article.


5. (C) During a June 26 discussion, Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (SASS) Professor Cheng Weili affirmed that Xie would
not be persecuted for his writings. Cheng argued, however, that
there was no need for Hu to "protect" the space for the debate
since Chinese society had already advanced to the point where
scholars did not need to fear reprisals for expressing their
opinions. Cheng pointed to the party's focus on harmony as
evidence of this. When dissected into their component radicals,
the Chinese characters for "harmony" meant everyone had food to
eat and everyone could speak freely.


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Xie Tao: Love Him or Hate Him
--------------


6. (C) Our contacts, like those in the CASS survey, were
divided on their opinions of Xie's article. SASS, Shanghai
Party School (SPS),and China Executive Leadership Academy
Pudong (CELAP) scholars dismissed Xie's notions as poor
scholarship and liberal propaganda. SASS Professor Cheng said
that Xie's article was too "shallow" and suggested Gao Fang's
May 31 article titled "A Hundred Years of Division and Unity
Between Scientific Socialism and Democratic Socialism" and Yu
Keping's June 19 article titled "The Average Notion of Marx's
Discourse on Democracy; Universal Value and Common Shape" as
"representative of the deep thinking of Chinese scholars."
Others seemed more favorably disposed, with Gu Su and Zhou
Meiyan--both self professed reform advocates--crediting Xie's
article as having had some influence with Hu Jintao.

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Democratic Versus Scientific Socialism
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7. (SBU) During a June 26 discussion, CELAP Professor of
Scientific Socialism Liu Xian explained that the "democratic
socialism" Xie was advocating was at odds with the "scientific
socialism" path that China had followed since its establishment
in 1949 (Note: Outside of China, many scholars refer to
"scientific socialism" as "revolutionary socialism." End
note.). Democratic socialism advocated the gradual change from
a capitalist to socialist system through utilizing democratic
institutions, while scientific socialism advocated a complete
overthrow of the capitalist system through revolution.


8. (SBU) During a separate June 26 discussion, SPS Professor
Shi Qinghao also noted that whereas scientific socialism
advocated public ownership of the means of production,
democratic socialism employed a mixed ownership model.
Scientific socialism was directed by Marxism and had the
eventual establishment of a communist society as its end goal.
Democratic socialism, on the other hand, could be driven by a
host of different ideologies, including humanitarianism and
religion, and did not necessarily have a specific end goal.
According to SPS Professor Huang Congren, another key
fundamental difference between the two was that scientific
socialism relied on the core leadership of a communist party
whereas democratic socialism stressed multi-party democracy as
the foundation.

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Scientific Socialism--Chinese Style
--------------


9. (SBU) During a June 26 discussion, CELAP Professor Liu
Jingbei said the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had only adopted
the spirit of scientific socialism, not the letter, meaning that
the CCP was flexible in terms of adapting to meet the realities
of China's social and historical context. Politically,
socialism with Chinese characteristics meant maintaining the
principle of the leadership monopoly of the CCP while
maintaining a consultative relationship with the eight
"participating" parties (Ref C) (Note: This refers to China's
eight "democratic" parties that work with the CCP through the
mechanism of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference
(CPPCC). End note.). Economically, it meant holding to the
principle of making public ownership the mainstay, supplemented
by multiple ownership systems. During a 26 June discussion,
former SASS professor Xia Yulong argued that socialism with
Chinese characteristics was flexible enough to be able to adopt
the "best practices" of democratic socialism while still
retaining its scientific socialist nature.

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17th Party Congress: Staying the Scientific Path?
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10. (C) SPS's Chen said major debates prior to a Party Congress
were a sign of things to be discussed at the Party Congresses
and that the Xie Tao debate signaled that political reform would
be the main topic of this fall's meetings. Liu Jingbei agreed
that political reform and democracy would feature prominently in
the Party Congress. Liu pointed to the June 25 speech Hu made
at the Central Party School, saying that Hu's speech mapped out
the party's strategy for political reform (Ref B). Liu believed
the speech also made it clear that the debate on the future of

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reforms had been resolved and the discussion over democratic
socialism had ended. Hu had unequivocally laid out that China
would retain the basic principle of scientific socialism and
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.


11. (C) During a June 26 discussion CELAP International
Exchange and Program Department Director General Jiang Haishan,
just because the CCP opposed democratic socialism, this did not
mean that it opposed democracy. Indeed, strengthening democracy
and rule of law within China's socialist system would be a main
part of the Party Congress. SPS Professor Chen said that
political reforms had been pushed to the back of the line for
the past 20 years in favor of economic reforms. However, they
were now at the front and could no longer be ignored. China
must have political reforms, those reforms must support Marxism,
scientific socialism, and China's current reality. The reforms
must be from all angles, including intra party democracy,
consultative democracy, grass roots elections, and others.
Jiang opined that intra-party competition ought to be based on
debate among groups with different ideas within the party rather
and dismissed the idea that there would be set factions that
developed out of different opinion groups.


12. (C) Xia likewise insisted that the 17th Party Congress
would focus on political reform and democracy, but it might not
lay out specifically what those two terms meant. The party
would move forward on reform, but it would do so in a manner
that preserved the concept of harmony. Democratic development,
Xia said, had four aspects that it needed to address, including
democratic elections, democratic decisionmaking, democratic
management, and democratic supervision. Among these, democratic
supervision needed to be addressed first in order to curb
corruption. To do so, media and supervision organs needed
independence


13. (C) None of the SPS, SASS, or CELAP contacts believed that
China needed multi-party democracy to implement its democratic
changes. According to Liu Jingbei, multiparty democracy should
not be adopted. It had been tried in the past in China and had
led to chaos since everyone wanted to be "number one." Liu also
argued that China would not adopt a three way separation of
powers, but that it would strengthen its current National
People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference systems (CPPCC) (Ref C).


14. (S) SASS Professor Cheng asserted that in his Party School
speech, Hu had raised the issue of "permanent tenure" in office
for party representatives, making the Party Congress more of a
democratic body with real use (Note: Although Cheng attributed
this information to Hu's Party School speech, it does not appear
in the official read out, suggesting that Cheng had access to an
internal version of the speech that had more detail or that he
had received the information from someone who had attended the
speech. End note.). Hu suggested making the representatives'
terms last for five years and having them hold annual meetings.
These representatives' functions would be to receive questions
and suggestions from their constituencies and bring concerns to
the annual meeting. Deng had first raised this idea at the 8th
Party Congress but had been forced to withdraw it due to an
anti-rightist movement at the time. (Comment: As it currently
stands, outside of a few experimental locations, party
representatives met only once every five years to "elect" the
party leadership during the Party Congress and then disbanded.
It is unclear how strengthening the Party Congress system would
impact or overlap the People's Congress system. It was also
unclear from Cheng's comments whether Hu intended only to
implement this program nation-wide at the local level, or if he
also intended to implement the system with the central-level
Party Congress as well. End comment.)

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Or Putting China On the Path to Democratic Socialism?
-------------- ---


15. (C) During a July 5 discussion, Shanghai University
Professor and reform advocate Zhu Xueqin noted that what was
reported from the speech actually gave no clear indication of
what the party intended. Leftists were happy with Hu's
reassurance that China would continue the "scientific socialism"
path, while rightists were satisfied with Hu's promise of
greater democratization. Zhu saw this as a demonstration of
Hu's unwillingness to make a hard decision on the issue. SMPC's
Zhou noted that it was impossible to know exactly what was said
during Hu's speech since it had been forbidden to be recorded.
What had come out in the press was a carefully constructed

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document that said precisely what the party wanted disseminated,
suggesting that perhaps it was intentionally vague.


16. (C) Although personally unconvinced that Hu was at heart a
democratic socialist, Zhou noted that Hu could not help but
start bringing China down the path of democratic socialism.
While he might want to push it onto his successors, Hu's
decision to tackle current problems such as fixing the social
safety net or welfare payments, and the means he was using to so
do meant that Hu was de facto changing China's style of
socialism.


17. (C) Gu was likewise confident that China would eventually
take the democratic socialist path; it was just a question of
time. While Hu was not necessarily himself a democratic
socialist, he was pragmatic and understood that China would
eventually need to democratize. When Hu was President of the
Party School, he sent several delegations to Germany and Sweden
to study their political systems and learn from democratic
socialism. Gu said that it was significant that Hu chose to
visit Sweden during his June trip to Germany--the first head of
state visit to Sweden since the two countries normalized
relations 57 years ago. Gu took it to be a symbol or gesture of
what Hu intended over the long term. Zhou also noted it was
significant that on July 6, Hu met with the Chairman of the
European Socialist Party, the leading pan-European democratic
socialist party.


18. (C) Gu beleived Hu was more intent on laying the
theoretical and ideological groundwork for an eventual shift to
democratic socialism rather than actually carry it out. The
so-called "Fifth Generation" of leaders, such as Jiangsu Party
Secretary Li Yuanchao and Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang,

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or even the "Sixth Generation" might be the ones to move reforms
forward in a more noticeable manner. Hu was more of an "old
school" socialist than the two Lis and was more sensitive to all
sides of the debate. The more party conservatives diminished in
influence, the greater Hu's leeway and willingness to implement
faster political reforms would be. To that end, Gu explained
that the more the United States could do to keep conflict and
tension out of the U.S.-Sino relationship, the less ammunition
leftists would have to criticize political reform and the more
space and ability Hu would have to implement democratic reforms.


19. (C) Unlike CELAP's Jiang Haishen, Gu opined that the
eventual establishment of the multiparty system needed for true
democratic socialism would likely grow out of preexisting
cleavages within the party itself. Some scholars were now
arguing that Jiang Zemin's inclusion of entrepreneurs into the
party in effect inadvertently laid the groundwork for an
eventual factional rift within the party. Indeed, many veteran
party members refused to accept entrepreneurs as genuine party
members, leading to a sort of factional divide. Moreover, Hu
was opening the door for greater participation from non-party
members by selecting some of them to fill ministerial slot.


20. (S) Zhou claimed that there were already organized factions
forming within the party, divided by left and right, which held
periodic meetings. The rightists, or those inclined toward
political reform, were headed by prominent and highly-respected
veteran party leader and former staff member to top leaders Li
Rui, military veteran and party elder Xiao Ke, and retired
scholar Gao Fang among others. Leading leftists in the
organization included former Hubei Governor Li Erzong, who was
well into his 90s, and current CASS Political Studies Institute
Director Wang Yichen. Zhou said that these organizations were
formed of scholars and retired leaders and that no acting
leaders participated in their meetings.


21. (C) Zhou also noted that there had been experiments in
intra-party democracy that could pave the way for multi-party
democracy. Jiangsu and Sichuan had been experimenting over the
past few years with direct elections of party bosses below the
provincial level. These elections had expanded slates of
candidates and allowed for people to self-nominate. The fact
that these experiments had continued and expanded led Zhou to
conclude that they might be implemented nationwide after or at
the Party Congress. Zhou admitted she was optimistic in this
regard, however, and noted that there was some contradicting
evidence. For instance, while some of these experiments were
moving forward, others--some having been run for years--had been
unceremoniously shut down. Zhou also noted that some of the
budget experiments that had been run in Zhejiang's Wenling might
be shut down as the Province sought to take some budget
authority out of the localities and move it to the provincial

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level. During a June 26 discussion, Tongji University Professor
Frank Peng noted that whatever came out of the Party Congress
would likely be small steps. However, in the context of China's
current political system, even small steps were a huge
improvement.

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Zeng Qinghong: Reformer or Reactionary?
--------------


22. (C) As an aside, Gu said he was skeptical about Vice
President Zeng Qinghong's commitment to political reform, noting
that Zeng was a complicated figure. The highest-ranked
princeling, Zeng was seen as the successor to the conservative
element within the party. As such, he needed to be an orthodox
figure. However, Zeng was also relatively open minded and
understood that China needed to Change. Zeng "controlled" the
Organization Department--in charge of recommending people for
advancement to the vice governor level and above--and had used
that position to "do something on reforms." Gu noted that there
was too much hatred of Zeng's orthodox side among reformers for
them to accept him as a "real socialist democrat."

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Comment: Can't Call a Spade a Spade
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23. (C) It is unclear from Hu's speech exactly what path China
intends to take with political reform and will likely remain
unclear for quite some time--perhaps well after the 18th Party
Congress. However, it appears that China is moving towards
introducing greater levels of public participation and
democratic practices. While it is quite possible that the
eventual long-term establishment of a socialist democratic state
could emerge, the CCP can ill-afford to call it such, at least
at this stage. As many of the contacts pointed out, China came
to power as a revolutionary party. As such, "scientific
socialism"--with its one party rule and ultimate vision of the
establishment of communism--is seen as integral to the Party's
identity. Open refutation of the "scientific socialism" concept
in favor of the path not taken (i.e. democratic socialism) would
be tantamount to an open acknowledgment of the irrelevance of
the CCP or at least the illegitimacy of the party's singular
control of the political system. At this point, the party
appears unwilling to mince words in a way that would leave it
vulnerable to power sharing, despite what its de facto actions
may or may not be.
SCHUCHAT