SHANGHAI ACADEMIC VIEWS ON NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000416

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/5/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS KN CH
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ACADEMIC VIEWS ON NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA

CLASSIFIED BY: Veomayoury Baccam, Acting Section Chief,
Political/Economic Section , U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In meetings with Poloffs in mid-June and early
July, four Shanghai academics specializing in Korea studies
predicted that there would be a long and difficult path of
negotiations ahead for the Six-Party talks. Two other academics
said, however, that North Korea would react positively if the
United States was more cooperative and established diplomatic
relations with it. The academics were firm that China could not
and should not tolerate a nuclear North Korea for long, but said
that China did not have the ability to force North Korea to
de-nuclearize by itself. On China-South Korea relations,
academics stated that the relationship between the two countries
was good and constructive, although there were frictions in the
relationship over historical issues. End Summary.

Difficult Negotiations Ahead?
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met separately with six Shanghai academics
specializing in Korea studies in mid-June and early-July to
discuss prospects for the Six-Party Talks. Four Shanghai
academics predicted that there would be a long and difficult
path of negotiations ahead. Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies Professor Liu Ming, in a
meeting on June 15, said that it was unclear how far Pyongyang's
commitment to further negotiations would go. He predicted that
North Korea would continue with the Six-Party talks, but make
further demands to maximize its awards at each stage. Shanghai
Institute of International Studies (SIIS) Research Fellow Xue
Chen in a separate conversation on June 15 said that neither the
United States nor North Korea appeared to be in a hurry to
resolve the issue. In particular, North Korea was waiting for a
regime change in Washington and believed that a Democratic
administration would be more flexible then the current
administration.


3. (C) SIIS Senior Fellow Gong Keyu in a separate meeting on
June 18 said that there was no trust between the United States
and North Korea, and it was specifically this lack of trust that
led to the failure of past negotiations. Furthermore, Gong
claimed that what Pyongyang really wanted was a bilateral talk
with the United States and the Six-Party talks may only be a
formality. SIIS Research Fellow Yu Yingli at the June 18
meeting with Gong added that the nuclear issue was North Korea's
only bargaining chip and it was hard for the North Koreans to
fully abandon it.


4. (C) SIIS International Strategic Studies Director Xia Liping
and Fudan University Institute of International Studies
Associate Dean Ren Xiao were more optimistic during separate
conversations on July 3. According to Xia, the Kim Jong-il was
ill and the regime was completely focused on succession issues.
Kim believed that one of the best way to maintain power and
ensure that one of his sons succeed him was to establish
relations with the United States. Therefore, North Korea would
be more flexible during future rounds of the Six-Party Talks.
Xia noted, however, that it was not certain yet whether North
Korea had made the strategic decision to give up nuclear
weapons. Fudan University's Ren was even more optimistic. He
said that there were more and more indications that North Korea
had made the strategic decision to give up the weapons. He
warned, however, that North Korea was taking a "reciprocal"
approach to the talks and would only cooperate if the United
States changed its "hostile" policy towards North Korea. He
noted that Assistant Secretary Hill's recent trip to North Korea
was a positive move in this direction.

China-North Korea Relations
--------------


5. (C) Gong, Xue, Xia, Yu, and Liu were firm that China could
not and should not tolerate a nuclear North Korea for long.
They were not only worried about nuclear proliferation along
China's borders, but the fact that North Korea was not reliable
or stable. Liu said, however, that there was little that China
could do on its own to stop North Korea and it needed to work

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with the international community on this issue. Xue cautioned
that China had limited influence over North Korea and noted that
China's attempts to influence North Korea's foreign policy and
nuclear policy for the past decade had failed. Gong mentioned
that Northeast China would be in jeopardy if the security
balance breaks down in the Korean Peninsula, and that was the
reason why China would never cut off its aid to North Korea.


6. (C) Ren said that China would continue to play its role of
"middle-man" in the Six-Party Talks and would use its influence
to get the North Koreans to participate in the talks. Xia said
that there were indications that the Kim Jong-il regime was
interested in economic reforms. According to Xia, although the
Kim Jong-il regime knew that opening up the economy would
increase the North Korean people's exposure to the outside world
and might lead to calls for political reform, it needed money to
maintain its control over society.

North Korean "Refugees"
--------------


7. (C) Liu, Xue, Gong and Yu noted that one of China's biggest
headaches was the North Koreans who had crossed the border into
China, reportedly due to widespread starvation in North Korea.
They said China was reluctant to label these North Koreans as
"refugees." All of them mentioned that taking care of North
Korean "border crossers" would not only cost a great deal of
money, but granting them refugee status would be a further
incentive for more North Koreans to cross the border into China.
Xue claimed that these North Koreans caused many vicious crimes
in Northeast China and continued to cause trouble for local
authorities. Furthermore, Xue said that many of these North
Koreans were in fact merchants who travel back and forth. Liu
said that China learned its lesson from the Vietnam War,
claiming that many Vietnamese refugees refused to repatriate to
Vietnam after the Vietnam War.


8. (C) Gong said that there was no benefit for China in
recognizing them as refugees and said that Beijing treated, and
should continue to treat, the international NGOs who work with
North Koreans in China very harshly. Gong also pointed out that
other countries, particularly the South Korea, were being
hypocritical. Gong mentioned that even South Koreans were
thinking of North Korean escapees in South Korea (more than
10,000 persons now) as a burden, and said that North Korean
escapees in South Korea often had very hard lives. Yu noted
that Beijing could not just simply give these people "refugee"
status before finding out more about their motivations.
Furthermore, Pyongyang would object to any move by Beijing to
give these people "refugee" status.

China-South Korea
--------------


9. (C) On China-South Korea relations, most of the academics
stated that the relationship between the two countries was good
and constructive. They acknowledged, however, that there were
frictions between the two countries over historical issues, and
the potential border conflict surrounding the Baekdu/Changbai
Mountain if the Koreas would be unified. Liu described South
Korea's place in the Six-Party talks as "in the middle," and
said that South Korea was playing an important role as the
go-between with all the powers that were involved. Xue
mentioned that in addition to good relations between Chinese and
South Korean governments, the "Korean culture wave" or "Hallyu"
coming from South Korea influenced Chinese popular culture in
important ways and brought the two countries closer together.


10. (C) According to the academics, one very conspicuous debate
between the academic communities of the two countries concerned
historical heritages of the ancient kingdoms of
Goguryeo/Gaoguoli and Balhae/Bohai. The two ancient kingdoms
were located in the southern part of Northeast China and the
northern part of Korean peninsula (Goguryeo in Korean and
Gaoguoli in Chinese, 37 BCE - 668 CE; Balhae in Korean and Bohai
in Chinese, 698 CE - 926 CE). The reaction has particularly
strong from South Korea, where many people believed that the
Chinese government-sponsored Northeast Project (2002 - 2006),
which focused on historical studies of ancient kingdoms based in
Northeast China, as a chauvinist act to "steal" a rightful part
of Korean national history. Such nationalist commotions

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produced another international controversy surrounding the
international border between North Korea and China around the
mountain situated along the border (Baekdu in Korean and
Changbai in Chinese),where certain individuals in South Korea
began to claim the whole mountain for Korea with Chinese
officials irately reacting against such claim.


11. (C) They said Beijing and Seoul were trying to control this
issue and prevent it from poisoning the relationship. Liu
stated that China was merely acting defensively against South
Korean nationalist/irredentist historiography. According to
Liu, Beijing tried to suppress each such studies in the past
because of its relations with Pyongyang, but it finally allowed
a "small" group of scholars to produce a "small" amount of
research papers through the Northeast Project after being
repeatedly provoked by South Korean history writers. Xue noted
that it was only the South Koreans who were voicing such
opinions while North Koreans were remaining silent. Liu wrapped
up the border issue by saying that the border was confirmed
decades ago through a PRC-DPRK "treaty" and another treaty would
settle the border issue if it continued to be an issue even
after the Koreas were unified.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Xue, Gong and Yu, all of whom appeared to be in their
early 30's, had a very different attitude towards North Korea
than Liu, Xia and Ren, who were a part of the older generation.
The younger academics spoke with disgust about North Korea and
its people, and appeared not to have much sympathy for them.
For these young academics, it appeared that North Korea
represented a backward country that held China back. Liu, Xia,
and Ren, were in their 50's and likely lived through the Mao era
in China. They spoke of North Korea and its people in a more
dispassionate tone and were overall more optimistic about North
Korea's future.
JARRETT