DEMOCRACY FROM HARMONIOUS SCIENCE--VIEWS FROM EAST CHINA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 SHANGHAI 000400

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT, AND TSMITH
OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, MCQUEEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/27/2052
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY FROM HARMONIOUS SCIENCE--VIEWS FROM EAST CHINA

REF: A) SHANGHAI 374; B) BEIJING 620; C) BEIJING 3608); D) 06 SHANGHAI 5783

SHANGHAI 00000400 001.2 OF 006


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate,
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (C) Summary: A number of East China contacts associate the
current Scientific Development Concept and Harmonious Society
ideological formulations with democratization, political reform
and civil society. Some believe that President Hu Jintao is
feeling the pressure of his second term and is concerned about
the legacy he will leave on Chinese politics. Those concerns
could drive him to push for greater democratization and reform.
At the same time, our contacts note that grassroots pressure for
reform is also pushing the national-level agenda to a certain
degree. Reforms are first taking the route of intra-party
democratization, although a few hold out hope for eventual
multi-party democracy. Some who have Hu's ear, including
Central Editing and Translation Bureau (CETB) Deputy Director Yu
Keping, are pushing him in that direction. Although there
appears to be momentum gathering to develop Chinese democracy,
leftist criticism, apathy among mid-career officials, and a
lingering fear of being branded "China's Gorbachev" could limit
the ultimate extent of Hu's reforms. Moreover, some of our
contacts believe that a more likely scenario is incremental and
limited political reform. End summary.

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SDC Plus Harmony Equals Democracy and Civil Society
-------------- -


2. (C) During recent discussions with East China contacts,
almost all uniformly associated the current ideological
doctrines of the Scientific Development Concept (SDC) and
Harmonious Society with China's eventual democratization, noting
that the concepts of harmony, democracy, and civil society were
closely linked. For instance, during a January 22 discussion,
Shanghai Party School (SPS) Foreign Affairs Office Head Wang
Shaojun said that the key to developing a Harmonious Society was
the promotion of a society characterized by rule of law and
democracy. During an April 6 discussion, Jiangsu Academy of
Social Sciences (JASS) Political Science School President Bian
Min said that the current ideology of the Scientific Development
Concept with Harmonious Society as its goal was not just about
economic reforms, but political reforms as well, although he
cautioned that such reforms would happen very slowly.


3. (C) During an April 4 discussion, Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (SASS) Deng Xiaoping Thought Research Institute
Director Xia Yulong said that establishing a Harmonious Society
also necessitated establishing a civil society. He explained
that in the past, the government took care of everything, but
that was increasingly untenable. A Harmonious Society needed a
balance between civil society and government. Although in
theory China understood that it needed to develop a true civil
society, in reality, China had more than 2,000 years of history
of governance without civil society and its background was
completely different from the United States. Therefore, it
would take years to incrementally implement the concept.


4. (C) During a January 23 discussion, China Executive
Leadership Academy Pudong (CELAP) Professor Liu Jingbei pointed
out that the decision on Harmonious Society had also allowed for
the establishment of "social organizations." Liu cited Zhejiang
as having a particularly active non-government sector and noted
that in Wenzhou there were now private organizations that were
in the debt collection business. Liu said that county-level
officials had a positive view of such social organizations. The
key was to ascertain how to standardize the transfer of
government functions to the NGO sector while preventing
organized crime (hei shehui) from moving into the gap. Liu also
believed that it was crucial during the process of transitioning
to service-oriented government and devolving functions to the
NGO sector to avoid the creation of sclerotic "second
government" (er zhengfu) institutions--GONGOs set up by retired
or redundant officials who did not represent popular interests
but rather served as "the people's nannies" (renmin de popo).

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To Live, to Love, to Leave a Legacy
--------------


5. (C) During a May 8 conversation with the Consul General and

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Pol/Econ Section Chief, Weyerhaeuser China General Manager Zhang
Renren said that coming into his second term, President Hu
Jintao had become very concerned with his legacy and that was
driving his political decision-making. During an April 6
discussion, Nanjing University Professor Gu Su likewise noted
that Hu was increasingly concerned with his historical legacy.
Gu said that Hu knew that if he did not do anything on political
reform and democratization, he would "look worse than [former
President] Jiang Zemin" both at home and in the international
community.


6. (C) According to Zhang, Hu would be unable to implement his
ideas until he brought "his own team" to Beijing. Currently,
the only person at the central level that was really "his guy"
was CCP General Office Deputy Director Ling Jihua. Zhang noted
tangentially that Ling was being considered for head of the
Organization Department, a position also being offered to
Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao. If Li did not accept the
job, Ling was Hu's fallback choice.


7. (C) During a May 16 discussion with Pol/Econ Section Chief,
The Carlyle Group chief China representative Luo Yi agreed that
once Hu had successfully consolidated power, he would move
forward with efforts on political reform. When asked what that
meant, Luo said that it would not be overnight democracy but
that Hu was genuinely interested in moving in that direction.
Moreover, Hu planned to take additional steps on economic
reform, rolling back the trend towards protectionism and
economic nationalism of the last few years.

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No Choice but Reform
--------------


8. (C) During a March 23 discussion, Professor Gu said that Hu
and Premier Wen Jiabao both believed that pressure from the
grassroots level to implement meaningful democratic political
reforms was becoming too great to be ignored. Moreover, Gu
assessed that the burgeoning middle class and wealthy
entrepreneurs were likewise becoming important constituencies
that were demanding greater representation. However, both Hu
and Wen were very concerned about the reaction from party
leftists in the run up to the 17th Party Congress this fall,
fearing that a backlash against political reforms could scuttle
any future efforts at democratization.


9. (C) During a 22 January discussion, Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences Professor Cheng Weili assessed that senior
leaders had been left with no other option but to democratize.
Cheng was optimistic about the prospects for reforms in the next
five years, pointing in particular to the introduction of pilot
elections in the party and government where there were more
candidates than positions. He stressed that this particular
practice would be nationalized by the 18th Party Congress.
Cheng also stated that the initial party documents on direct
elections for townships and town governments had already been
completed and were working their way through the system. He
also thought that this reform would eventually necessitate a
revision of the state constitution, possibly at the 2012
People's Congress.


10. (C) Cheng was critical of the process for local party and
government candidate selection, however. He said that local
organization departments continued to select most candidates.
Cheng doubted that the lack of transparency in candidate
selection would be solved anytime soon, noting that the party
was still unwilling to relinquish control. However, he added
that the fact that elections were being introduced would put
some pressure on officials over time to be responsive to the
needs of their constituents to ensure they maintained their
positions.


11. (C) During a March 16 meeting with the CG and Poloff, China
Europe International Business School (CEIBS) Executive President
and former Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Vice President Liu
Ji said that the ultimate goal of Hu, Jiang Zemin, and Deng
Xiaoping was democracy. The party understood that in order to
remain viable, it needed to remain ahead of the curve on public
demand for political reform or risk getting swept aside. Hence,
Deng, Jiang, and Hu had all actively sought both to nurture the
conditions for public participation and democracy, while at the
same time implementing political reforms.


12. (S) Gu said that the chief editor for the "Social Sciences

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Weekly"--a friend of his--said that he had received an internal
memo from the central Propaganda Department. Beijing had
ordered the paper to disallow any criticism of the concept of
Marxism. However, the memo continued, it was fine for the paper
to publish articles calling for greater democracy. (Note: The
"Social Sciences Weekly" is published by the Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences and claims national distribution. Gu
occasionally publishes articles in the paper, most recently in
March. We do not know if this memo was widely circulated to
scholarly media outlets or if it was an isolated case. End
note.)

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Chinese Democracy: Cleansing the Inner Vessel First
-------------- -


13. (C) Our contacts were generally ambiguous on what form
China's "democracy" would ultimately take--few held out for a
Western-style multiparty democratic system--but were generally
in agreement that the first step was the development of
intra-party democracy. Professor Liu, for instance, echoed the
current party line that the party needed to first learn how to
govern itself democratically before it could bring democracy to
the general public (Ref C). Liu noted that shows like "Super
Girls" (Ref D) were playing an important role in helping train
the average person on how to vote and assessed that it was only
a matter of time before people began asking why they could vote
for a pop star but not a president.


14. (C) Cheng likewise believed that intra-party democracy was
the necessary first step. Cheng dismissed the likelihood of
multi-party democratic competition in the near term, arguing
that the dominance of the CCP made it unrealistic that other
parties could compete. However, he did believe it was possible
for political pluralism to emerge within the CCP through the
establishment of factions within the Party. Cheng predicted
that "real" democracy would not come to China until its per
capita GDP exceeded USD 3,000.


15. (C) During a January 22 discussion, Shanghai Party School
(SPS) Foreign Affairs Office Head Wang Shaojun argued that the
Party was using intra-party democracy to promote "people's
democracy." (Comment: "People's democracy" as used by Wang and
SPS Dean Chen Xichun apparently referred to public participation
in decision-making. End comment.) Wang added that since most
government officials were party members, the promotion of
intra-party democracy would make the government more open as
well. Instead of simply focusing on party members' duties, for
instance, the party was now stressing party members' rights as
well. Wang cited reforms within party standing committees at
local levels, noting that they were being given more influence
in party and government decision making at the county,
prefecture, and provincial levels. He explained that in the
past, it was common to have the party secretary and his deputies
make all the decisions. Now, however, the number of deputy
party secretaries was being scaled back to just two, forcing
them to cooperate and coordinate more with the party standing
committees, where each member had one vote.


16. (C) SPS Dean Chen Xichun noted that there was an important
intra-party democratic mechanism now in place at the department
(chu) level. He said that every three years, the performance of
department-level officials was evaluated by the officials'
subordinates. If the officials did not meet a "certain
threshold," they were forced to change jobs. (Comment: It was
not clear if this was a nationwide or Shanghai-specific
practice. End comment.) Wang added that the party and
government had also begun using a system of "democratic
recommendation" (minzhu tuijian) in selecting local officials to
help control bad development practices. Wang and Chen
acknowledged that there was a need to redefine and clarify how
power was distributed in the political system. They explained
that the central government was still refining its own
distribution of power, so such efforts at the local level would
not take place any time soon.

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Maybe an "Electric Democracy?"
--------------


17. (C) Professor Liu Ji said that the party would eventually
become internally democratic, paving the way for China itself to
be democratic. Liu refused to say exactly what a democratic
China would look like, noting that that decision would be up to

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future generations, once they got to that point. It could be
multi-party, single party, or some sort of "party-less
electronic democracy" (wudang dianzi minzhu) where direct
elections were held online without a party structure. When
pressed on when China might move along that path, Liu responded
that Mao had foreseen the initial stage of Socialism taking 100
years to establish and that by 2049 China would be a democracy.


18. (C) Liu also said that the two basic requirements for
having democracy were an educated populace (Liu referred to
these people as "intellectuals" (zhishi fenzi)) and a majority
middle class. He said that democracy would be viable when China
had around 500 million college graduates. It was impossible,
Liu argued, to suddenly enfranchise large numbers of poor and
illiterate--China still had a "70 percent" illiteracy
rate--without throwing the country into chaos (Comment: Liu's
"70 percent illiteracy rate" is at striking odds with the
central government's claims of 99 percent literacy among adults.
End comment.). He noted that democracy in the United States
had taken a similar path, with only wealthy male educated
landowners being allowed to decide how the country was run in
the early stages of the nation.

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Recentralize to Democratize
--------------


19. (C) The Shanghai Party School's Chen Xichun explained that
centralism was key to democratization. The idea of democratic
centralism said that the party needed to integrate ideas from
below and that centralism would occur through the rule of law
and would be broad enough to include everyone's contribution.
He noted that in order to protect democracy and the party's
authority at the local level, Beijing needed to centralize power.


20. (C) Professor Gu believed that the recent trend towards
recentralization of power was aimed at controlling the provinces
and enforcing party discipline in the run-up to the 17th Party
Congress. Gu argued that recentralization was not necessarily
at odds with increased democracy. He said that Hu and democracy
advocates such as CETB Deputy Director Yu Keping were actually
in agreement that the best way to promote democracy at the local
level was to maintain tight control at the top for the time
being.

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Yu Keping: The Softer Side of Hu?
--------------


21. (C) According to Gu, Hu Jintao was toying with different
models of democratic development. In December, Hu had floated
an experimental balloon with his approval of the publication of
the book "Democracy is a Good Thing." Gu referred to the author
of the book, Yu Keping, as "the liberal face of Hu Jintao,"
noting that whenever Hu hesitated on political reform, Yu was
there to push him forward. Gu said that with the "Democracy"
book, Yu was speaking for Hu Jintao on some level. He said it
was important to note that Yu's article on democracy by the same
title (in actuality, the preface to the book) was first
published by the Beijing Party newspaper and later carried in
the Central Party School newspaper, Xuexi Shibao.


22. (SBU) In his article, Yu called for greater democracy,
arguing that it was "indispensable" for "building a socialist
modern strong country with Chinese characteristics." Democracy,
Yu said, "guarantees people's basic human rights...and embodies
the basic values of human beings." It provides a check against
corrupt officials who would be "subject to the restraints of the
citizenry." It is "an inevitable trend in all countries of the
world." However, the particular type of democracy that
manifested in any given country was "closely related to the
economic system and the economic development level, the
geopolitical and international environment of a country," as
well as its "political and cultural traditions, the quality of
political figures and citizens, and the habits of the citizenry
in their daily lives." Yu also argued that to be true
democracy, the political system needed to be chosen by the
people of a country, without having it foisted on them by the
leaders of the country or by the leaders of another country.
Although democracy was not perfect, Yu continued, and was
subject to "repeated deliberation and discussion," it was the
political system that had "the least defects" and was "the best
political system in human society." (Note: Yu did not clearly
spell out what sort of democracy he was advocating. End note.)

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23. (C) During a January 22 discussion, Tongji University
Professor Frank Peng said that Yu's article was "the most
important statement on the subject of Chinese democracy." Peng
perceived the article as extremely progressive and interpreted
its publication as a trial balloon from Hu on future political
reform. During a February discussion, Shanghai Municipal
People's Congress researcher Ms. Zhou Meiyan explained that Yu
was advocating the introduction of real multi-party democracy,
not the "representational" democracy China already had, through
its People's Congress and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference systems.


24. (S) Gu said he was on good terms with Yu and that Yu had
consulted with him via email as he was writing his "Democracy"
book. Yu was originally from Zhejiang and did his undergraduate
work in Fujian. He was later a doctoral candidate at Beijing
University (Note: According to the cover of Yu's book, he
received his in Political Science PhD from Beijing University in

1988. The blurb describes him as one of the first generation of
Political Science PhD's trained in China. End note.). From
there, he became Director of the Beijing University Center for
Political Research and Reform before moving to CETB. Hu's
advisors recommended Yu to Hu as a capable scholar with good
ideas. Three to five months after taking the reins of power, Hu
promoted Yu to be CETB Deputy Director. According to Gu, Yu and
his friends at Beijing University, together with a group of
scholars within the Communist Youth League, had formulated Hu's
democratic and Harmonious Society theories.


25. (C) Contrary to Gu, Ms. Zhou said she had heard from her
contacts in Beijing that by the end of 2006, Yu was no longer a
member of Hu's "inner circle." She noted, for instance, that he
was not on the 17th Party Congress Preparatory Committee.
Moreover, the Central Editing and Translation Bureau had also
fallen in importance and influence. Because of this, Zhou
assessed, Yu felt free to write his tome on democracy, something
he would not have risked if he were still close to Hu. Zhou
thought the article was an important touchstone but was not
clear if it truly represented Hu's beliefs. Zhou said that in
contrast, Xia Yong, a scholar with the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Law Institute, was a close advisor to Hu. During a
March 23 meeting with Poloff, Gu defended his position, noting
that for the year prior to Hu's U.S. visit, Hu had distanced
himself from Yu due to pressure from party leftists. Yu was
brought back into Hu's fold shortly after the visit. If Hu
truly did not condone Yu's writings, Gu reasoned, it would have
made more sense for Yu to have written his article during that
period.

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Democracy and the Anhui Gang
--------------


26. (C) In pointing to other possible democratic influences on
Hu, Weyerhaeuser's Zhang discussed the existence of what he
referred to as the "Anhui Gang," a loose coalition of political
operators whose families, like Hu Jintao's, hailed from Anhui
province. These people had also all served with Hu during his
time in Tibet. Zhang described the period as a particularly
formative period in the group members' political thinking and
added that during their Tibet days, they had all regularly
discussed their ideas about political reforms. Zhang, who is
close friends with one of the members of the group (Sage Ni, a
wealthy entrepreneur/philanthropist from Anhui currently living
in Suzhou),said that during that period, Hu--a member of the
group--had expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the Communist
Party. Hu also reportedly said, however, that since there was
no alternative, the best course was to try to reform it from
within. Although it is unclear to what extent the group still
shares the same agenda with Hu, Zhang said that the members
still periodically get together in Anhui--absent Hu--to discuss
political issues. Moreover, most of them are currently in
Beijing, serving in government-affiliated think tanks and
research bodies.

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Is Democracy Really Possible? Confronting the Gorbachev Image
-------------- --------------


27. (C) Although our contacts remained relatively positive
about the prospects for democratization, it was not without
caveat. While some contacts asserted that once Hu consolidated
power he would push forward reforms, not everyone was convinced

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he would be able to do so. During a May 11 discussion, Deputy
Director of Shanghai's Office of Financial Services Fang Xinghai
said that even after Hu consolidated his power, he would not be
able to wield complete control over the direction of policy,
needing to accommodate "other interest groups."


28. (C) Ms. Zhou pointed out that even if the goal of
Harmonious Society was to establish real democracy, there
appeared to be little interest among China's political
leadership at the present to move in that direction. A late
2006 poll conducted by the Central Party School (CPS) found that
84 percent of CPS students did not care about political reform.
Stability and economic development topped the list of concerns.
Zhou said that these students were representative of the Chinese
government as a whole.


29. (C) Gu opined that Hu really desired to change things after
the 17th Party Congress. He said that once he was secure in his
second term, there would likely be "big changes." By December
2008, Gu expected to see competition in elections for party
officials and various other institutional reforms. He believed,
however, that Hu's democratic legacy would have its limits. Gu
said that Hu was not likely to try implementing multi-party
democracy during his tenure, noting that Hu had neither the time
nor the "guts" to do so. Hu did not want to be seen as China's
Gorbachev. Gu said Hu's successors would be able to build on
Hu's legacy to implement more sweeping changes in the future.


30. (C) During a May 15 discussion, Dean of Jiaotong
University's International and Public Affairs School Hu Wei said
he did not foresee a chance for multi-party democracy in the
next 20 years. Where Gu saw "big changes," Hu saw relatively
minor progress compared to Western countries such as the United
States. Professor Hu expected that there would be many new
ideas on political reform promulgated, but that real
implementation would be incremental and limited. He argued that
real change was risky and that no one--not just Hu
Jintao--wanted to be branded with the Gorbachev label.

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A New Ideology in the Wings?
--------------


31. (C) SASS Professor Cheng predicted that the next
ideological formulation to be advanced, perhaps by Hu after the
17th Party Congress, would deal more comprehensively with the
interaction between the state, the market economy, and society.
More importantly, this future doctrine would deal directly with
the issues of democracy and public participation, integrating
them into the themes of Harmonious Society and Scientific
Development. He noted that the party, while touting a
"harmonious society" had not yet come up with a doctrine for a
"harmonious government," but he felt that this was the next
logical and probable step. Such a formulation would be used to
justify political reform.
JARRETT