Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI379
2007-06-21 10:06:00
SECRET
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

EAST CHINA--ZENG QINGHONG STEPPING DOWN, WU YI RISING?

Tags:  PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH 
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VZCZCXRO1637
RR RUEHCN RUEHVC
DE RUEHGH #0379/01 1721006
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 211006Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5958
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6381
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000379 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN
TREAS FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT,TSMITH
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: MANUAL REVIEW, X1
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: EAST CHINA--ZENG QINGHONG STEPPING DOWN, WU YI RISING?

REF: A) SHANGHAI 315; B) 06 SHANGHAI 5742; C) SHANGHAI 23; D) 06 SHANGHAI 6344

SHANGHAI 00000379 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate,
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000379

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP/CUSHMAN
TREAS FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT,TSMITH
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: MANUAL REVIEW, X1
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: EAST CHINA--ZENG QINGHONG STEPPING DOWN, WU YI RISING?

REF: A) SHANGHAI 315; B) 06 SHANGHAI 5742; C) SHANGHAI 23; D) 06 SHANGHAI 6344

SHANGHAI 00000379 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate,
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (C) Summary. One of our better-connected political contacts
said that the current word among Beijing princelings was that
all but the top three members of the Politburo Standing
Committee would retire at the upcoming Party Congress as
President Hu Jintao tried to consolidate his power and purge
former-President Jiang Zemin's supporters. Press reports that
Vice President Zeng Qinghong had submitted a letter of
resignation were accurate, according to this contact. Zeng had
decided to resign rather than risk splitting the party by
continuing on as a symbol of two power centers. Despite her
age, Vice Premier Wu Yi was currently Hu's favorite to replace
Zeng as Vice President. The one person most likely to present a
problem to Hu's plan to re-jigger the Politburo was propaganda
chief Li Changchun. Although Li was still relatively young, Hu
was attempting to use a past bout with liver cancer as
ammunition to leverage Li out on the grounds of health concerns.
End summary.

--------------
And Then There Were Three
--------------


2. (S) During a June 20 discussion with Poloff, Carlyle's Chief
China representative Luo Yi (strictly protect) said that the
current rumors among his princeling contacts were that all of
the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members except the top
three--President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and legislative
chief Wu Bangguo--were slated to retire at the Party Congress
this fall. Luo said that Hu was hoping to push forward his
political reform agenda and needed to force out the remnants of

the so-called "Shanghai Gang" in order to solidify his power and
do away with the residual influence of former-President Jiang
Zemin. Luo said that having his people in key positions on the
PBSC had allowed Jiang to exercise significant influence in
party affairs after his retirement. Executive Vice Premier
Huang Ju's death had struck a blow to Jiang's influence, but Hu
still needed to root out Jiang's remaining followers.

--------------
Zeng Submits his Resignation
--------------


3. (S) Luo said that his princeling contacts confirmed recent
press reports that Vice President Zeng Qinghong had submitted a
letter of resignation to the PBSC (Ref A). Zeng realized that
many people in the party hated him, not because of who he was,
but because he was still perceived as the symbol of the Shanghai
Faction. Zeng understood that if he were to push the issue and
remain in power, it would perpetuate the idea that there were
two power centers within the party. Luo assessed that Zeng
genuinely cared about the future of the party and decided that,
in accordance with the "seven up, eight down" "rule" established
at the 2002 Party Congress to force out Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference Chairman Li Ruihuan, he would
gracefully step aside rather than risk further tarnishing the
party's image. Moreover, Zeng did not want to perpetuate
Jiang's influence in politics. Luo said he got this information
both from those who were pro-Zeng and those that disliked him.


4. (S) According to Luo, Zeng, like Hu, was a political
reformer who had wanted to push forward democratic ideas.
(Note: Luo did not explain what kind of democratic reforms Zeng
wanted to push. End note.) Luo opined that Zeng--were he in
charge--had the personal power base, connections, and political
savvy to push forward reforms more drastically than Hu was
capable of. However, Hu was not interested at this point in
cooperating with Zeng, whom he considered a potential political
threat. According to Luo, Hu worried that if Zeng mobilized the
political base to carry out Hu's reforms, he might question Hu's
relevance and move to oust him.

--------------
Madame Vice President?
--------------


5. (S) Luo said that Vice Premier Wu Yi was currently the front

SHANGHAI 00000379 002.2 OF 003


runner to replace Zeng as Vice President and number five on the
PBSC. Luo said Wu was "very close" to Hu and his family. Wu
frequently visited Hu at his home and knew Hu's son, Hu Haifeng,
quite well. Luo said that Wu's political standing had been
boosted significantly by her leadership in the Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED) process. Although she had surpassed the
"mandatory" retirement age of 68 (she is currently 69)--that
Zeng was citing as the reason he needed to step down--Luo said
that Hu was working on bending the "rule" for her.

--------------
Li Changchun and his Political Liver
--------------


6. (S) Luo said that PBSC member and propaganda chief Li
Changchun was the wild card in Hu's bid to purge the PBSC of
Jiang supporters. Li had been at odds with Hu over the idea of
political reforms and had used the propaganda apparatus as a
bully pulpit to crack down on reformers. Luo believed that Li
relied on his connections to Jiang to push his conservative
agenda. Hu, in turn, was frustrated over his inability to force
Li's compliance and control the "rogue" propaganda
apparatus--and wanted Li gone.


7. (S) Luo said that although Li, 63, was actually younger than
Hu, all of the princeling gossip these days said that Li would
step down at the Party Congress. Hu was using Li's past
struggle with cancer as a pretext to remove him. Luo said that
Li had been diagnosed with liver cancer several years ago and
had undergone treatment and major surgery to remove the infected
portion. (Note: no further information was available about the
timing of Li's initial bout with cancer. End note.) While the
cancer had been in remission, Luo said that it was now making a
"political resurgence" and that Li would be "allowed" to retire
for health reasons. (Comment: Hu Jintao is no stranger to the
pretext of political illness being used to remove someone,
having faced similar attacks himself over the course of his
career. With Huang Ju's recent death from pancreatic cancer,
Hu's argument that Li is unfit to continue his duties might have
greater traction, as concern over party stability might trump
Li's age card. End comment.)

--------------
The Only Constant is Change
--------------


8. (S) Luo stressed that none of these changes, including
Zeng's resignation, were set in stone. He cited the fluidity of
politics in the months prior to the Party Congress and said that
the next three months were "like an eternity" in the Chinese
political system, during which, anything could happen. The
information he provided was more a snapshot of the current
status of personnel wrangling than a blueprint of what was to
come.

--------------
Bio Comment
--------------


9. (S) At 36, Luo is a young political operator, but his ties
to the party run deep. His father had been an influential party
official in Sichuan Province who retired in the 1980s to go into
business. Luo's father had initially helped him get a job at
the People's Bank of China (Ref B). Luo worked for Merrill
Lynch and Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong, where he came to know
former-Premier Zhu Rongji's daughter, Zhu Yunlai. Luo is also
close friends with Lu Zhonglin (DOB 10/13/1974),the son of
Zhejiang governor Lu Zushan. He has also been involved in
business ventures with Hu Jintao's son and a nephew of Premier
Wen Jiabao, among others (Refs C and D). Luo is also friends
with National Development Reform Commission Chairman Ma Kai's
daughter and her husband. In a past conversation, Luo noted
that Chairman Ma had viewed "Brokeback Mountain" at Ma's home in
Beijing on DVD; Ma had found it offensive for its portrayal of
homosexual relationships. As a princeling himself, Luo is
accustomed to operating in privileged political circles and
having access to inside information.


10. (C) Luo earned an MBA at the University of Michigan where
he attended from 1995-97, and a B.S. from the Southwest
University of Economics and Finance in China. He is married and
has two sons, ages 9 and 5, who live with his parents in
Sichuan. His ex-wife, and mother of his older son, lives in

SHANGHAI 00000379 003.2 OF 003


Canada. Luo's current wife, and mother of his younger son, is
in her mid 20s and is studying fashion design in Shanghai.
JARRETT