Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SHANGHAI23
2007-01-10 09:09:00
SECRET
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI CORRUPTION SCANDAL AND LEADERSHIP GOSSIP

Tags:  PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4006
RR RUEHCN RUEHVC
DE RUEHGH #0023/01 0100909
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 100909Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5420
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5761
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000023 

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DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: X1 MANUAL REVIEW
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI CORRUPTION SCANDAL AND LEADERSHIP GOSSIP

REF: A) SHANGHAI 7129; B) SHANGHAI 7131

SHANGHAI 00000023 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate,
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: X1 MANUAL REVIEW
TAGS: PGOV PINR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI CORRUPTION SCANDAL AND LEADERSHIP GOSSIP

REF: A) SHANGHAI 7129; B) SHANGHAI 7131

SHANGHAI 00000023 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate,
Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (S) Summary. Two well-connected Shanghai contacts claimed
that President Hu Jintao had offered the job of Shanghai Party
Secretary to several people, none of whom were willing to take

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it because of the headaches associated with the continuing Chen
Liangyu investigation. The one person eager to take the job,
United Front Work Department head Liu Yandong, was disliked by
the Shanghai party bureaucracy, making it next to impossible for
Hu to send her there. A scan of press reports since the last
update on the unfolding investigation (Ref A),shows that in
total, more than 50 officials have fallen since the
investigation began, including the recent additions of several
businessmen. Chief among them was Shanghai real estate magnate
Zhou Zhengyi, who had come under investigation again for his
links to Chen and Chen's family; Zhou had finished a three year
prison term last spring for his role in a scandal that is
rumored to have implicated many Shanghai and national leaders
but was detained again in early December. One contact explained
that Chen's troubles all started when he put the brakes on the
initial investigation of Zhou several years ago. While the
related nationwide anti-corruption campaign appeared to be
winding down, the fate of one top leader, Politburo Standing
Committee member Jia Qinglin, was still uncertain, although it
appeared likely he would be stepping down within the next year.
End summary.

--------------
No One Wants Shanghai...
--------------


2. (S) During a December 20 discussion, Shanghai Municipal
People's Congress researcher Zhou Meiyan said that Hu Jintao had

initially offered the position of Shanghai Party Secretary to
Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao, who declined, saying the
municipality was too much of a mess. On January 8, Carlyle
Group Managing Director and Chief China Representative Luo Yi,
who has close contact with Li Yuanchao and his "assistant,"
confirmed that Li had been offered the job and turned it down.
Li was happy in Jiangsu and hoped to stay there for another five
years. According to Luo, who knows Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng
well, Hu Haifeng said that Li was close friends with Hu Jintao
and that Hu Haifeng grew up calling Li "uncle." Both Hu Jintao
and Li have kept in frequent contact, although, given their
positions, they did not stop by each other's homes much these
days. (Bio note: Li's son is currently a junior at Fudan
University, where he is studying mathematics like his father
had. Li was pushing his son to go to graduate school in the
United States. End note.)


3. (S) Luo said that Hu hoped to move Li to the Politburo and
was considering "helicoptering" him to the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC). Luo cited rumors that Hu had offered Li the
position of Director of the General Office to replace Wang Gang
two years ago, but that Li had turned it down. (Note: Luo said
that the Director of the General Office position was equivalent
to Hu's Chief of Staff. He noted that Wang Gang was not "Hu's
guy." End note.) Hu was currently trying to recruit Li to take
over as head of the Organization Department from He Guoqiang, a
powerful position that would put Li at the center of all major
personnel moves. It was not clear, however, if Li wanted to
take that job, since he preferred policy jobs to party ones.
Luo commented that Li was probably "the most elect-able of
China's officials" although, he noted, that did not count for
much in Chinese politics.


4. (S) Zhou also said that Hu had offered the Shanghai position
to Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang but that Li had likewise
declined it. Luo said that Li Keqiang was now rumored to be
moving to Beijing--not because he was particularly talented, but
because he was particularly close to Hu. Hu was also rumored to
be trying to helicopter Li Keqiang to the PBSC. Such a move
would clearly designate Li as Hu's successor, according to Luo.


5. (S) Zhou said that a friend in Beijing told her on December
17 that the current frontrunner for the Shanghai job was
Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping, saying that some party
elders were backing Xi for the job. Zhou described Xi as "very
conservative like Hu Jintao" and worried about what it would

SHANGHAI 00000023 002.2 OF 005


mean for the political atmosphere in Shanghai if he were
appointed. Luo, however, said that he had been informed by a
well-placed source that Xi had, indeed, been offered the
position, but like the two Li's, had also declined it. The
source said Xi would be heading to Beijing soon for an
unspecified position. (Note: Among others, Luo is friends with
the son of Zhejiang Governor Lu Zushan, Lu Zhonglin, whom he had
introduced to Pol/Econ Section Chief at a reception to seek visa
advice. End note.)


6. (S) Zhou said she had also heard rumors that Organization
Department chief He Guoqiang might be in line for the Shanghai
Party Secretary slot, but she tended to discount them (Ref B).
He Guoqiang, Zhou said, had never headed a major economically
developed area before, something she saw as a prerequisite for
running what was arguably China's most economically advanced
area. (Note: He Guoqiang had served as Fujian Governor from
1997-99 and Chongqing Party Secretary from 1999-2002. End
note.) Luo, on the other hand, saw He as the most viable
candidate for the job. Luo recently met with He's son who
confirmed that Hu had offered He the job but said that his
father had not been interested.


7. (S) Luo saw Hu's offer to He Guoqiang as a way to both
appease party elder Jiang Zemin, who was He's patron, and move
one of Hu's people into He's current slot. There were, however,
two problems with this scenario, aside from He not wanting the
job. First, those who opposed Jiang did not want He transferred
to such an influential post. (Note: Zhou said that she and
other reformers in Shanghai "hated" He because of his "rightist"
views. However, she also said she had heard that He was
"behind" an experiment in intra-party democracy in Sichuan while
he was Party Secretary of Chongqing. Zhou said she had been
surprised to hear of his involvement. End note.) Second, Jiang
himself might not want to lose one of the few powerful slots
left that he "controlled" in the central party apparatus.
However, everyone's objections aside, Luo said that if Hu was
unable to find someone else to take the job, He Guoqiang might
have no choice but to go to Shanghai. (Comment: The implication
of what we are hearing about the difficulty in filling the
Shanghai Party Secretary position is that if high-ranked cadres
are close to the leader in charge, they may have a certain
amount of say over their onward assignments. End comment.)


8. (C) Neither Zhou nor Luo believed acting Party Secretary Han
Zheng would continue on in that position much longer, and both
said there was little to no chance that Han would be named full
Party Secretary. Zhou said Han had been too close to Chen
Liangyu to allow him to stay in the job. Neither knew if Han
would remain on as Shanghai Mayor after he stepped down as
acting Party Secretary. Han's final disposition would be clear
in the next two to three months as Shanghai tee-ed up for its
party congress this spring, according to Zhou.

--------------
...Except Liu Yandong and She Can't Have it
--------------


9. (S) Zhou said that she had heard that United Front Work
Department head Liu Yandong had really wanted the Shanghai
position (Ref A). While Hu initially had also wanted to put Liu
in Shanghai, he was unable to because there was too much
animosity toward her among the rank and file of Shanghai's party
apparatus. The disdain stemmed from Chen Liangyu's accusations
of Liu having "a big mouth." Zhou cited one of the "Internal
Quotations of Chen Liangyu"--an "internal" document that showed
up online a few months back which Zhou claimed was genuine
(http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2006/10/post_3. php)--saying it had
been aimed directly at Liu:

- "There are people who take matters we discuss within our party
to Hong Kong. They add oil and vinegar and start rumors and
slander about those who criticize them. That is behaving like a
hoodlum. I won't take after this kind of behavior."

Chen, Zhou said, had effectively poisoned the well for Liu by
outing her as an individual who aired Shanghai's political dirty
laundry to the media. If Hu sent Liu to Shanghai, Zhou opined,
she would be a lame duck from the get go.

--------------
Shanghai Scandal: Bring Up the Body Count
--------------


SHANGHAI 00000023 003.2 OF 005



10. (C) It is not difficult to understand why promising young
leaders would want to avoid taking up the once-prestigious title
of Shanghai Party Secretary. Officials and businessmen have
continued to fall as Central Discipline Inspection Commission
(CDIC) investigators pursued their inquiries into the pension
scandal that toppled Chen and other questionable activities
involving Shanghai leaders. As of December 29, there were more
than 50 people confirmed to have been linked to the pension
scandal and there were more than 100 people that had been
brought in from outside of Shanghai to assist in the
investigation.

- On December 8, a Chinese news outlet
reported that Major General Wu Qi replaced Dai Changyou as the
Shanghai PLA Garrison's Political Commissar. There was no
information on when Wu took up the post or what had happened to
Dai.

- Press reports on December 28 said that
property developer Yan Liyan--the mainland's 56th richest person
- came under investigation for allegedly using 2.7 billion yuan
from the Shanghai pension fund to buy a stake in a Shanghai
shopping mall, now also partly owned by retailer Bailian Group.
The loan is almost the same size as the initial loan that got
Chen sacked.

- Authorities have also questioned
Bailian Chairman Xue Quanrong in connection with the case. Xue
was the former party secretary of Shanghai's Baoshan district
and was reportedly an associate of Chen Liangyu.

- On December 29, the Shanghai Wen Hui
Bao newspaper reported that the Shanghai Baoshan District Party
Secretary Xue Quanrong had recently been placed under shuang gui

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restrictions. Xue was allegedly involved in questionable
actions regarding renting land to a foreign invested company.

- On January 6, Xinhua News Agency
reported that the Shanghai Detention Center Chief Huang Jian had
been arrested in December for accepting more than USD 61,000 in
bribes from family members of Shanghai real estate baron Zhou
Zhengyi to ensure that Zhou lived a comfortable life in prison
during his three year incarceration.

- On December 29, the PRC-owned Hong Kong
newspaper Ta Kong Pao reported that Chen's son, Chen Weili, had
also been implicated in the pension scandal but had fled to the
United States.

--------------
Chen Liangyu and Zhou Zhengyi Connection
--------------


11. (S) Zhou said that the CDIC was still in Shanghai digging
for additional dirt on Chen Liangyu. The December 29 Ta Kong
Pao report claimed that Chen had now been accused of accepting
more than USD 37.5 billion in bribes. Luo said that all the
rumors leaking out in the press about Chen were true. He said
that Chen's woes began a few years back when Chen successfully
helped put the kibosh on the scope of the investigation into
Zhou Zhengyi. Although the investigation had been called off,
it was clear to Beijing investigators that Chen had a personal
stake in the case and was trying to hide something. In 2003,
Zhou had been arrested and subsequently served three years in
prison for stock manipulation, not corruption, per se. However,
since Chen's brother was Zhou's former partner, it was clear
that when Chen fell, it was only a matter of time before Zhou
fell again, too. On December 8, a Shanghai government spokesman
confirmed that Zhou was once again in custody. Luo said that
Zhou retained some leverage since he had information that could
get many senior leaders into trouble. However, if he overplayed
his hand, Zhou might also end up dead.

-------------- --------------
Investigation All But Over: Top Leaders Can Breath Easy...
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Although it appeared that a cleanup campaign was still
underway, at least in Shanghai, Luo said that he thought the
nationwide anti-corruption witch hunt was all but over. A
friend of Luo's who was currently on the team investigating Zhou
Zhengyi noted that the team recently had uncovered a dinner that
Chen had hosted in Beijing that had run up a tab of USD 60,000.
When the bill came, Chen called on Zhou to pay for it, which

SHANGHAI 00000023 004.2 OF 005


Zhou admitted doing. According to Luo's friend, when asked who
else was present at the dinner, Zhou said Chen was the most
junior person at the table. Investigators abruptly cut him off
and changed the conversation, indicating that Chen was the
highest person the investigators wanted to pursue. Luo said
that it was becoming increasingly clear to him that--with the
exception of Hu Jintao who remained uncorrupt--all senior
Chinese leaders could be bought for the right price.


13. (S) Luo had told Pol/Econ Section Chief in late October
that his partners in a plan to form a private Chinese equity
fund with CITIC--including Hu Haifeng, Wen Jiabao's nephew, and
legislative chairman Wu Bangguo's son-in-law--had decided to
delay the venture after the Chen case broke due to the unsettled
climate the anti-corruption campaign had created. However, in
another sign that the campaign might be winding down, plans were
now moving forward again (in fact, Luo got a phone call from
Wen's nephew to discuss the subject during the January 8 meeting
with Pol/Econ Section Chief). Luo said that Hu Haifeng had an
interest in the venture from a policy perspective. The others,
however, were primarily interested in making money,
legitimately. Luo emphasized that Hu and his family were all
clean and that Hu Haifeng did not have much money. (Comment:
Coming from Luo, who recently purchased a new Ferrari with the
money he got from a recent promotion, the amount of money Hu's
son makes may be a relative issue. End comment.)

--------------
...Except for Jia Qinglin
--------------


14. (C) According to Luo, the one issue in the current
nation-wide anti-corruption campaign that remained unresolved
was the future of Jia Qinglin, head of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference. Luo believed that Jia would
be forced to "retire"--despite not having reached the mandatory
retirement age. Jia's son had already reportedly fled the
country out of fear that his father would no longer be able to
protect him once he "retired." Luo said that Jia was also
currently trying to sell a Beijing-based real estate firm that
he "owned" for cash at rock-bottom prices--facts that, Luo said,
indicated Jia was desperate. It was not clear how Jia "owned"
the company, but Luo maintained that it was an open secret that
it was Jia's. Consequently, Jia was having a hard time
unloading the company since no one wanted to inherit any of
Jia's problems. Luo said it was possible, however, that a deal
had already been struck that would allow Jia a chance to exit
gracefully from the stage, without threat of prosecution.

--------------
Fair Weather Friends
--------------


15. (S) Waxing speculative about the inter-personal dynamics of
the investigation, Zhou said that she thought Hu had very few
friends, per se--something that people at his level could ill
afford--rather, many allies of convenience. She said, for
instance, that Hu had realized early on that he needed a strong
ally in the provinces, and so began throwing his weight behind
Li Keqiang. Also, Hu was not terribly fond of
princelings--people who traded on the status of their
high-ranked parents--but that he found that working with them
was part of the cost of doing business and could provide him
certain benefits. In fact, several of his closest protigis were
princelings, including Liu Yandong (Ref A) and Li Yuanchao,
whose father used to be on the State Council. (Comment: Based
on Luo's insights, it does seem that Li Yuanchao actually is a
person Hu might consider a personal friend. End comment.)


16. (C) Zhou warned against underestimating the impact of
groups (tuan)--such as the Communist Youth League (CYL) Group,
or one of the several princeling groups--within the leadership.
Members of these groups often found like-minds and ready allies
or, in some cases, clemency. For instance, although he had been
just as guilty as Chen, Han Zheng had been protected from
investigation, in part, because of his ties into the CYL group.
(Note: Han spent several years in the Shanghai CYL bureaucracy.
End note.) Also, Hu's alliance with Li Keqiang was based, in
part on their shared history in the CYL.


17. (C) Zhou noted, however, that even Chinese leaders fell
into the trap of overplaying the strength of factional
alliances. Chen Liangyu was a classic example. Zhou said that
Chen had assumed that Vice Premier Huang Ju--both men were

SHANGHAI 00000023 005.2 OF 005


long-time associates and "friends" in Shanghai--would be willing
and able to protect him and was therefore emboldened to stand up
to Hu Jintao. However, much to Chen's disappointment, Huang's
illness, combined with lack of political spine on Huang's part,
led Huang to abandon Chen when push came to shove.
JARRETT