EAP/MLS DIRECTOR RAPSON'S CONSULTATIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000763

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PREF KS BM CB TH
SUBJECT: EAP/MLS DIRECTOR RAPSON'S CONSULTATIONS ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Visiting EAP/MLS Director Robert Rapson on
March 9 met with ROK officials to exchange views and discuss
USG objectives on Mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Burma
and DPRK refugees. ROK officials conveyed general support
for greater political freedoms and participation in Burma,
but noted that China, India and ASEAN had key roles to play
in bringing about the reforms sought. On DPRK refugees,
MOFAT interlocutors described a more formal relationship with
Thailand, one with standard-operating procedures, which
compared to an "informal" and sensitive relationship with
Cambodia. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) EAP/MLS Director Robert Rapson visited Seoul March
9-11, meeting separately with Cho Baek-san, Deputy
Director-General for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT); Ju Joong-chul,
Director of MOFAT's Southeast Asia Division; Yu Joon-ha,
Director of MOFAT's Inter-Korean Policy Division; and Lee
Ju-heum, Chancellor of MOFAT's Institute of Foreign Affairs
and National Security, and former ROK Ambassador to Burma
(2005-2006).

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BURMA
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3. (C) Providing an overview of U.S. objectives toward Burma,
Rapson noted that the USG was disappointed by the January 12
veto by China and Russia of the UN Security Council
resolution on Burma. Still, the veto and recent events
offered an opportunity to engage with China, ASEAN and others
in the region to press Burma on reforms, especially to
broaden participation in its current National Convention
process. Despite its veto of the Security Council
resolution, China issued constructive comments in its
explanatory statements, including criticism of the Burmese
leadership and its policies. The key now, Rapson stressed,
was not to let the Burmese regime perceive the veto as a
victory and a mandate to accelerate the current sham national
convention process. Post-veto, the USG was engaging with
China and key members of ASEAN to find a way forward on
Burma. Rapson noted that if the regime took some genuine
steps to broaden political participation, then the
international community, including the United States, would
be in a position to possibly respond with positive steps of
its own. Without political reforms, Burma would continue to
pose a threat to regional stability, especially in terms of
HIV/AIDS, Avian Influenza, narcotics and refugee flows.
Rapson suggested that international donors to Burma,
including the ROKG, should make efforts to avoid providing
assistance that directly benefits the regime.


4. (C) DDG Cho said that the ROKG shared the objective of
pressing Burma, adding that Seoul, privately, supported USG
efforts to hold a special session of the Human Rights Council
to discuss Burma. Former ROK President Kim Dae-jung, who had
a special interest in human rights, had sought to visit Burma
and support Aung San Suu Kyi, but Burmese officials denied
his request. Cho agreed that assistance projects in Burma
should not encourage the regime and insisted that the ROKG
was careful about its humanitarian projects. It was
important to get China and India to play a bigger role on
Burma, he said. He relayed his understanding that China in
February sent State Council Tang Jiaxuan to Burma to
discreetly press Burma to reform. Indian actions, however,
were not commensurate with India's diplomatic status, he
said. Now that India was a member of the East Asia Summit
(EAS),the international community might mobilize EAS to
press Burma. Other venues could include the Asia Cooperation
Dialogue, which Seoul was hosting in June, APEC in September
and ASEAN Plus Three in November. The ROKG was willing to do
what it could to provide a good example to Burma of how a
country could promote both economic and political
modernization.


5. (C) In a separate meeting, Southeast Asia Division
Director Ju Joong-chul stressed that the ROK had not imposed
economic sanctions on Burma, but Seoul had pursued a cautious
approach on aid and investment. The ROKG had only given USD

14 million in grant aid over the past 15 years, and the USD
85 million in tied loans were focused on the humanitarian
sector. Ju acknowledged that the Korean Electricity and
Power Corporation (KEPCO) had wanted to give tied loans to
improve electricity, but the ROKG had expressed reservations.


6. (C) IFANS Chancellor Lee Ju-heum spoke to his experience
as ROK Ambassador to Burma (2005-2006),saying that the only
way to get things done was to work with the number one or
number two official in the country. It was probably
unrealistic to expect international pressure, such as
demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, to get results.
Turning to the arms scandal involving Daewoo International
late last year, Lee said that Daewoo was caught selling
strategic materials and artillery-production equipment to
Burma thanks to a whistle-blower who contacted the ROK
intelligence services. Lee speculated that Daewoo's
involvement in the arms trade with Burma probably went back
to when Kim Woo-choong was running Daewoo in the late 1990s.

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VIETNAM
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7. (C) DDG Cho said that 2007 marked the 15th anniversary of
South Korea and Vietnam diplomatic relations, and Vietnam
General Secretary Nong Duc Manh was expected to visit Seoul
in 2007. Vietnam was the largest destination for ROK
overseas investment in SEA, and currently there were no major
bilateral problems. The ROK was once worried about history
issues concerning the ROK's role in the Vietnam War, but
leaders in Hanoi insisted on the need to focus on a
future-oriented relationship, he said.

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THAILAND
--------------


8. (C) Director Ju noted that the ROK had made no official
comment on the 2006 coup in Thailand. Still, Seoul
approached relations with the current government with
caution. The ROKG had declined a request for a visit by
General Sonti Boonyaratglin over concern that a visit would
seem to recognize the coup in Thailand.

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NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES
--------------


9. (C) In conversations with MOFAT interlocutors, Rapson
noted that since the passage of the 2004 North Korean Human
Right Act, the USG has sought to admit eligible North Korean
refugees to the United States and was appreciative of ROKG
cooperation. He reiterated that the USG did not solicit
refugees, but once approached the USG had a responsibility to
seek to process their cases, if host governments allowed.
The USG understood that the ROKG had a unique relationship
with the Government of Cambodia and that DPRK refugees was a
sensitive topic for both the ROKG and GOC. Still, the USG
would seek continued ROKG cooperation in Cambodia, as
appropriate, and elsewhere, to fulfill our requirements under
the Act.


10. (C) DDG Cho said that Cambodia and the ROK had an
"informal" relationship on DPRK refugees. Phnom Penh might
be averse to diversifying this channel. The current
situation involving three North Koreans seeking USG
resettlement from Cambodia probably arose because the ROKG
had limited facilities there to process North Koreans, plus
the ROKG wanted to keep the program quiet to avoid a
situation like in Vietnam in 2004 when publicity involving a
large airlift of refugees to South Korea had essentially
ended the program. Conditions in ROK shelters in Cambodia
were crowded and logistical support was insufficient,
especially in more remote areas of Cambodia. The three North
Korean refugees might have heard rumors, possible from NGOs,
that USG resettlement might be a better option. Asked if he
thought more North Korean refugees might approach the USG in
Cambodia, Cho said that it depended on the feedback that
other North Koreans heard on cases in Cambodia or on those
resettled to the United States. If word spread of their

difficulties, this might reduce the demand for USG
resettlement.


11. (C) In a separate meeting, Inter-Korean Policy Division
Director Yu Joon-ha said that unlike Cambodia, the ROKG had a
good relationship with Thailand concerning DPRK refugees.
The most important route to South Korea was
DPRK-China-Thailand, often via, but not directly from
Vietnam. Following the 2004 airlift incident, Vietnam was
essentially closed, he said. In 2006, the ROKG resettled
over 2,000 North Koreans, with most coming from Thailand, but
only a couple of hundred from Cambodia. Lately, even
Thailand was dragging its feet and cracking down on ROK
shelters that had been allowed to operate by mutual consent.
While there were standard-operating procedures in Thailand,
cases in Cambodia were handled "unofficially," meaning
case-by-case with the GOC Prime Minister's office.


12. (C) Yu continued that from time to time, the ROKG also
helped North Koreans in Burma, by putting them on a plane for
Bangkok and processing them through UNHCR there. In one
incident, a family of four, allegedly, once in Bangkok asked
for USG resettlement, but when denied, they changed their
mind and again sought ROKG resettlement. Yu said that each
case of North Korean refugees was complicated for different
reasons.
VERSHBOW