Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL570
2007-02-27 08:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

LAWMAKERS PROPOSE DENUCLEARIZED DPRK BEFORE

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0570/01 0580857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270857Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3083
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2084
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8371
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7832
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2198
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000570 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: LAWMAKERS PROPOSE DENUCLEARIZED DPRK BEFORE
WARTIME OPCON TRANSFER

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000570

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ABLD KS KN
SUBJECT: LAWMAKERS PROPOSE DENUCLEARIZED DPRK BEFORE
WARTIME OPCON TRANSFER

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A resolution introduced by a group of
lawmakers opposing wartime OPCON transfer passed the Defense
Committee on February 21 and is scheduled for a National
Assembly plenary vote in the coming weeks. The leaders of
the anti-OPCON coalition, including a former Defense
Minister, met separately with the Ambassador on February 16,
prior to ROK Defense Minister's Washington visit at which a
final agreement was reached, to promote postponement of
wartime OPCON transfer and to deliver a letter to Secretaries
Rice and Gates (text at para 8). Endorsed by 142 lawmakers,
the Coalition's letter argues that the transfer of wartime
OPCON will significantly weaken deterrence on the Korean
peninsula and recommends that the decision be postponed until
certain conditions are met, including resolution of the North
Korean nuclear issue. The Ambassador emphasized that
effective deterrence and a combined ability to respond to any
North Korean threat would be maintained under the future
command structure. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
ANTI-OPCON RESOLUTION MOVES FORWARD IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The National Assembly Defense Committee passed a
resolution stating that the transfer of wartime OPCON should
not occur before the resolution of North Korean nuclear
problem. Initiated by 21 representatives of all parties, the
resolution was passed by one vote (7 to 6) in the Defense
Committee on February 21. The resolution is estimated to be
introduced to the plenary on March 5. If passed by the
plenary, postponing wartime OPCON transfer until the
resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue will become a
formal ROK legislative position. While the resolution is not
legally binding, it will highlight the formal differences of
opinion within the ROK on OPCON transfer. On February 23,
Reps Hwang Jin-ha (GNP) and Kim Song-ja (DP),co-chairs of
the "Parliamentarians' Coalition to Oppose Transfer of

Wartime Operational Control Before the Resolution of the
North Korean Nuclear Problem," held a press conference at the
National Assembly press room in support of the resolution.


3. (C) In a separate meeting, Foreign Relations Committee
Chair Chung Eui-yong (URI) told POL-MIL Chief that the
resolution passed the Defense Committee only because three of
its members, including the Chair, were absent to vote against
the resolution. Chung commented, however, that it was now
"entirely possible" the measure would be passed by the
plenary. Separately, Chief of Staff to Defense Committee
Vice Chair Rep Ahn Young-keun (URI) and staff to former
Defense Committee Chair Rep Yoo Jae-kun shared Chung's
assessment that when introduced to the plenary, the
resolution is likely to pass.

-------------- --------------
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR SOLUTION BEFORE OPCON TRANSFER
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on February 16, Reps
Hwang Jin-ha (GNP),Kim Song-ja (DP) and former Defense
Minister Cho Seong-tae (Uri Party) argued the case for
postponement of wartime OPCON transfer until North Korea's
nuclear issue is resolved and to deliver a letter containing
this message to Secretaries Rice and Gates. (See para 8 for
full text of the letter). Hwang stated that the transfer of
wartime OPCON should occur only after the following three
conditions are met:

- resolution of North Korean nuclear problem;
- establishment of a peace system between the two Koreas; and
- establishment of greater mutual confidence between North
and South Korean militaries.

142 lawmakers have endorsed the resolution. An additional 20
to 30 signatures are expected to be added in coming weeks.


5. (C) Former Defense Minister Cho explained that
dismantlement of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and
cancellation of OPLAN 5027 would send a misleading signal to
North Korea that the U.S.-ROK alliance is weakening. This

"missignal," Cho continued, would not contribute to a
productive and speedy outcome of the Six-Party Talks. Cho
and other supporters of the resolution believe that North
Korean nuclear dismantlement should precede the
disestablishment of CFC.


6. (C) Turning to regional implications, Cho stated that
both denuclearization and democratization of North Korea are
necessary to achieve a peaceful and secure Northeast Asia.
Cho warned that it would be difficult to counter Chinese
influence once it has "absorbed" North Korea, and therefore
the long-term goal must include democratization of the DPRK
as well.

-------------- --------------
CONTINUED U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENT AFTER OPCON TRANSFER
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that solving the North
Korean nuclear issue is our common goal, but noted that the
U.S. and ROK Defense Ministers had already reached an
agreement in October 2006 to transfer wartime OPCON, with
only the date still to be determined. After thanking the
representatives for sharing their views, the Ambassador
underscored that effective deterrence and a combined ability
to respond to any North Korean provocation could be
maintained under the future command structure, even if the
North Korean nuclear threat remained. He questioned whether
the dissolution of CFC would be a determining factor in North
Korea's willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons, as Cho
and Hwang suggested. The key was to carry out the transition
safely, including writing new OPLANs, conducting exercises,
etc., and to maintain the unity of purpose that was at the
heart of the alliance, the Ambassador said.

--------------
ANTI-OPCON LETTER TO SECSTATE AND SECDEF
--------------


8. (U) The following is the text of the letter from the
Republic of Korea Parliamentarians' Coalition Opposing
Transfer of Wartime Operation Control Before the Resolution
of the North Korean Nuclear Program to Secretary of State
Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates. The February 23
National Assembly press release mirrored the content of the
letter.

BEGIN TEXT

February 16, 2007

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Republic of Korea

Hon. Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State

SIPDIS
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rice:

We, 142 members of the Republic of Korea National Assembly,
send this letter to you to express the Korean people's grave
concern over the planned transfer of wartime operational
control (OP-CON) between 2009-2012 agreed upon at the US-ROK
Security Consultative Meeting on October 20 last year.

The security situation on the Korean peninsula is more
perilous than ever. In particular, North Korea's nuclear
test has not only worsened the security situation on the
peninsula, it has also proved that we should not make any
decision that could induce North Korea's miscalculation about
our readiness posture.

It is fortunate that an agreement was reach at the Six Party
Talks which ended on February 13. Nevertheless, there still
is a long road of us until we accomplish the 'Complete,
Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)' of the
North Korean nuclar program. The fact that the North Korean
nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles threaten the security
of Korea and the region remains unaltered.

In this time of insecurity, transfer of wartime OP-CON is
unwise as it will inevitably lead to dismantlement of the
US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) and significantly weaken
our deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the Korean
people are very much concerned about the risks the transfer
of wartime OP-CON would bring to the US-ROK combined defense
posture, and whether this would spell further uncertainly for
Northeast Asia's future.

It is Pyongyang who is calling for withdrawal of the American
troops and dismantlement of the US-ROK Combined Forces
Command. It is also Pyongyang who stubbornly insists that it
would not discuss any military issues with a Seoul that does
not even have wartime control over its military. Knowing
this uncomfortable fact, we cannot allow our own alliance
making all of North Korea's wishes come true. This is the
very reason why the absolute majority of the Korean people
including hundreds of leading intellectuals and former
defense and foreign ministers have so strongly opposed the
transfer.

According to the recent opinion polls, over 70 per cent of
the Korean people opposed the OP-CON transfer. This result
tells the true view of the Korean people regarding the
transfer.

What is important is not the time of transfer but the
security environment of the Korean peninsula. We strongly
believe the following three conditions must be met before
making any decision on the transfer. First, the North Korean
nuclear problem must be resolved. We mean the 'complete,
verifiable and irreversible dismantlement' of the North
Korean nuclear program. Second, there must be a peace system
established between the two Koreas. And, third, there must be
a strong mutual confidence between North and South Korean
militaries. These are the requirements to minimize the
impact of the OP-CON transfer.

The number of Korean legislators endorsing this letter
currently stands at 142 but we are certain about additional
joining of the ruling party members who have not been able to
do so due to their party's situation. With the joining of
the ruling party members, we are certain that more than a
half of the National Assembly members will be standing in
opposition of the OP-CON transfer.

Madame Secretary,

The Korean people are grateful for the United States for its
sacrifice during the Korean War and contribution to Korea's
economic development and democratization. We believe our
alliance in the twenty-first Century should be developed into
a more future-oriented and comprehensive relationship. For
this purpose, it is critical to maintain a robust deterrence
and stability on the Korean peninsula and the region.

Therefore, we oppose the transfer of OP-CON before a complete
settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem. We cordially
ask you that our concerns and will regarding this critical
issue are taken seriously and considered in the future US-ROK
discussion on the OP-CON transfer.

Lastly, we sincerely thank you for your effort for continuous
development of the US-ROK relations.

A copy of the same letter will be delivered to Secretary of
Defense Hon. Robert Gates.

Sincerely,

Republic of Korea Parliamentarians' Coalition Opposing
Transfer of Wartime Operation Control Before the Resolution
of the North Korean Nuclear Program

Seong-Tae CHO
Advisor, Member of National Assembly (Uri Party)

Jin Ha HWANG
Co-Chairperson
Member of National Assembly (Grand National Party)

Song Ja KIM
Co-Chairperson
Member of National Assembly (Democratic party)

This letter is endorsed by the 142 members of the
parliamentarians' Coalitions to Oppose Transfer of Wartime
operational Control Before the Resolution of the North Korean
Nuclear Problem

END TEXT
VERSHBOW