Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL2761
2007-09-11 08:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

JAPAN-DPRK WORKING GROUP MEETING

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS KN JP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2761 2540821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110821Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6513
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3257
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3112
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8246
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1536
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002761 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN JP
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK WORKING GROUP MEETING


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002761

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN JP
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK WORKING GROUP MEETING


Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: A Japanese Embassy contact told us that the
September 5-6 Japan-North Korea bilateral meeting in
Ulaanbaatar was "better" than the previous meeting in Hanoi,
especially the overall atmosphere. One concrete result was
that North Korea agreed to have further meetings.
Substantively, results were quite limited. The two sides
agreed to divide the meeting into two sessions: the
abductions and the "past." There was no movement on the
abduction issue; the "past" was essentially a discussion of
Japanese economic and financial assistance North Korea could
expect upon normalization of relations, but no specific
amounts were discussed. End Summary.

--------------
Atmosphere Better
--------------


2. (C) While lacking in substantive results, the September
5-6 bilateral working group meeting between Japan and North
Korea was better than expected, according to Japanese Embassy
Political Minister Aiboishi. North Koreans were on their
best behavior, listening politely and asking a number of
questions. At the outset, the two sides agreed to hold two
sessions. The first day would be devoted to resolving the
history issues, or the "past," as characterized by our
Japanese Embassy contact, while the second day's discussion
would be on the abduction issue. At the end of the two-day
meeting, both sides agreed to meet "more frequently."

--------------
Day 1: Economic Assistance
--------------


3. (c) The first day discussion on the past was largely
devoted to discussing the Japanese economic assistance
program. The Japanese side explained that North Korea could
expect a substantial assistance package upon normalization of
relations, just as South Korea received compensation when it
normalized relations with Japan in 1965. The GOJ delegation
explained that the 1965 Japan-South Korea agreement consisted
of USD 300 million in grant, USD 200 million in long-term
loans at concessional interest rates and USD 300 million in
private credits from Japanese financial institutions. The
GOJ delegation also spent some time discussing various
economic assistance options, including the wide use of
concessional loans provided by the Japan Bank for
International Cooperation.


4. (C) The North Korean delegation was quite well aware of
the Japanese economic assistance policy, having held similar
discussions five years ago during PM Koizumi's visit to
Pyongyang. There was no discussion on the likely size of the
package. The North Korean side, however, voiced some
concerns on the loans, saying that Pyongyang would prefer
most of the assistance be given as grants.

--------------
Day 2: Abductions
--------------


5. (C) There was no progress on the abduction issue, Aiboshi
said. Still, the North Korean side went through the motion
of describing the various steps they had taken over the past
several years, including the return of several victims, their
families and a set of remains they claimed belonged to
Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota. There was nothing more they
could do, the North Koreans said.


6. (C) The bilateral working group also discussed the
remaining Japanese Red Army members currently living in North
Korea. Aiboshi explained that beyond the core five JRA
members responsible for terrorist incidents, including the
1970 Yodo-go hijackers, there were a number of other JRA
associates and family members who later joined the core
members. The North Korean position was that this was an
issue for the GOJ and Japanese people. If the JRA members
wanted to go back to Japan, Pyongyang would be accommodating.

VERSHBOW