ROK DEFENSE WHITE PAPER LABELS DPRK A 'SERIOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LCC SEOUL SEOUL KOREA PLEASE PASS TO J2, J5 AND SCJS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE WHITE PAPER LABELS DPRK A 'SERIOUS
THREAT'

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. The Ministry of National Defense (MND)
released its biennial Defense White Paper on December 29.
The White Paper upgraded its characterization of the DPRK
from a "direct military threat" to a "serious threat" to
national security. The White Paper's focus remains on the
threat posed by North Korea's conventional capability, WMD
development, and frontline deployment of military power, but
highlights the DPRK's nuclear test in October 2006 and its
nuclear capabilities as a new, more serious, factor. The
Paper also addresses for the first time OPCON transfer, the
2020 Defense Reform Plan, and USFK base relocation. The
White Paper notes that the Yongsan Relocation Program will
proceed with the "end of 2008 as a target," despite recent
reports that the schedule will be delayed five years to 2013.
While the 2006 White Paper falls short of pre-2004 White
Paper characterizations of the DRPK as a "main enemy," its
assessment of the North's threat, particularly in light of
the October 2006 nuclear test, seems to be more in line with
reality. End Summary.


2. (U) On December 29, MND released its biennial Defense
White Paper. The previous White Paper published in 2004
characterized the DPRK as a "direct military threat" based on
its conventional capabilities, WMD, and redeployment of
military power. The new White Paper continues to highlight
these same factors in its assessment. In particular, the
White Paper focuses on North Korea's frontline deployment of
forces, including 200 new artillery units, 40 percent of its
820 air fighters, and 60 percent of its 420 vessels and 60
submarines.


3. (U) The most significant change from the 2004 Defense
White Paper is in its assessment of the North Korean nuclear
capability following the October 2006 nuclear test. The
statement in previous White Papers that "there is no solid
evidence that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons" was
deleted in the 2006 White Paper, but the Paper falls short of
declaring the DPRK a nuclear power. The White Paper
estimates that the DPRK may have extracted over 30 kilograms
of additional plutonium, but does not speculate on the
manufacture of additional nuclear devices beyond the "1 to 2"
possible devices indicated in the 2004 White Paper. Upon the
release of the 2006 White Paper, MND Policy Planning Chief
Major General Chung Seung-jo emphasized that the ROKG
position remains to "not acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear
power."


4. (U) The 2006 White Paper included background information
on OPCON transfer for the first time, stating that "the
United States and ROK agreed to transfer OPCON between
October 15, 2009 and March 15, 2012." The White Paper
outlines the 2020 Defense Reform Plan and Defense Reform Act,
which was just passed by the National Assembly in December.
The White Paper also states that the USFK's relocation from
Yongsan to Pyeongtaek will be carried out with the "end of
2008 as a target." In his comments, Major General Chung said
that 2008 had always been the target completion date, but
that resistance by residents of Pyeongtaek was to blame for
the delay.


5. (C) Comment. The previous Defense White Paper released in
2004 gained notoriety for removing the designation of North
Korea as a "main enemy." This newest White Paper is
similarly restrained in its characterization of the North as
a "serious threat." However, by highlighting the nuclear
test, it addresses the threat in a somewhat more realistic
manner. MND also appears to be backing up its words
regarding this threat with concrete steps as evidenced by the
FY 2007 budget approval for 'bunker buster' bombs and
ballistic-missile early warning system components worth Won
39.2 billion (USD 42.2 million). End Comment.
STANTON