Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL2146
2007-07-18 07:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: WHAT THE ROK WILL/WON'T DO

Tags:  MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PTER PREL AF IZ KS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002146 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PTER PREL AF IZ KS
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: WHAT THE ROK WILL/WON'T DO
AND NEEDS FROM US

REF: SEOUL 02101

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002146

SIPDIS

NOTE: BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS. GIVE TO INR DUTY OFFICER FOR
GUAIDANCE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PTER PREL AF IZ KS
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: WHAT THE ROK WILL/WON'T DO
AND NEEDS FROM US

REF: SEOUL 02101

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 16, MOFAT North America DG Cho
Byung-jae conveyed the following ROKG decisions to POLMC
regarding South Korea's planned 2008 role in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

-- The ROK will withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan
by the end of 2007.
-- In place of those troops, the ROKG would establish a PRT
in Parwan staffed by civilians (which will not require
National Assembly approval),as long as security is provided
by the United States.
-- The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) would
train and equip Afghani policemen and participate in the
Border Management Initiative Training Program, but the ROK
would be unable to provide military equipment to Afghanistan.
-- The ROK will provide a $25 million long-term, low-interest
loan to construct a 30 mile electrical transmission line from
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and is asking the Asian Development
Bank to provide joint funding for a second 200 mile long
transmission line.

DG Cho said the ROK has already carried out the necessary
survey in Uzbekistan and will now send a survey team to
Afghanistan in early August. Cho asked that Washington tell
Seoul as soon as possible whether the USG prefers a continued
ROK military presence in Iraq or a continued ROK military
presence in Afghanistan, as it will soon be finalizing its
decisions regarding both deployments. END SUMMARY

WHAT THE ROK WILL AND WON'T DO IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2008
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Following up on Foreign Minister Song Min-soon's July
12 meeting with the Ambassador (reftel),MOFAT North American
Affairs Director General Cho Byung-jae met with POLMC on July

16 to formally convey the ROK position on its continuing role
in Afghanistan. DG Cho began by stating that he was
instructed to officially respond to the June 2007 U.S.
proposal on ways in which the ROK might continue to
contribute to stabilization and reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. He said the U.S. proposal, presented to MOFAT
during the June 6-8 visit to Seoul by Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense Richard Lawless, had received full and careful
consideration within the South Korean Government. He then
presented the POLMC with the following ROKG decisions
regarding the ROK presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan:

-- The ROK has contributed over $160 million to
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and
will continue to support that important undertaking.

-- In keeping with the express will of the National Assembly,
the ROK will withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan by
the end of 2007.

-- In place of those troops, the ROKG wishes to establish a
ROK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) headquarted in
Bagram Airbase and operating in the Parwan province of
Afghanistan. That PRT would be staffed by civilians but
would include several ROK military officers who would serve
as military liaisons. The sending of civilian personnel (and
military liaisons) to Afghanistan will not require National
Assembly approval. The sending of military personnel will.
-- Civilian medical personnel will replace the ROK military
medical team at the hospital at Bagram Airbase so that the
health services provided at that facility would continue to
be available to Afghan citizens in that area.

-- In addition, the Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA) would undertake to bring Afghani policemen to Korea
where it would train and equip them.

-- KOICA would also participate in the Border Management
Initiative Training Program, sending experts and equipment to
Kabul for that purpose.

-- The ROKG would work to increase KOICA's funding for
civilian projects in Afghanistan, but for domestic political
reasons would be unable to provide military equipment to the
Afghan Armed Forces.

-- The ROKG would do its best to encourage Korean companies
to undertake more private-sector economic activity in
Afghanistan.

WHAT THE ROK WILL DO TO HELP BRING ELECTRICITY TO AFGHANISTAN
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Turning to the effort to link up an abundance of
electricity in Uzbekistan with the severe need for it in
Afghanistan, DG Cho reported that the ROKG had now twice sent
a survey team to Uzbekistan and had concluded that it was
willing to provide funding and assistance for the completion
of two electrical transmission lines. The first, he said,
would be a 30 mile span from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan that
would be funded with a $25 million loan from the ROK's
Economic Development Cooperation Fund. That assistance would
be in the form of a long-term, low-interest loan, Cho
explained. In addition, he said the ROK planned to ask the
Asian Development Bank to provide joint funding for a second
transmission line that would cross over 200 miles in northern
Uzbekistan.

WHAT THE ROK NEEDS FROM THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN
-------------- --------------


4. (C) DG Cho went on to explain that because security of
its citizens working in Afghanistan is a critical issue to
the ROKG, and since it would be difficult to secure popular
support for relying on security from non-allied countries,
the ROK would request the United States to provide the
security for its proposed PRT. He noted that the U.S. was
already providing a ring of security around Bagram Airbase,
so no additional U.S. security personnel would be needed for
that purpose.


5. (C) Before the ROKG makes its final decision on South
Korea's continuing role in Afghanistan, it plans to send a
survey team there in early August. The ROKG would like to
receive the USG's response before that occurs. The survey
team may also require some U.S. assistance while it is on the
ground in Afghanistan, Cho added.

WHAT THE ROK WANTS TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. PLANS AND PRIORITIES IN
IRAQ
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Echoing Foreign Minister Song's reftel request, DG
Cho asked that the USG share more details of its 2008 plan
for Iraq with the South Korean government. He also asked
that Washington tell Seoul as soon as possible whether the
USG prefers to see a continued ROK military presence in Iraq
or in Afghanistan. Cho said it was his impression that Iraq
was a higher priority, indicating the ROK was considering
keeping at least some of its troops in Iraq, while pulling
all of its troops out of Afghanistan. Alternatively, Cho
indicated the ROK might consider doing the reverse if that
was an incorrect assumption, and if Washington in fact had a
stronger preference for a continued ROK military presence in
Afghanistan. In that event, however, Cho said the ROK would
likely withdraw its Zaytun unit from Irbil.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) POLMC expressed appreciation for the South Korean
government's careful consideration of the USG request for a
continued ROK role in Afghanistan. He welcomed its
willingness to lead a PRT, increase KOICA's training of
Afghan police and border guards, and provide funding and
assistance to the Uzbekistan-to-Afghanistan electrification
project, but pushed back on the withdrawal of ROK troops from
Afghanistan, pointing out that the ROK would be the first
country to remove its forces. He made it clear the USG
strongly desired that the ROK extend the dispatch of its
troops to both Iraq AND Afghanistan. Cho's no-nonsense
response, however, made it clear that with a presidential
election looming in South Korea and with National Assembly
approval required for any dispatch or extension of ROK forces
overseas, the ROKG felt it was unable to continue to maintain
troops in both countries. Cho pointed out that approval for
the extension of the Zaytun dispatch to Iraq for 2007 had
been contingent upon an agreement with the National Assembly
that it would withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan by the
end of this year and "conclude" the deployment in Iraq. For
that reason, the ROK clearly plans to withdraw its troops
from one country or the other. Unless the U.S. Government
urges it to do otherwise, the ROKG's current understanding is
that we prefer they keep their troops in Iraq rather than in
Afghanistan.
STANTON