DUSD LAWLESS' ALLIANCE MEETINGS WITH MOFAT, BLUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001893

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP PARM PREL KS
SUBJECT: DUSD LAWLESS' ALLIANCE MEETINGS WITH MOFAT, BLUE
HOUSE

REF: SEOUL 1852

Classified By: A/Pol Brian D. McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 7, visiting Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (DUSD) Richard Lawless met with the following senior
South Korean officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MOFAT) and the Blue House: Senior Secretary to the
President for National Security Yun Byung-se, MOFAT North
American Affairs Bureau Director General Cho Byung-jae, and
MOFAT Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Shim
Yoon-joe. All agreed that U.S.-ROK Alliance relations had
recently improved but that serious issues related to the ROK
ability to address U.S. Air Force training range requirements
and the use of burden sharing funds to pay for the relocation
of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) remained to be
resolved prior to the October Security Consultative Meeting
(SCM). DG Cho clarified that the ROKG had accepted the
return of the remaining 9 USFK camps on June 1 without
conditions, but stressed that the ROK would propose a"
re-inspection/validation" procedure be adopted for future
camp returns. He also requested U.S. concurrence in the
public release of SOFA documents pertaining to the 23
completed camp returns. DUSD Lawless stressed the value of
the ROK contribution to reconstruction in Afghanistan and the
importance of a continued ROK role in that effort. All three
of his interlocutors indicated that the request was being
looked at favorably, but warned that security for South
Korean personnel in Afghanistan would remain the highest
priority for the ROKG. END SUMMARY


2. (C) While heading the U.S. delegation to the 13th Security
Policy Initiative (SPI) talks in Seoul (reported reftel),
DUSD Richard Lawless held bilateral meetings on June 7 with
three senior South Korean officials at MOFAT and the Blue
House. Those discussions, held with Senior Secretary to the
President for National Security Yun Byung-se, MOFAT North
American Affairs Bureau Director General Cho Byung-jae, and
MOFAT Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Shim
Yoon-joe, focused on U.S.-ROK Alliance issues, including camp
returns, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA),the training
range issue, and the need for the ROK to continue its helpful
role in Afghanistan. The ROK officials he met with stressed
the following points of view:

--------------
State of the U.S.-ROK Alliance
--------------


3. (C) Senior Secretary to the President for National
Security Yun Byung-se used his meeting with DUSD Lawless to
highlight the improved state of U.S.-ROK Alliance relations.
He richly praised DUSD Lawless for his role in strengthening
the alliance and helping to reshape it into a "more
future-oriented partnership." The U.S. and ROK have mutual
interests that extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula, Yun
pointed out, adding that it was in the interests of both
Seoul and Washington to work together to address other
important issues around the globe. Yun cited recent alliance
progress on the transition of wartime operational control
(OPCON),camp returns, and the Yongsan Relocation and Land
Partnership plans (YRP/LPP),as well as mutual efforts in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, and pointed to
President Roh's planned September groundbreaking ceremony at
the future USFK headquarters site in Pyeongtaek as an
opportunity to highlight the recent progress in alliance
relations. He added that "a lot of blood had been shed" by
both alliance partners during contentious negotiations in
recent years, but concluded that the results had been worth
it and that a degree of trust had now been restored.


4. (C) DUSD Lawless agreed that progress had been made in
repairing alliance relations. He went on to stress the hope
that remaining problems, such as the serious lack of training
opportunities available to U.S. pilots on the peninsula, be
resolved before Secretary Gates meets with ROK Minister of
National Defense Kim Jang-soo at the SCM in Seoul in October.
Yun expressed his understanding of the seriousness of the
issue. He then raised the F-16 issue by asking for continued
U.S. assistance in resolving the ROK Air Force's F-16 engine
parts problem. DUSD Lawless responded that the U.S. was
ready to work with the ROK Air Force (citing DAS for SAF/IA
Bruce Lemkin's recent visit) to fix the systemic problem, but
was receiving some resistance to doing so. DUSD Lawless and
Yun both agreed that the U.S. and ROK defense chiefs had
gotten off to an excellent start when they met in February,
and again at the Shangri-la dialogue in early June, and
shared the hope that their working relationship would
continue to be a positive and productive one.

--------------
Camp Returns
--------------


5. (C) At DUSD Lawless' request, MOFAT North American Affairs
DG Cho Byung-jae clarified in their meeting that the ROKG had
accepted the return of the remaining 9 USFK camps on June 1
without conditions. Cho added, however, that in the future
the U.S.-ROK Alliance would need to address the problem of
differing environmental standards as ROK environmental law
had become far more stringent in recent years than was
reflected in the SOFA camp return process. For that reason,
Cho said the ROKG would likely propose the adoption of some
sort of "re-inspection/validation" procedure prior to
accepting any future camps. DUSD Lawless responded by saying
that the proper channels for such a discussion already
existed through SOFA channels.

--------------
Release of SOFA Documents
--------------


6. (C) Turning to the ROKG's May 16 request for public
release of SOFA documents relating to the completed camp
returns, Cho stated that it was the policy of the ROK
government to disclose as much information to the public as
possible, and that the ROKG wished to follow that broad trend
with regard to the camp returns issue. Failure to do so, he
argued, would raise speculation within the National Assembly
that the U.S. and ROK had something to hide. Cho said he had
personally read the Tab A documents the National Assembly had
requested and that he could not think of any reason why they
should not be made public. He added, however, that since it
is the ROK's confirmed policy is not to release SOFA
documents without the concurrence of the United States, it
was necessary for MOFAT to formally request that the U.S.
agree to the release.


7. (C) DUSD Lawless replied that the USG was taking the
request very seriously, but that it could depart from
established SOFA agreements the U.S. had with other
countries. The request would therefore have to be very
carefully considered, he said. He also pointed out that
since some of the documents to be released referred to other
documents it was likely that the initial request would open
the flood gates. Furthermore, one of the documents that had
been submitted by the Ministry of the Environment was a
screed against the United States, accusing USFK of poor
stewardship of the land. Cho replied that he clearly
understood all three of those concerns, but that he
nevertheless hoped the U.S. would agree to the release prior
to June 25-26 National Assembly hearings on the camp
return/environmental remediation issue. Cho stated that
MOFAT would likely go ahead and release a summary of the
essence of the documents if the U.S. did not agree to release
them.

--------------
Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
--------------


8. (C) Turning to the ROK's "Proposal for a New SMA Formula,"
DG Cho asked DUSD Lawless to carefully consider MOFAT's
proposed solution regarding the National Assembly's
prohibition against using SMA funds for construction of USFK
facilities under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP),stating
that he needed the USG's help in addressing this "political
problem." Cho said he wanted the SMA to be used as a symbol
of support for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, rather than as a tool
used by opponents of the alliance to undermine that support.
Echoing the U.S. response to the proposal PM/SNA Senior
Advisor Loftis had provided to DG Cho on June 4, DUSD Lawless
explained that while the USG understood the political
sensitivities involved, the USG position was that it was a
problem created by MOFAT, and so up to MOFAT, not the U.S.
Government, to appropriately resolve.


9. (C) In a subsequent meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM)
Shim also asked that the U.S. respond favorably to the ROK's
SMA proposal. DUSD Lawless responded by stating that was an
impossibility, since the ROKG was asking that USFK move funds
around in a manner that violated U.S. law. Furthermore, it
was highly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would agree to
fund the overseas construction of new facilities for the 2nd
Infantry Division (2ID),Lawless pointed out. At the time
the LPP Agreement was reached, the U.S. clearly stated that
the USFK budget would fund the 2ID relocation and that the
USFK budget derives funding from two sources -- SMA and U.S.
Mil-Con. Lawless added that if the ROKG should persist in
its argument that SMA funds cannot be used to relocate 2ID,
the U.S.-ROK Alliance would face a worst case scenario
situation sometime in 2008.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


10. (C) DUSD Lawless used his meetings with all three senior
ROK officials to stress the value of the ROK contribution to
reconstruction in Afghanistan and the importance of the
Republic of Korea continuing to play a role in that effort
beyond its current 2007 commitment. DG Cho said the request
was being viewed positively within the South Korean
government and that MOFAT was also taking a serious look at
the proposal to link up an electricity transmission system
from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Finally, the possibility of
the ROK leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was
also being considered, Cho said. The ROK's biggest concern
was security, he added, noting that the National Assembly had
passed legislation requiring the withdrawal of all ROK
military forces from Afghanistan by the end of the year.


11. (C) Senior Secretary Yun pointed out that the ROK wished
to become more involved not only in Afghanistan, but in
Central Asia as a whole. In that context, he said, the Blue
House was considering what the U.S. had proposed "in a
serious way." He cautioned that no decision had been made,
but revealed that as an initial step the ROK would be sending
a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan.


12. (C) Later in the day, DFM Shim applauded what he termed
"a great U.S.-ROK working-level discussion on Afghanistan"
that had taken place that afternoon. He echoed Yun's comment
that all five of the Central Asian "stans" would welcome
closer ties with the ROK and Afghanistan, and that broader
opportunities existed for South Korea to help in the
development and integration of the region, noting that there
are many ethnic Koreans living in Central Asia. While there
was clearly value to ROK troops staying longer, Shim warned
that the domestic political situation in South Korea would
not allow for that. Whatever role the ROK does play in
Afghanistan in 2008 and beyond, protection would be a top
priority, he added, making it clear that South Korea looked
to the U.S. to provide that security and to assist the ROK in
its nascent relationship with NATO's International Security
Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).


13. (C) In his response, DUSD Lawless raised the possibility
of the ROK partnering with other countries, such as Mongolia,
that were willing to provide security, but unable to afford
the level of reconstruction funding and expertise the ROK had
to offer. All three ROK officials indicated they would also
give that idea their serious consideration.
VERSHBOW