Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1841
2007-06-18 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

PROGRESSIVE COALTION: CLEAR AS MUD?

Tags:  KN KS PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 180803Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5060
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2659
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2771
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001841 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PROGRESSIVE COALTION: CLEAR AS MUD?

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001841

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PROGRESSIVE COALTION: CLEAR AS MUD?

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 11, the Ambassador met with Park
Sang-cheon and Kim Han-gill, the co-chairs of the newly
formed Moderate Unified Democrats (MUD) and discussed FTA,
North Korea, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),SOFA and the
future of the MUD party. The MUD co-chairs said their goal
was to develop a coalition, anti-GNP party in the short term
to field a competitive moderate, reform candidate in the
December presidential elections. In the long term, they said
they hoped their grouping could become similar to the U.S.
Democratic Party and they could help Korea develop a strong,
U.S.-style two-party political system. Park and Kim's newly
formed party consists of 34 lawmakers formerly with the Uri
Party and the Jeolla-based Democratic Party; their party is
now the third largest in the National Assembly after the GNP
(127) and the Uri Party (91). Co-chair Park said the new
party would not support the KORUS FTA until there were
adequate allocations made to protect farmers and fishermen.
On the DPRK, Park and Kim agreed South Korea should be very
cautious about holding a North-South summit this year and
noted that it could have a negative impact on the
progressives. They both emphasized that the U.S.-ROK
alliance was important for peace and stability on the
Peninsula and in the region. END SUMMARY

--------------
NEW COALITION MUD PARTY
--------------


2. (C) Moderate Unified Democrats (MUD) Co-chair Park
Sang-cheon told the Ambassador on June 11 that the merger
between his Democratic Party and Kim Han-gill's group of
former Uri lawmakers was not official yet, but it would be
legally established shortly as an anti-GNP party without
common, specific policy views by the participating lawmakers.
Since economic development can adversely affect the working
classes, the MUD party, just like the Labour Party in England
and the Social Democrats in Germany, will lay out a third way
of centrist reformism. Park noted that the party's reform
agenda would embrace competitiveness and globalization, which
is needed for Korea to continue to develop economically, but

would also call for easing the disparity between the rich and
poor. While the party had to attempt to explain its new
policy direction, the most important task was to form a broad
anti-GNP (opposition Grand National Party) coalition.


3. (C) Co-chair Kim Han-gill said MUD hoped to become
Korea's equivalent of the U.S. Democratic Party. He said
that if Korea developed a stronger, two-party system it would
enhance Korea's political stability. (NOTE: currently there
are five main parties with an additional 50 independent
lawmakers. END NOTE) Park emphasized that the MUD Party
welcomed any lawmakers from the Uri Party who agreed with
MUD's principles. (NOTE: Park has told reporters that he
does not want to form a coalition with politicians who were
former leaders of the Uri Party, such as former Unification
Minister and declared presidential candidate Chung
Dong-young. END NOTE) Kim said the goal of the party was to
become the second largest bloc in the National Assembly after
the GNP. Whether the MUD Party succeeded in forming a broad
coalition or not, the progressives would support a single
presidential candidate - to be determined later.

---
FTA
---


4. (C) The Ambassador asked the co-chairs if the new party
supported the KORUS FTA. Park said he supported the FTA in
principle but that until the ROKG came up with sufficient
measures to protect those potentially harmed by the
agreement, MUD would oppose its ratification. He added that
fishermen and farmers in particular had to be helped to
adjust to economic conditions the FTA would bring about.
Kim noted that in addition to compensation issues, the
renegotiation/clarification demands the U.S. had made could
cause many FTA supporters to sour on the deal. The
Ambassador assured the two that the U.S. was not demanding a
renegotiation of the FTA but rather some minor clarifications
on labor and the environment that would not affect the
balance of the agreement. Additionally, the clarifications
to the labor chapter were based on a 1998 ILO Declaration
that Korea had signed, and the clarifications to the
environmental chapter were based on seven separate
environmental accords that Korea was party to.

--------------
U.S. OPPOSITION TO FTA
--------------


5. (C) Kim said he was puzzled by Senator Hilary Clinton's
public opposition to the KORUS FTA due to the damage she said
it would cause the U.S. auto industry, and also concerned
about other U.S. lawmakers who had recently said ratification
of the agreement would be impossible. The Ambassador agreed
that these comments were not helpful, and added that we were
satisfied by the automobile chapter's provisions to open the
Korean market. He also noted that while ratification would
not be easy in the U.S., after the labor and environmental
clarifications were made, 60-70 pro-FTA votes could be gained
in the U.S. Congress.


6. (C) Rep. Kim said that while President Roh had to come up
with measures to protect those affected by the FTA, the USG
also had to play a role to assure protection of these groups.
The Ambassador said that adjustments were already in the
agreement to protect certain groups. For example, he noted
Jeju's market would only be open to U.S. citrus fruits during
the non-growing season in Korea and rice was excluded
entirely from the agreement. He hoped MUD could support the
FTA and work with the ROKG to support the "lesser winners."

--------------
NORTH KOREA
--------------


7. (C) Park said that if denuclearization were not achieved,
any North-South summit would be seen as meaningless. Kim
agreed and added he did not think a North-South summit, if it
were to occur this year, would influence the presidential
election. He noted that in April 2000, just one day before
national elections, then Blue House Chief of Staff Park
Ji-won announced a summit would take place, but it had no
effect on the elections. This year as well, he said, any
North-South summit would be greeted with skepticism since all
Koreans knew it would be for domestic political reasons and
not for peace on the Peninsula. Kim said he had warned the
Roh administration several times not to have a summit before
the election, since in such a case the North would likely
exploit the South. The Ambassador agreed a summit without
North Korea fulfilling the pledges it made in the February 13
agreement would not be productive. The USG was pleased that
President Roh was working hard to keep inter-Korean relations
coordinated with the Six-Party negotiation process. As long
as the U.S. and the ROK maintained the same close
coordination, the common goal of denuclearization could be
achieved. It was important that the DPRK not get rewards
from South Korea or elsewhere without taking steps to
denuclearize, the Ambassador concluded.

--------------
THE NON-PROLIFERATION MYTH
--------------


8. (C) Park said that some Koreans thought the U.S. would
accept a nuclear North Korea as long as it could guarantee
the North would not proliferate. The Ambassador stated
firmly that the U.S. would not settle for a nuclear North
Korea. If North Korea wanted to conclude a peace regime or
establish normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., it had
to abandon its nuclear programs.

---
BDA
---


9. (C) Kim suggested U.S. claims that the BDA issue was
simply a technical hurdle to overcome were not convincing.
If the U.S. were more flexible and looked at the issues
beyond banking, it could help peace flourish on the
Peninsula. The Ambassador said the U.S. had been very
flexible on resolving BDA, but the problem was international
banks did not want to handle North Korea's funds.

--------------
ENGAGEMENT
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador asked the two how the coalition MUD
Party would approach engagement toward the North. The two
said that their party platform supported engagement and peace
on the Peninsula, but that peace and engagement should be
based on strong security. Also, they said there were
different ideas on how to apply the principle of reciprocity
to the engagement policy and that they had not yet come to a
decision.


11. (C) The Ambassador said he was impressed by the scale of
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),but said that KIC could
only fulfill its potential as a huge manufacturing zone that
employed hundreds of thousands of workers only if the DPRK
denuclearized. He emphasized that the USG was not blocking
investors, but that investors would shy away from the KIC as
long as North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. Kim noted
that if KIC was included in the KORUS FTA as an Outward
Processing Zone (OPZ),it would contribute toward peace on
the Peninsula. The Ambassador noted that the KORUS FTA
contained a framework that could allow the inclusion of KIC
into the FTA in the future, but noted that there were serious
concerns about labor rights of the KIC workers. Kim noted
there was a difference between the two countries: the U.S.
felt that if the DPRK improved its behavior, KIC could grow,
while the ROK felt that if KIC grew, it would encourage
internal change in the DPRK.


12. (C) The Ambassador noted the U.S. had had bad experience
with the DPRK and was reluctant to give the North the benefit
of the doubt. Kim said he and Park were ministers during
DJ's administration and he was also disappointed with North
Korea after the October 2006 nuclear test. However, if the
U.S. and ROK worked together, he stated, progress could be
made.

--------------
ALLIANCE ISSUES
--------------


13. (C) Park and Kim both said they supported the U.S.-ROK
alliance firmly and said the alliance not only helped block
Northern aggression, but also contributed to stability and
balance in Northeast Asia. The Ambassador said the ROK-U.S.
security relationship was in good shape and had made lots of
progress recently with the February 23 agreement to
transition wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK in

2012. He asked Park and Kim to remember, when debate
surfaced in the National Assembly about environmental issues
surrounding the transfer of bases back to ROK control, that
the U.S. had stationed soldiers in the ROK to defend the ROK.
The transfer of bases was being executed in line with the
SOFA agreement and the U.S. had done more than stipulated in
the agreement to deal with environmental concerns.


14. (C) Kim said he thought there were some discrepancies
between the U.S.-ROK SOFA and the SOFAs between the U.S. and
Japan and Germany. He said the U.S. was the ROK's most
important ally, but when Koreans saw discrepancies in SOFA
agreements, they wondered how important the relationship was
to the U.S. The Ambassador said the U.S.-ROK alliance was
just as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance and that both
relationships were essential for regional security. All
SOFAs were negotiated between the respective countries and
not imposed by the U.S., the Ambassador said.


15. (C) Park said he was Justice Minister when the SOFA was
last negotiated and hoped that eventually the ROK could have
the same SOFA as Japan. The Ambassador noted that at the
next SOFA negotiation, the ROK could make that request, but
noted that in the U.S.-Japan SOFA, Japan took a much larger
financial responsibility for the burdensharing. He also
noted that the U.S. will not charge the ROKG for any
buildings or infrastructure that it leaves on the bases,
while in Germany, the government had to pay for buildings and
other improvements on the bases.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) According to National Assembly sources, the MUD
coalition party will likely not succeed in officially
forming. The MUD Party announced they would delay the
official merger until sometime the week of June 18.
Currently the Kim Han-gill faction is insisting on an even
partnership between its group of 23 lawmakers and the
Democratic Party. The Democratic Party wants a larger share
in the coalition since they have a regional base in the
southeast. Whatever the outcome, this is only one step of
many needed to create a broad progressive coalition, and more
importantly, to arrive at a single progressive candidate.
Even if the coalition forms a new party, the progressive
camp's future remains as clear as mud.
VERSHBOW