Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1826
2007-06-15 04:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
MOFAT EQUIVOCAL ABOUT CONTINUING THE ROK PRESENCE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1826/01 1660436 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 150436Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5042 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2654 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1607 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8463 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0066 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8096 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2767 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 1985 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001826
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MOPS MARR PBTS KS
SUBJECT: MOFAT EQUIVOCAL ABOUT CONTINUING THE ROK PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2007
Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001826
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MOPS MARR PBTS KS
SUBJECT: MOFAT EQUIVOCAL ABOUT CONTINUING THE ROK PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2007
Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. In a June 7 meeting, DoS and OSD
representatives presented the ROKG with a proposed course of
action for the ROK's continued presence in Afghanistan beyond
2007. In response, Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs
(MOFAT) North America III Division Director Lee Jeong-kyu
acknowledged that the ROK would like to assist in
Afghanistan's security and development, and expressed that
the ROKG had been examining possible ways for it to continue
in Afghanistan. However, the ROKG was very cautious
regarding the U.S. suggestions. Lee stressed that the
security situation in Afghanistan would be a determining
factor in the ROK's continued presence. Furthermore, any
additional ROK troop deployment would be extremely difficult
to achieve given the legislated demand by the National
Assembly for a troop withdrawal by the end of 2007. Lee said
that ROK participation in a Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) was a good possibility, but that the ROKG would prefer
to work with the United States rather than NATO. Lee
expressed more support for continued non-military assistance,
including expanded Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA) aid projects and efforts to improve Korean private
sector development in Afghanistan. End Summary.
--------------
Proposal for a Continued ROK Presence
--------------
2. (C) On June 7, an interagency U.S. team presented ROKG
officials from MOFAT, the Ministry of National Defense (MND),
Blue House (Presidential staff),and the ROK JCS with the
U.S. "Proposal for Continuing the ROK Presence in Afghanistan
Beyond 2007." Recognizing the ROK's valuable contributions
to date and the ROK National Assembly's call for the complete
withdrawal of ROK troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2007,
USG officials noted that much more remains to be done to
assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of
Afghanistan. USG officials called for the ROKG to continue
its military presence, participate in the UN-mandated
NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),and
expand the geographical range of their assistance activities
to meet needs outside of Kabul.
3. (C) DoS ROK Unit Chief Andrew Hyde praised the current
ROK efforts and outlined the five "pillars" of the U.S.
proposal for how the ROK could continue to contribute to the
mission in Afghanistan, asking that the ROK:
- Maintain and expand existing KOICA programs
- Continue operations of its Medical Clinic at Bagram Air
Force Base and consider expanding medical
services outside of Kabul
- Take a lead role in a PRT (working with NATO)
- Train and equip Afghan Forces
- Further encourage Korean business investment in Afghanistan
Hyde requested that the ROKG provide a response on the
proposed future ROK presence in Afghanistan as soon as
possible. He also suggested that the ROKG meet with NATO
headquarters staff in Brussels to learn more about leading a
PRT and consider sending an assessment team to Afghanistan.
4. (C) MOFAT's Lee Jeong-kyu responded that the ROK is
committed to assisting in the stabilization and rebuilding of
Afghanistan. Lee emphasized that the security of ROK
personnel remains of paramount concern for the ROKG.
Regarding the U.S. proposal, Lee said that ROK troops in
Afghanistan would have to be withdrawn by the end of 2007 in
accordance with the National Assembly's mandate, but that the
ROKG was examining how it could continue to contribute to
Afghanistan. Lee also noted that maintaining a ROK troop
presence, or deploying new ROK troops, would be very
difficult to get through the National Assembly.
--------------
KOICA
--------------
5. (C) Lee stressed that Foreign Minister Song Min-soon had
recently reaffirmed the ROK's commitment to assisting in
Afghanistan through KOICA. To date, KOICA has focused on the
construction of much-needed schools, hospitals, power plants,
and rural development projects, Lee said. KOICA's programs
in Afghanistan would continue to expand, but Lee stressed
that the scope and location of its future activities would be
heavily dependent on the security situation in Afghanistan.
--------------
Provincial Reconstruction Team
--------------
6. (C) Lee said that the ROKG was giving serious
consideration to leading a PRT, stating that he "can't
guarantee anything, but it is moving in a positive
direction." However, Lee expressed several concerns about a
ROK led PRT. As with other aspects of continued ROK
involvement in Afghanistan, Lee said the security situation
would heavily influence the ROKG decision to lead or
participate in a PRT. As a result, Lee stressed that
considerable support would be needed to safeguard the
civilian ROK staff if the ROK were to lead a PRT. Lee also
pointed out that the U.S. (and ISAF) preferred PRT location
of Dai Kunde province was very isolated, noting that it was
one of only two provinces yet to receive a PRT and that it
was "perhaps better suited to a country with experience in
leading a PRT." Consequently, Lee explained that the ROKG
would prefer to work with the U.S. on a PRT in another
location, perhaps Parwan, where the U.S. military could
provide security for Korean nationals. Lee added that the
ROKG preferred to work directly with the United States rather
than establish a PRT under NATO's leadership, due to
difficulties the ROKG had already encountered with NATO,s
bureaucracy in trying to gain ISAF membership.
7. (C) Hyde responded that it would be feasible for the ROKG
to work with another country on a PRT operation, but it was
disappointing that the ROKG wanted to work exclusively with
the United States, highlighting that many other countries
were working successfully with NATO in Afghanistan. Hyde
added that the U.S. expectation was that the ROKG would
request the National Assembly authorize sending troops to
assist in providing security for the ROK PRT. Hyde noted
that while the National Assembly mandated that the current
deployment return to the ROK at the end of 2007, this did not
prevent the ROKG from considering a new deployment in 2008.
Lee dismissed the suggestion, saying that "it would be
difficult to propose sending troops to the very country that
we had to pull them out of."
8. (C) Hyde and OSD,s Morgan noted that they could
understand the ROKG's apprehension about navigating the NATO
bureaucracy and offered continued and constant U.S. support
throughout the process. However, Hyde emphasized that "this
is about the Korean role in Afghanistan and in the
international community. We do not want you to limit
yourselves to looking exclusively at PRTs partnered with the
U.S."
--------------
Training and Equipping Afghan Forces
--------------
9. (C) In response to the request to assist in "building an
Afghani army from scratch," ROK JCS Overseas Development
Branch Chief Colonel Kim Young-shik explained that the ROK
military was "exploring feasible ways to keep troops in
Afghanistan," but faced constraints in terms of both the
National Assembly's mandate on troop withdrawal and a limited
availability of resources due to the North Korean
threat. Deploying ROK troops to train and equip Afghan
forces would be difficult, he said. During the meeting it
appeared that there was some confusion on the ROK side. In a
subsequent discussion with Kim after the meeting, LTC
Finnegan clarified the USG position in this area, which
resulted in Kim acknowledging that he misunderstood the
initial request and that he would further consider the idea,
leaving the door open for further discussion.
--------------
Korean Business Investment
--------------
10. (C) According to Lee, current Korean contracts in
Afghanistan totaled approximately USD 270 million. The ROKG
hoped to see an expanded Korean business presence in
Afghanistan, Lee said, while again cautioning that this
expansion would be tied to improved security in the country.
Lee requested the United States share any information
available about how the USG or U.S. companies identify ways
to promote U.S. investment in Afghanistan. OSD's Morgan
noted that such a program was in operation in the United
States and offered to provide the information at a later date.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
11. (U) List of Participants
United States
--------------
Mr. Andrew Hyde, ROK Unit Chief, EAP/K, DoS
Mr. David Wolff, Pol-Mil Chief, DoS/American Embassy Seoul
LTC Michael Finnegan, Senior Country Director for Korea,
ISA/AP, OSD
Ms. Mary Beth Morgan, Korea Country Director, ISA/IA OSD
LCDR Kevin Aanestad, Korea Desk Officer, NEA Div J5, JCS
Major Marc Acosta, J5, USFK
Mr. Jordan Heiber, DoS/American Embassy Seoul
Republic of Korea
--------------
Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America III Division, MOFAT
Mr. Kim Chang-sik, Director, Security Policy Division, MOFAT
Mr. Lee Yong-soo, Director, Development Cooperation Division,
MOFAT
Mr. Lee Han-sang, Second Secretary, Southwest Asia and Oceana
Division, MOFAT
Mr. Park Sung-il, Second Secretary, North America Division
III, MOFAT
Mr. Kim Jung-sup Director, International Policy Division, MND
Lt. Col. Lee Hoon-ki, Overseas Deployment Policy Officer,
International Policy Division, MND
Col. Kim Young-shik, Chief, Overseas Deployment Branch, JCS
Lt. Col. Lee Won-seok, Overseas Deployment Policy Officer,
Overseas Deployment Branch, ROK JCS
Col. Jun Jin-goo, Assistant Secretary to the President for
National Security Policy
STANTON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MOPS MARR PBTS KS
SUBJECT: MOFAT EQUIVOCAL ABOUT CONTINUING THE ROK PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2007
Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. In a June 7 meeting, DoS and OSD
representatives presented the ROKG with a proposed course of
action for the ROK's continued presence in Afghanistan beyond
2007. In response, Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs
(MOFAT) North America III Division Director Lee Jeong-kyu
acknowledged that the ROK would like to assist in
Afghanistan's security and development, and expressed that
the ROKG had been examining possible ways for it to continue
in Afghanistan. However, the ROKG was very cautious
regarding the U.S. suggestions. Lee stressed that the
security situation in Afghanistan would be a determining
factor in the ROK's continued presence. Furthermore, any
additional ROK troop deployment would be extremely difficult
to achieve given the legislated demand by the National
Assembly for a troop withdrawal by the end of 2007. Lee said
that ROK participation in a Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) was a good possibility, but that the ROKG would prefer
to work with the United States rather than NATO. Lee
expressed more support for continued non-military assistance,
including expanded Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA) aid projects and efforts to improve Korean private
sector development in Afghanistan. End Summary.
--------------
Proposal for a Continued ROK Presence
--------------
2. (C) On June 7, an interagency U.S. team presented ROKG
officials from MOFAT, the Ministry of National Defense (MND),
Blue House (Presidential staff),and the ROK JCS with the
U.S. "Proposal for Continuing the ROK Presence in Afghanistan
Beyond 2007." Recognizing the ROK's valuable contributions
to date and the ROK National Assembly's call for the complete
withdrawal of ROK troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2007,
USG officials noted that much more remains to be done to
assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of
Afghanistan. USG officials called for the ROKG to continue
its military presence, participate in the UN-mandated
NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),and
expand the geographical range of their assistance activities
to meet needs outside of Kabul.
3. (C) DoS ROK Unit Chief Andrew Hyde praised the current
ROK efforts and outlined the five "pillars" of the U.S.
proposal for how the ROK could continue to contribute to the
mission in Afghanistan, asking that the ROK:
- Maintain and expand existing KOICA programs
- Continue operations of its Medical Clinic at Bagram Air
Force Base and consider expanding medical
services outside of Kabul
- Take a lead role in a PRT (working with NATO)
- Train and equip Afghan Forces
- Further encourage Korean business investment in Afghanistan
Hyde requested that the ROKG provide a response on the
proposed future ROK presence in Afghanistan as soon as
possible. He also suggested that the ROKG meet with NATO
headquarters staff in Brussels to learn more about leading a
PRT and consider sending an assessment team to Afghanistan.
4. (C) MOFAT's Lee Jeong-kyu responded that the ROK is
committed to assisting in the stabilization and rebuilding of
Afghanistan. Lee emphasized that the security of ROK
personnel remains of paramount concern for the ROKG.
Regarding the U.S. proposal, Lee said that ROK troops in
Afghanistan would have to be withdrawn by the end of 2007 in
accordance with the National Assembly's mandate, but that the
ROKG was examining how it could continue to contribute to
Afghanistan. Lee also noted that maintaining a ROK troop
presence, or deploying new ROK troops, would be very
difficult to get through the National Assembly.
--------------
KOICA
--------------
5. (C) Lee stressed that Foreign Minister Song Min-soon had
recently reaffirmed the ROK's commitment to assisting in
Afghanistan through KOICA. To date, KOICA has focused on the
construction of much-needed schools, hospitals, power plants,
and rural development projects, Lee said. KOICA's programs
in Afghanistan would continue to expand, but Lee stressed
that the scope and location of its future activities would be
heavily dependent on the security situation in Afghanistan.
--------------
Provincial Reconstruction Team
--------------
6. (C) Lee said that the ROKG was giving serious
consideration to leading a PRT, stating that he "can't
guarantee anything, but it is moving in a positive
direction." However, Lee expressed several concerns about a
ROK led PRT. As with other aspects of continued ROK
involvement in Afghanistan, Lee said the security situation
would heavily influence the ROKG decision to lead or
participate in a PRT. As a result, Lee stressed that
considerable support would be needed to safeguard the
civilian ROK staff if the ROK were to lead a PRT. Lee also
pointed out that the U.S. (and ISAF) preferred PRT location
of Dai Kunde province was very isolated, noting that it was
one of only two provinces yet to receive a PRT and that it
was "perhaps better suited to a country with experience in
leading a PRT." Consequently, Lee explained that the ROKG
would prefer to work with the U.S. on a PRT in another
location, perhaps Parwan, where the U.S. military could
provide security for Korean nationals. Lee added that the
ROKG preferred to work directly with the United States rather
than establish a PRT under NATO's leadership, due to
difficulties the ROKG had already encountered with NATO,s
bureaucracy in trying to gain ISAF membership.
7. (C) Hyde responded that it would be feasible for the ROKG
to work with another country on a PRT operation, but it was
disappointing that the ROKG wanted to work exclusively with
the United States, highlighting that many other countries
were working successfully with NATO in Afghanistan. Hyde
added that the U.S. expectation was that the ROKG would
request the National Assembly authorize sending troops to
assist in providing security for the ROK PRT. Hyde noted
that while the National Assembly mandated that the current
deployment return to the ROK at the end of 2007, this did not
prevent the ROKG from considering a new deployment in 2008.
Lee dismissed the suggestion, saying that "it would be
difficult to propose sending troops to the very country that
we had to pull them out of."
8. (C) Hyde and OSD,s Morgan noted that they could
understand the ROKG's apprehension about navigating the NATO
bureaucracy and offered continued and constant U.S. support
throughout the process. However, Hyde emphasized that "this
is about the Korean role in Afghanistan and in the
international community. We do not want you to limit
yourselves to looking exclusively at PRTs partnered with the
U.S."
--------------
Training and Equipping Afghan Forces
--------------
9. (C) In response to the request to assist in "building an
Afghani army from scratch," ROK JCS Overseas Development
Branch Chief Colonel Kim Young-shik explained that the ROK
military was "exploring feasible ways to keep troops in
Afghanistan," but faced constraints in terms of both the
National Assembly's mandate on troop withdrawal and a limited
availability of resources due to the North Korean
threat. Deploying ROK troops to train and equip Afghan
forces would be difficult, he said. During the meeting it
appeared that there was some confusion on the ROK side. In a
subsequent discussion with Kim after the meeting, LTC
Finnegan clarified the USG position in this area, which
resulted in Kim acknowledging that he misunderstood the
initial request and that he would further consider the idea,
leaving the door open for further discussion.
--------------
Korean Business Investment
--------------
10. (C) According to Lee, current Korean contracts in
Afghanistan totaled approximately USD 270 million. The ROKG
hoped to see an expanded Korean business presence in
Afghanistan, Lee said, while again cautioning that this
expansion would be tied to improved security in the country.
Lee requested the United States share any information
available about how the USG or U.S. companies identify ways
to promote U.S. investment in Afghanistan. OSD's Morgan
noted that such a program was in operation in the United
States and offered to provide the information at a later date.
--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------
11. (U) List of Participants
United States
--------------
Mr. Andrew Hyde, ROK Unit Chief, EAP/K, DoS
Mr. David Wolff, Pol-Mil Chief, DoS/American Embassy Seoul
LTC Michael Finnegan, Senior Country Director for Korea,
ISA/AP, OSD
Ms. Mary Beth Morgan, Korea Country Director, ISA/IA OSD
LCDR Kevin Aanestad, Korea Desk Officer, NEA Div J5, JCS
Major Marc Acosta, J5, USFK
Mr. Jordan Heiber, DoS/American Embassy Seoul
Republic of Korea
--------------
Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America III Division, MOFAT
Mr. Kim Chang-sik, Director, Security Policy Division, MOFAT
Mr. Lee Yong-soo, Director, Development Cooperation Division,
MOFAT
Mr. Lee Han-sang, Second Secretary, Southwest Asia and Oceana
Division, MOFAT
Mr. Park Sung-il, Second Secretary, North America Division
III, MOFAT
Mr. Kim Jung-sup Director, International Policy Division, MND
Lt. Col. Lee Hoon-ki, Overseas Deployment Policy Officer,
International Policy Division, MND
Col. Kim Young-shik, Chief, Overseas Deployment Branch, JCS
Lt. Col. Lee Won-seok, Overseas Deployment Policy Officer,
Overseas Deployment Branch, ROK JCS
Col. Jun Jin-goo, Assistant Secretary to the President for
National Security Policy
STANTON